The role of rural land in mixed asset investment portfolios

Rural land has not always been considered as a major long-term investment with both institutional investors and absentee owners in countries such as U.K. and Australia. Although rural land is included in both single asset and mixed asset portfolios in the U.S, it is not at the same levels as either commercial or industrial property. Rural land occupies over 50% of the total area of Australia, and comprises over 115,000 economic farm properties (excludes rural residential, hobby farms and rural lifestyle blocks. However, less than 1.6% of the total economic farm numbers are actually owned by corporate or institutional investors. This low level of corporate involvement in the Australian rural property market has limited both the investment performance research and inclusion of this rural land type in both property and mixed asset investment portfolios. In the U.S. rural land is also the most extensive real estate type based on total area occupied. The United States Department of Agriculture statistics (1998) show that in 1997 there were 2.06 million farms in the U.S., covering 968 million acres, with a total value of $912 billion and generating an annual income of $202 billion. The level of corporate ownership of farms in the U.S. is also higher than the level of corporate farm ownership in Australia. This high level of institutional ownership in rural land in U.S has provided the opportunity for the rural property asset class to be analysed in relation to it’s investment performance and possible role in a mixed asset or mixed property investment portfolio.

Role of timberland in us investment portfolios

Timberland is now regarded as a long-term investment with both institutional investors and absentee owners. This paper utilises the NCREIF Timberland index to examine the performance of US timberland over the period of 1987-1999. US timberland was found to provide significant risk reduction and portfolio diversification benefits in the portfolio resulting from the low risk and low correlation with stocks and bonds. Timberland was also found to make a significant contribution to a portfolio of stocks, bonds and real estate, particularly at low to midrange portfolio risk levels.

Short-termism : challenges and resolutions

The global financial crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of our economy to systemic risks. While its causes are numerous and relate to complex problems deeply embedded in capital markets, ‘short-termism’ (excessive focus on short-term outcomes at the expense of long-term wealth creation and sustainability) has frequently been flagged as a major contributor to this crisis. Although short-termism is not new, the global financial crisis has highlighted the presence of short-termism among institutional investors, and the failure of global markets and regulators to deal with such perverse and destructive behaviour (Guyatt 2009). Solutions are clearly needed. Although there is a body of research that provides evidence of the presence of short-termism in capital markets and the consequences of short-term decision-making on the financial wellbeing of both individuals and organisations, there is no consensus on mitigating solutions to short-termism. What emerges from the literature is the need to take a broad interdisciplinary perspective in seeking solutions to the problem.

Building a successful partnership to increase affordable rental housing supply in Queensland

Accessibility to housing for low to moderate income groups in Australia has been experiencing a severe decline since 2001. On the supply side, the public sector has been reducing its commitment to the direct provision of public housing. Despite high demand for affordable housing, there has been limited supply generated by non-government housing providers. One possible solution to promote an increase in affordable housing supply, like other infrastructure, is through the development of multi-stakeholder partnerships and private financing. This research aims to identify current issues underlying decision-making criteria for building multi-stakeholder partnerships to deliver affordable housing projects. It also investigates strategies for minimising risk and ensuring the financial outcomes of these partnership arrangements. A mix of qualitative in-depth interviews and quantitative surveys has been used as the main method to explore stakeholder experiences regarding their involvement in partnership arrangements in the affordable housing sector in Queensland. Two sets of interviews were conducted following an exploratory pilot study: one set in 2003-2004 and the other in 2007-2008. There were nineteen respondents representing government, private and not-for-profit organisations in the first stage interviews and surveys. The second stage interviews were focussed on twenty-two housing providers in South East Queensland. Initial analyses have been conducted using thematic and statistical analyses. This study extends the use of existing decision making tools and combines the use of a Soft System Framework to analyse the ideal state questionnaires using qualitative thematic analysis. Soft System Methodology (SSM) has been used to analyse this unstructured complex problem by using systematic thinking to develop a conceptual model and carrying it to the real world situations to solve the problem. This research found that the diversity of stakeholder capability and their level of risk acceptance will allow partnerships to develop the best synergies and a degree of collaboration which achieves the required financial return within acceptable risk parameters. However, some of the negativity attached to future commitment to such partnerships has been found to be the anticipation of a worse outcome than that expected from independent action. Many interviewees agree that housing providers' fear of financial risk and community rejection has been central to dampening their enthusiasm for entering such investment projects. The creation of a mixed-use development structure will mitigate both risk and return as the commercial income will subsidise the affordable housing development and will normalise concentration of marginalised low-income people who live in a prime location with an award winning design. In addition, tenant support schemes and rent-to-buy incentive programs will encourage them to secure their tenancies and significantly reduce the risk of rent arrears and property damage. There is also a breakthrough investment vehicle offered by the social developer which sells the non-physical but financial product to individual and institutional investors to mitigate further financial risk. Finally, this study recommends modification of the current value-for-money framework in favour of broader partnership arrangements which are more closely aligned with risk minimisation strategies.

