The Path to Universal Healthcare: White Paper on Universal Health Insurance

  The Government is committed to ending the unfair, unequal and inefficient two-tier health system and to introducing a single-tier system, supported by universal health insurance The Government will achieve a single-tier system via a multi-payer model of universal health insurance (UHI), in line with the Programme for Government (PfG), involving competing private health insurers and a State-owned VHI. UHI will be gradually rolled out over several years, with full implementation by 2019 at the latest. Click here to download the White Paper (PDF, 1.5mb) Read the UHI Explained document (PDF, 200kb). See the stakeholder briefing (PDF, 400kb)

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2013

This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the insurers support, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The Phase 1 report contains 32 recommendations under 9 headings as follows: Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation. Some of the key recommendations to drive down costs are can be summarised as follows: Controlling costs in private health insurance Care settings and use of resources Age structure of the market Clinical audit and utilisation management Industry approach to private psychiatry Fraud, waste and abuse Chronic disease management Claims processing Admission and discharge procedures and processes. Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation.

Report to the Minister for Health and Children on Risk Equalisation in the Irish Private Health Insurance Market

Provision for risk equalisation was first made in the Health Insurance Act, 1994, section 12 of which empowered the Minister to prescribe a scheme for risk equalisation. A Risk Equalsiation Scheme was introduced in 2003. In December 2005, the Minister decided, on the Authorityâ?Ts recommendation, which referred to risks now materialising, to commence risk equalisation payments under the Scheme as from 1 January 2006, but in the event the relevant legislation was overturned by the Courts in 2008. Download document here

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014

5.11.2014 This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the support of the health insurers, and the Health Insurance Authority, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The work of the Group has been conducted in two phases, with the first phase report published on 26 December 2013. The Phase 1 report sets out the context, establishment, membership and terms of reference for both phases of the Groups work.  The report also outlines the legislative provisions for private health insurance in Ireland, the objectives of both phases of the review and the approach and methodology followed. Phase 2 of the process focused on the compilation and analysis by the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) of claims data to assess the cost drivers for health insurance, the effects of medical technology and innovations on costs, and claims processing issues.The report and submissions from relevant stakeholders which were examined and considered under the Phase 2 Review can be downloaded below. Download the Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014 -  Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council here. Submissions received HSE Submission to Pat McLoughlin, Chair of Review Group IHAI submission 11 April 2014 IHCA submission to Chair 1 May 2014 Insurance Ireland submission Society of Actuaries in Ireland submission St. Patricks Mental Health Services submission April 2014 St John of Gods Submission        

Fécondation in vitro: intérêt et désavantage du remboursement par l'assurance maladie en Suisse [In-vitro fertilization: advantage and disadvantage of covering the costs of IVF/ICSI by the health insurance in Switzerland]

In-vitro fertilization: advantage and disadvantage of covering the costs of IVF/CSI by the health insurance in Switzerland The reimbursement of certain infertility treatments (stimulation with/without insemination) whereas IVF/ICSI is not leads patients with an indication of IVF to prefer treatments of low efficacy. The costs of multiple pregnancies issued by reimbursed or non-reimbursed fertility treatments are paid by the society. There should be measures to reduce these costs and to take the money used today to pay the complications of infertility treatments to reimburse IVF. The efficacy of such a system (single embryo transfer) has been proven in Belgium since several years. The dangers of complete reimbursement (IVF treatment in cases without any chances of success, only because it is for free) can be avoided by an Efficacy and Safety Board.

Social and medical vulnerability factors of emergency department frequent users in a universal health insurance system.

