International procurement code [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Procurement of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ... April 3 and 12, 1979.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

"Streamlined auditing and monitoring of community based services: first steps toward a more efficient system for providers, state government, and the community" : report to the Illinois General Assembly as required by PA 96-1141 /

The Steering Committee recognizes that the Departments may need to implement reviews necessary to address specific Federal requirements and that while consolidated reporting should be used when possible, the review and reporting processes should facilitate the ability to garner Federal funding. However, the analysis thus far confirms the need for change and a significant potential to reduce redundant monitoring and reporting. At the end of this Executive Summary, there is a summary presentation, including a timeline and progress indicators, that gives more details on these recommendations.

Additional information on the Social Security Administration's management of data communications contracts with Paradyne Corporation.

"B-213963."

1960 government program shipments total 30 percent of agricultural exports /

Caption title.

The influence of Government antidiscrimination programs : actual vs. potential impact /

Cover title.

Contracting officer representatives : managing the government's technical experts to achieve positive contract outcomes.

"A report to the President and Congress of the United States by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board."

Bibliography on Government procurement and contractual procedure and related material [prepared by the] Law Branch, the Army Library, Mar. 1953. Rev.

Cover title.

Equitable distribution of R. & D. funds by Government agencies : hearings ... Eighty-ninth Congress, second session.

Pt. 1 not named as such.

Continued investigation into fraud and mismanagement in General Services Administration : hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices and Open Government of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, October 2, 1980, Part 6.

Mode of access: Internet.

National Defense Program: Contracts and Expenditures

Title varies: June-July 1940, National Defense Program: Contracts and Awards; July 12,1941, National Defense Program: Contract Award Listing

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Exploring foreign market access in government procurement

Using unexplored Japanese and Swiss public procurement data over 1990-2003, we examine the effect of macroeconomic, political economy, procurement-specific and domestic policy factors on governments’ sourcing decisions. We also provide for an empirical test of Baldwin's (1970, 1984) "neutrality proposition" and for the effectiveness of the WTO's Uruguay Round Agreement on Government Procurement (URGPA) in increasing foreign market access. Our results suggest the importance of the magnitude of procurement demand, domestic firm attributes and unobserved sector-specific heterogeneity in these governments' purchases from abroad. However, the expected impact of traditional macroeconomic variables and political budget cycles does not come through in our results. Public and private sector imports do not offset each other in our analyses for Japan and only selectively for Switzerland. Finally, membership of the GPA is only found to increase the value of foreign procurement in Switzerland, though it seems to increase the import demand for contracts in both countries.

Services Procurement under the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement: Whither Market Access?

This paper studies the government procurement of services from foreign suppliers by conducting a statistical analysis of data submitted by Japan and Switzerland to the WTO's Committee on Government Procurement. Using several metrics, the paper examines if the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has led to greater market access for foreign suppliers in services procurement. Our results indicate that despite the GPA, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have declined over time for both countries and in the absence of this decline, the value of services contracts awarded to foreign firms would have been more than 15 times higher in the case of Japan and nearly 68 times more in the case of Switzerland. We also find that for the same services categories, at least the Japanese government is not purchasing as much from abroad as it's private sector is importing from the rest of the world, a finding that further points to the home-bias in that government's public purchase decisions.

Evaluating Methods of Calculating the Fixed Fee on Professional Service Contracts

The South Carolina Department of Transportation routinely retains Professional Consulting Engineering firms to provide engineering design and related professional services for the preparation of construction plans or design-build Request for Proposal bid packages for a wide variety of Federal-aid Highway Program roadway and bridge construction projects throughout South Carolina.The purpose of this project is to examine the current process of determining a "Fair and Reasonable" fixed fee for professional service contracts and to evaluate possible alternative methods including practices in other states that may improve the process, particularly in light of the considerable variation in audited overhead rates among consulting firms. In reviewing such alternative methods particular attention will be given to evaluating the potential impact of the method as an incentive to consulting firms to effectively manage their overhead costs.