Disclosure of proxy voting information by Australian managed investment schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Comission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practises. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.

Stakeholder pressures and climate change disclosure : Australian evidence

This paper investigates the stakeholder pressures behind corporate accountability and disclosures in relation to climate change. By means of a questionnaire survey, the study focuses on ascertaining the views of a sample of stakeholder groups such as government bodies, institutional investors, environmental NGOs, media accounting professionals, and researchers to examine their perceptions of pressures upon Australian corporations to be accountable in relation to climate change. Prior social and environmental research found that NGOs (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Tilt, 1994) and the media (Brown and Deegan, 1996; Islam and Deegan, 2010) were powerful stakeholder groups influencing corporate social and environmental disclosure practices. Our paper finds that along with NGOs and the media, institutional investors and regulators (governments) are equally important and powerful actors for applying pressure for corporate accountability in relation to climate change. Based on the findings of the paper, we would argue that climate change is an issue with no single stakeholder group involved, rather it is a set of stakeholder groups including regulators, institutional investors, the media, and NGOs who demand corporations to be accountable.

Stakeholder pressures on corporate climate change-related accountability and disclosures: Australian evidence

This study investigates stakeholder pressures on corporate climate change-related accountability and disclosure practices in Australia. While existing scholarship investigates stakeholder pressures on companies to discharge their broader accountability through general social and environmental disclosures, there is a lack of research investigating whether and how stakeholder pressures emerge to influence accountability and disclosure practices related to climate change. We surveyed various stakeholder groups to understand their concerns about climate change-related corporate accountability and disclosure practices. We present three primary findings: first, while NGOs and the media have some influence, institutional investors and government bodies (regulators) are perceived to be the most powerful stakeholders in generating climate change-related concern and coercive pressure on corporations to be accountable. Second, corporate climate change-related disclosures, as documented through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), are positively associated with such perceived coercive pressures. Lastly, we find a positive correlation between the level of media attention to climate change and Australian corporate responses to the CDP. Our results indicate that corporations will not disclose climate change information until pressured by non-financial stakeholders. This suggests a larger role for non-financial actors than previously theorized, with several policy implications.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Le traitement des porteurs minoritaires de titres de sociétés par actions publiques dans un contexte transactionnel : où en sommes-nous?

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en Droit (LL.M) Option Droit des Affaires"

Comparative Lessons on Corporate law and CSR: Hard Law as Solution? Do the French offer the way ahead?

This paper provides a comparative analysis of corporate law and CSR and asks whether there are lessons for Australia from corporate law and CSR developments in France. This presentation presents a summary of the provisions of the new French Act Number 2010-788 passed on 12 July 2010 – called “Grenelle 2” –. Firstly, article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes the Commercial Code to extend the reach of non-financial reporting and to ensure its pertinence. Secondly, article 227 Law’s Grenelle 2 amends certain provisions of the Commercial and Environmental Codes and incorporates into substantive law the liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries. In fine, article 224 of Law’s Grenelle 2 reinforces the pressure on the market to act in a responsible manner. It modifies article 214-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to compel institutional investors (mutual funds and fund management companies) to take social, environmental and governance criteria into account in their investment policy.