OBJECTIVES: The objectives were to identify the social and medical factors associated with emergency department (ED) frequent use and to determine if frequent users were more likely to have a combination of these factors in a universal health insurance system. METHODS: This was a retrospective chart review case-control study comparing randomized samples of frequent users and nonfrequent users at the Lausanne University Hospital, Switzerland. The authors defined frequent users as patients with four or more ED visits within the previous 12 months. Adult patients who visited the ED between April 2008 and March 2009 (study period) were included, and patients leaving the ED without medical discharge were excluded. For each patient, the first ED electronic record within the study period was considered for data extraction. Along with basic demographics, variables of interest included social (employment or housing status) and medical (ED primary diagnosis) characteristics. Significant social and medical factors were used to construct a logistic regression model, to determine factors associated with frequent ED use. In addition, comparison of the combination of social and medical factors was examined. RESULTS: A total of 359 of 1,591 frequent and 360 of 34,263 nonfrequent users were selected. Frequent users accounted for less than a 20th of all ED patients (4.4%), but for 12.1% of all visits (5,813 of 48,117), with a maximum of 73 ED visits. No difference in terms of age or sex occurred, but more frequent users had a nationality other than Swiss or European (n = 117 [32.6%] vs. n = 83 [23.1%], p = 0.003). Adjusted multivariate analysis showed that social and specific medical vulnerability factors most increased the risk of frequent ED use: being under guardianship (adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 15.8; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.7 to 147.3), living closer to the ED (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 2.8 to 7.6), being uninsured (adjusted OR = 2.5; 95% CI = 1.1 to 5.8), being unemployed or dependent on government welfare (adjusted OR = 2.1; 95% CI = 1.3 to 3.4), the number of psychiatric hospitalizations (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 1.5 to 14.1), and the use of five or more clinical departments over 12 months (adjusted OR = 4.5; 95% CI = 2.5 to 8.1). Having two of four social factors increased the odds of frequent ED use (adjusted = OR 5.4; 95% CI = 2.9 to 9.9), and similar results were found for medical factors (adjusted OR = 7.9; 95% CI = 4.6 to 13.4). A combination of social and medical factors was markedly associated with ED frequent use, as frequent users were 10 times more likely to have three of them (on a total of eight factors; 95% CI = 5.1 to 19.6). CONCLUSIONS: Frequent users accounted for a moderate proportion of visits at the Lausanne ED. Social and medical vulnerability factors were associated with frequent ED use. In addition, frequent users were more likely to have both social and medical vulnerabilities than were other patients. Case management strategies might address the vulnerability factors of frequent users to prevent inequities in health care and related costs.

Getting Ready to Retire: Health Insurance Issues, December 2006

Before making the decision to retire, understand the health insurance options available to you (and your spouse if you are married). Which questions you need to ask depends on: • how old you are. • how old your spouse is. • whether you or your spouse is eligible for Medicare. • whether you or your spouse will continue to be employed. • how many employees the employer has.

COBRA: Continuation of Employer Group Health Insurance, March 2007

COBRA stands for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act *COBRA is not insurance; it is the law, since 1985. COBRA allows employees and their dependents to continue employer group health insurance for several months when that insurance would usually end. *Insurance plans under COBRA are private health plans, not plans sold by the government. *The U.S. Departments of Labor and Treasury enforce COBRA.

Demand for private health insurance: Is there a quality gap?

Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand forvoluntary private health insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems(NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the influence of the qualitygap between public and private health insurance and other demanddeterminants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI ismodelled as a demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the development of a link between thetheoretical and the empirical model dealing with unobserved heterogeneityand endogeneity issues. Results suggest that a rise in PHI qualityenhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equalreduction of NHS quality. Income and price elasticity estimates areconsistent with the observed feature that PHI appears to be a luxurygood and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief'sand monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.

COBRA: Continuation of Employer Group Health Insurance, 2007

Medicare Deductible, co-insurance and premiuns form, and rescription drugs plans.

