Fabrication and Characterization of PZT-PAni/PVDF Based Nanocomposite

This work presents the preparation and characterization of PZT ceramic obtained by the polymeric precursor method (PPM). The influence of the synthesis method on the grain size and the morphology are also object of study. The fabrication and characterization of composite films with 0-3 connectivity, immersing nanoparticles of PZT into the non-polar poly(vinylidene fluoride) -PVDF as the polymer matrix were presented. For comparison there are results obtained with composite samples made of ceramic particles unrecovered and recovered with a conducting polymer, the polyaniline (PAni).

Velero de Competición IMOCA OPEN 60

TIPO DE BUQUE: velero de competición IMOCA OPEN 60 CONSTRUCCIÓN: materiales compuestos ESLORA: LOA mayor de 59’ (17.938 m) y menor de 60’ (18.288) CALADO: máximo de 4.5 m CLASIFICACIÓN Y COTA: 2007 IMOCA Open60 Rule. ABS guide for building and classing offshore yachts. ISAF Offshore Special Regulations, category 0 VELOCIDAD A MOTOR: 8 nudos al 90% MCR SISTEMA DE PROPULSIÓN: motor diesel de potencia 37 CV. Hélice de 3 palas OTROS REQUERIMIENTOS: sólo competición, estudio del comportamiento en la mar en condiciones oceánicas. Insumergibilidad. Sistema de orza pivotante. Vela spinnaker asimétrica para vientos portantes

Hostages to Moscow, clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes. OSW Study 10/2014

The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- -2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global superpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an approach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was taken into account in this publication. The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the probable course of events in the security dimension following 2014. The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the international arena, and its internal developments).

Ever further from Moscow. Russia's stance on Central Asia. OSW Study 48/2014

The post-Soviet countries of Central Asia are important for Moscow as a potential source of danger; as a site of its relationships with China, the West and the Islamic world; and not least as a space covered by Russia’s integration initiatives. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian influence in this region has undergone a far-reaching erosion. The Kremlin’s consistent actions to build up the Eurasian Union, as well as the threat of destabilisation in region after the ISAF operation in Afghanistan winds up in 2014, have slowed down this process, although it is unlikely to be reversed. The current ‘state of possession’ (i.e. the instruments and assets which Russia possesses) still ensures Moscow a minimum level of control over the region, which means that the activity of other global players is limited. This situation may change in tandem with a rise in their ambitions, especially with the possible involvement of China in the field of ‘hard’ security.

Central Asian Islamism in the spotlight. EUCAM Commentary No. 13, June 2011

In recent years, terrorist actions have increased in Central Asia, especially in the two weakest states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and on the Uzbek side of the Ferghana Valley. The killing of Osama bin Laden by US special forces has raised fears of a possible backlash from his supporters and a new wave of terror across a large area surrounding Afghanistan. Now the Taliban have warned Kazakhstan – Central Asia's most successful economy and largest oil producer which has to date avoided the Islamist violence that has affected its Central Asian neighbours – of the dangers of entering the war on Afghanistan after the Kazakh parliament decided to send troops to join the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) war efforts.

Shades of CORDS in the Kush : the false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency /

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.