The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy

Includes bibliography

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

Myanmar Sugar SMEs: History, Technology, Location and Government Policy

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged in sugar processing in Myanmar appeared in the last decade of the socialist era. An acute sugar deficit, restricted trade in white sugar, and high demand from the conventional dairy business led to the growth of sugar SMEs by appropriate blending of semi-finished products (syrup) in the fields, which were then processed in vacuum pans and centrifugals to obtain white sugar. This became a tradable commodity and sugar SMEs grew in clusters in big cities. They are family-owned businesses. However, they lack the bagasse-based power generation. In recent years, large modern sugar factories operated by private and military companies have emerged as key players. The current shortage of fuel feedstock and competition for raw materials have become driving forces that shift sugar SMEs from market-oriented to raw material-oriented locations. Internal competition among key players made sugar price highly volatile, too. Being placed on a level playing field, the whole industry should be upgraded in terms of price and quality to become export-oriented.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

Competition for procurement shares

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.

International competition of the Carnegie Foundation : the Palace of Peace at the Hague : the 6 premiated and 40 other designs chosen by the Society of Architecture at Amsterdam and reproduced under its direction.

Vignette by K. Sluyterman on portfolio cover, fasc. wrappers, and t.p.

Government's role in economic competitiveness : hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, first session.

"June 8, 9, 1987"--Pt. 2.

Deregulation, competition policy and intra-professional contests in medical education

This paper investigates how government policy directions embracing deregulation and market liberalism, together with significant pre-existing tensions within the Australian medical profession, produced ground breaking change in the funding and delivery of medical education for general practitioners. From an initial view between and within the medical profession, and government, about the goal of improving the standards of general practice education and training, segments of the general practice community, particularly those located in rural and remote settings, displayed increasingly vocal concerns about the approach and solutions proffered by the predominantly urban-influenced Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP). The extent of dissatisfaction culminated in the establishment of the Australian College of Rural and Remote Medicine (ACRRM) in 1997 and the development of an alternative curriculum for general practice. This paper focuses on two decades of changes in general practice training and how competition policy acted as a justificatory mechanism for putting general practice education out to competitive tender against a background of significant intra-professional conflict. The government's interest in increasing efficiency and deregulating the 'closed shop' practices of professions, as expressed through national competition policy, ultimately exposed the existing antagonisms within the profession to public view and allowed the government some influence on the sacred cow of professional training. Government policy has acted as a mechanism of resolution for long standing grievances of the rural GPs and propelled professional training towards an open competition model. The findings have implications for future research looking at the unanticipated outcomes of competition and internal markets.

Technology transfer and Chinese government policy:opportunities and implications for business

State-owned enterprises in China have been given greater autonomy and responsibility, have freer access to foreign technology, and are being encouraged to form groups to gain from rationalization and integration. This article uses case studies to identify the key strategic issues that affect the commercial viability of foreign technology acquisition by state-owned enterprises within the context of enterprise reforms. All the case study enterprises used technology transfer to develop new or improved products. Technologies acquired as parts of subcontracting arrangements and well-established technologies to produce end-use products are easier to manage and operate profitably. However, the latter type of technology has been imported by numerous enterprises and has led to fierce competition and industy restructuring. Importing capital-intensive and complex technology to produce major components for products, such as cars, is more difficult and requires closer coordination with customers and suppliers.

Organised for inward investment? Development agencies, local government, and firms in the inward investment process

Inward investment promotion and aftercare remain central aspects of local economic development for English Regional Development Agencies, Scottish and Welsh development bodies, and local authorities in Britain. In many cases, partnership and consultation mechanisms have become integral to attracting inward investment and providing aftercare. Inward investment is thus an important area in which to explore interinstitutional relations between agents operating along diverse spatial boundaries and with different responsibilities. In this paper we analyse the local and regional institutional structures and relations characterising the inward investment process in Britain using new survey data from local authorities, regional bodies, and inward investors. We find that promotional activities have clearly defined structures which are chiefly led by the regional level. Aftercare is characterised by more collaborative arrangements involving both regional bodies and local government. However, many bodies are little used, with competition and tension between partners remaining frequent within English regions, regardless of recent institutional changes designed to reduce such problems. In Scotland and Wales, however, their national institutions are not only widely used, but they create high levels of satisfaction from firms. Hence, England has yet to respond to the effective challenges of Scotland and Wales. The analysis also highlights the limited importance of all national, regional, and local public institutions in attracting inward investors and their subsequent aftercare. The critical inputs to business decisions appear to be driven chiefly by more general supply-side conditions (for example, general skills versus local public packages) and the general attractions of a particular location.

From bilateral to trilateral governance in local government contracting in France

In France, the tradition of contracting out local public services has been predominantly one of partnership and co-operation rather than competition and antagonism. However, in recent years the traditional approach has come under intense criticism, something which has far-reaching implications for public-private governance. Adopting the socio-legal approach to the study of contract governance set out by Peter Vincent-Jones, this paper explores the discrepancy between descriptions of a traditional French approach to local public services governance, in which the bilateral values of trust and co-operation are emphasized, and a new discourse of local public services governance, which argues for detailed contract planning and close contract monitoring. It is argued that this discrepancy reveals the beginning of a shift in the governance of public service exchange relationships from relatively noncontractual and bilateral to relatively contractual and trilateral. The French case highlights the importance of regulatory and accountability frameworks to the manner in which contracting parties perceive exchange governance. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.

A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága (Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and community economics: some lessons from the theory of tax competition)

Mennyiben képes jelenleg a közösségi gazdaságtan az adópolitikák nemzetek fölötti centralizációjára vonatkozó politikai döntések megalapozására? Válaszunk röviden az lesz, hogy a közösségi gazdaságtan főárama - noha számos releváns gazdasági és politikai tényező hatását sikeresen elemzi - jelenleg nem kínál kielégítőnek tekinthető döntési kritériumokat a döntéshozók számára. Ennek oka, hogy központi szerepet játszik benne egy, a modellek szempontjából exogén és a közgazdasági elmélettől idegen tényező: a kormányzatok jóindulatára, pontosabban annak mértékére vonatkozó premissza. Tanulmányunk az adóverseny fiskális föderalista elméletét vizsgálja, és megpróbál általánosabb szinten is a közszektor gazdaságelméletének jelenlegi állapotára, valamint továbbfejlesztésére vonatkozó tanulságokat levonni. A kiutat az elméleti zsákutcából a kormányzati működés és döntéshozatal, valamint a kívánatos gazdaságpolitikai döntések elméletének összekapcsolása jelentheti. Erre megtörténtek az első kísérletek, de a szisztematikus és átfogó elemzés egyelőre várat magára. / === / How far can community economics provide a basis for political decision-making on supranational centralization of taxation policies? The short answer here will be that although the mainstream of community economics succeeds in analysing many relevant economic and political factors, it fails at present to provide satisfactory criteria for decisionmakers. This is because a central role is played in it by a factor exogenous to the models and alien to economic theory: the premise of the measure of goodwill from governments. The study examines the fiscal federalist theory of tax competition. It tries to draw conclusions, on a more general level, about the present state of the economic theory of the public sector and future development of it. The way out of the theoretical blind alley could be to link the theories of government operation and decision-making and of desirable economic-policy decision-making. The first attempts to do so have been made, but a systematic and comprehensive analysis is still awaited.