Social and medical vulnerability factors of emergency department frequent users in a universal health insurance system

Objectifs - Identifier les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux associés au recours multiple aux consultations des urgences. - Déterminer si les patients à recours multiple sont plus à même de combiner ces facteurs dans un système d'assurance universelle. Méthode Il s'agit d'une étude cas-contrôle rétrospective basée sur l'étude de dossiers médico-administratifs comparant des échantillons randomisés de patients à recours multiple à des patients n'appartenant pas à cette catégorie, au sein des urgences du Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois et de la Policlinique Médicale Universitaire de Lausanne. Les auteurs ont défini les patients à recours multiple comme comptabilisant au moins quatre consultations aux urgences durant les douze mois précédents. Les patients adultes (>18 ans) ayant consulté les urgences entre avril 2008 et mars 2009 (période d'étude) étaient inclus ; ceux quittant les urgences sans décharge médicale étaient exclus. Pour chaque patient, le premier dossier d'urgence informatisé inclus dans la période d'étude était sélectionné pour l'extraction des données. Outre les variables démographiques de base, les variables d'intérêt comprennent des caractéristiques sociales (emploi, type de résidence) et médicales (diagnostic principal aux urgences). Les facteurs sociaux et médicaux significatifs ont été utilisés dans la construction d'un modèle de régression logistique, afin de déterminer les facteurs associés avec le recours multiple aux urgences. De plus, la combinaison des facteurs sociaux et médicaux a été étudiée. Résultats Au total, 359/Γ591 patients à recours multiple et 360/34'263 contrôles ont été sélectionnés. Les patients à recours multiple représentaient moins d'un vingtième de tous les patients des urgences (4.4%), mais engendraient 12.1% de toutes les consultations (5'813/48'117), avec un record de 73 consultations. Aucune différence en termes d'âge ou de genre n'est apparue, mais davantage de patients à recours multiples étaient d'une nationalité autre que suisse ou européenne (n=117 [32.6%] vs n=83 [23.1%], p=0.003). L'analyse multivariée a montré que les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux les plus fortement associés au recours multiple aux urgences étaient : être sous tutelle (Odds ratio [OR] ajusté = 15.8; intervalle de confiance [IC] à 95% = 1.7 à 147.3), habiter plus proche des urgences (OR ajusté = 4.6; IC95% = 2.8 à 7.6), être non assuré (OR ajusté = 2.5; IC95% = 1.1 à 5.8), être sans emploi ou dépendant de l'aide sociale (OR ajusté = 2.1; IC95% = 1.3 à 3.4), le nombre d'hospitalisations psychiatriques (OR ajusté = 4.6; IC95% = 1.5 à 14.1), ainsi que le recours à au moins cinq départements cliniques différents durant une période de douze mois (OR ajusté = 4.5; IC95% = 2.5 à 8.1). Le fait de comptabiliser deux sur quatre facteurs sociaux augmente la vraisemblance du recours multiple aux urgences (OR ajusté = 5.4; IC95% = 2.9 à 9.9) ; des résultats similaires ont été trouvés pour les facteurs médicaux (OR ajusté = 7.9; IC95% = 4.6 à 13.4). La combinaison de facteurs sociaux et médicaux est fortement associée au recours multiple aux urgences, puisque les patients à recours multiple étaient dix fois plus à même d'en comptabiliser trois d'entre eux (sur un total de huit facteurs, IC95% = 5.1 à 19.6). Conclusion Les patients à recours multiple aux urgences représentent une proportion modérée des consultations aux urgences du Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois et de la Policlinique Médicale Universitaire de Lausanne. Les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux sont associés au recours multiple aux urgences. En outre, les patients à recours multiple sont plus à même de combiner les vulnérabilités sociale et médicale que les autres. Des stratégies basées sur le case management pourraient améliorer la prise en charge des patients à recours multiple avec leurs vulnérabilités afin de prévenir les inégalités dans le système de soins ainsi que les coûts relatifs.

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data.

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Insurance Fraud Alert, 2011

Do not let anyone use your personal information from your car or health insurance policy to file a fraudulent insurance claim of any kind.