L’activisme actionnarial : une perspective canadienne

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires.

Gobierno corporativo y protección jurídica de los accionistas minoritarios en las sociedades anónimas en Colombia

Verificar el estado actual de la protección al accionista minoritario, tendiendo como objeto de estudio la sociedad anónima, por razones naturales de alternativas posibles de financiación

La disonancia cognitiva y trampa de la memoria en decisiones de Inversión: caso colombiano

Este documento es el resultado de una investigación bajo el enfoque de Finanzas Corporativas del Comportamiento, disciplina relevante en el mundo financiero desde el 2002 y que hasta el momento poco se ha investigado en Colombia. Esta difiere del supuesto tradicional de la racionalidad de los individuos en la toma de decisiones financieras, ya que pueden ser influenciadas por sesgos cognitivos y emocionales que la teoría ortodoxa no tiene en cuenta en sus supuestos. Esta investigación busca indagar, desde el punto de vista conceptual y mediante el análisis de resultados de estudio de campo con operadores del mercado bursátil colombiano, sobre la posible presencia de elementos comportamentales en las decisiones de inversión. Los sesgos que se evaluaron fueron: disonancia cognitiva, heurístico de disponibilidad y sesgo de confirmación. Para la recolección de fuentes primarias, una encuesta fue enviada a los operadores Colombianos, categorizados en operadores con experiencia y operadores jóvenes. Después del filtro, 142 encuestas fueron seleccionadas para el análisis. Los principales hallazgos fueron que los jóvenes son más propensos a experimentar disonancia cognitiva y heurístico de disponibilidad y en ambas categorías, los sesgos analizados influencian medianamente la toma de decisiones de inversión.

The impact of real estate on the terminal wealth of the UK mixed-asset portfolio

The argument for the inclusion of real estate in the mixed-asset portfolio has concentrated on examining its effect in reducing the portfolio risk - the time series standard deviation (TSSD), mainly using ex-post time series data. However, the past as such is not really relevant to the long-term institutional investors, such as the insurance companies and pension funds, who are more concerned the terminal wealth (TW) of their investments and the variability of this wealth, the terminal wealth standard deviation (TWSD), since it is from the TW of their investment portfolio that policyholders and pensioners will derive their benefits. These kinds of investors with particular holding period requirements will be less concerned about the within period volatility of their portfolios and more by the possibility that their portfolio returns will fail to finance their liabilities. This variability in TW will be closely linked to the risk of shortfall in the quantity of assets needed to match the institution’s liabilities. The question remains therefore can real estate enhance the TW of the mixed-asset portfolio and/or reduce the variability of the TW. This paper uses annual data from the United Kingdom (UK) for the period 1972-2001 to test whether real estate is an asset class that not only reduces ex-post portfolio risk but also enhances portfolio TW and/or reduces the variability of TW.

Country, sector and regional factors in European property returns

For those portfolio managers who follow a top-down approach to fund management when they are trying to develop a pan-European investment strategy they need to know which are the most important factors affecting property returns, so as to concentrate their management and research efforts accordingly. In order to examine this issue this paper examines the relative importance of country, sector and regional effects in determining property returns across Europe using the largest database of individual property returns currently available. Using annual data over the period 1996 to 2002 for a sample of over 25,000 properties the results show that the country-specific effects dominate sector-specific factors, which in turn dominate the regional-specific factors. This is true even for different sub-sets of countries and sectors. In other words, real estate returns are mainly determined by local (country specific) conditions and are only mildly affected by general European factors. Thus, for those institutional investors contemplating investment into Europe the first level of analysis must be an examination of the individual countries, followed by the prospects of the property sectors within the country and then an assessment of the differences in expected performance between the main city and the rest of the country.