Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Community empowerment or a strategy of containment? Evaluating neighbourhood governance in the city of Westminster

The longstanding emphasis on the neighbourhood as a scale for intervention and action has given rise to a variety of forms of governance with a number of different rationales. The predominant rationales about the purpose of neighbourhood governance are encapsulated in a fourfold typology developed by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008). This article sets out to test this approach by drawing on an evaluation of neighbourhood initiatives in the City of Westminster which were delivered through a third sector organisation, the Paddington Development Trust. ‘Insider’ perspectives gathered at city and neighbourhood levels regarding the infrastructure for neighbourhood management are discussed and evaluated in the light of these rationales. The conclusions, while broadly reflecting Lowndes and Sullivan and a follow-up study of Manchester, suggest that in Westminster the civic and economic rationales tend to predominate. However, the Westminster approach is contingent on the prevailing ethos and funding regimes at central and local levels and remains relatively detached from mainstream services. While community empowerment is an important part of the policy rhetoric, it is argued that in practice a ‘strategy of containment’ operates whereby residents in the neighbourhoods have relatively little control over targets and resources and that new governance mechanisms can be relatively easily de-coupled when required. In retrospect, co-production might have been a more effective model for neighbourhood governance, not least given its fit with policy direction.

Deviations of Governance In IT Multi-Sourcing: A Case Study

IT outsourcing (ITO) refers to the shift of IT/IS activities from internal to external of an organization. In prior research, the governance of ITO is recognized with persistent strategic importance for practice, because it is tightly related to ITO success. Under the rapid transformation of global market, the evolving practice of ITO requires updated knowledge on effective governance. However, research on ITO governance is still under developed due to the lack of integrated theoretical frameworks and the variety of empirical settings besides dyadic client-vendor relationships. Especially, as multi-sourcing has become an increasingly common practice in ITO, its new governance challenges must be attended by both ITO researchers and practitioners. To address this research gap, this study aims to understand multi-sourcing governance with an integrated theoretical framework incorporating both governance structure and governance mechanisms. The focus is on the emerging deviations among formal, perceived and practiced governance. With an interpretive perspective, a single case study is conducted with mixed methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and qualitative inquiries. The empirical setting embraces one client firm and its two IT suppliers for IT infrastructure services. The empirical material is analyzed at three levels: within one supplier firm, between the client and one supplier, and among all three firms. Empirical evidences, at all levels, illustrate various deviations in governance mechanisms, with which emerging governance structures are shaped. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of ITO governance in three domains: the governance of ITO in general, the governance of multi-sourcing in particular, and research methodology. For ITO governance in general, this study has identified two research strands of governance structure and governance mechanisms, and integrated both concepts under a unified framework. The composition of four research papers contributes to multi-sourcing research by illustrating the benefits of zooming in and out across the multilateral relationships with different aspects and scopes. Methodologically, the viability and benefit of mixed-method is illustrated and confirmed for both researchers and practitioners.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

Corporate governance developments in commonwealth countries

Corporate failures, fraud and rising salaries have directed attention towards the corporate governance mechanisms of companies. A review of governance developments in selected Commonwealth countries is undertaken in order to inform the governance debate and provide an opportunity to discuss governance relating to some countries which may not receive much attention in the debate. The countries covered in this review are the United Kingdom, South Africa, India and Australia. Brief coverage of the respective countries' progressions in the corporate governance debate is provided.

The proposed goodwill impairment test - implications for preparers, auditors and corporate governance

Accounting for goodwill is again controversial as Australia adopts international accounting standards from 1 January 2005. The current method of accounting for goodwill will change dramatically as detailed in the AASB's E0109 and IASB's E03. Goodwill acquired in a business combination will no longer be amortised but rather goodwill will be tested for impairment annually (E03, para 54). This paper explores the potential impact of the proposed changes to goodwill accounting for preparers, auditors and those involved with corporate governance. We compare and discuss the current goodwill treatment and the proposed treatment of goodwill, demonstrating the advantages and complexities of the proposed treatment for preparers and auditors. Auditors will be required in many instances to use their professional judgment and rely on managements' abilities and integrity as well as sound corporate governance mechanisms (such as audit committees) in auditing the 'fair' valuation of goodwill and associated transactions. This paper raises the issues and challenges that preparers, independent auditors and those involved in corporate governance will face with the introduction of the new treatment for goodwill accounting.

Perceptions of corporate boards about standards of corporate governance in Thailand

The aim in this study is to discover the nature and extent of corporate governance in listed companies in Thailand. This includes a consideration of theoretical underpinning for amendments made to the western models of corporate governance that have been implemented by Thai listed companies, and of the effect of corporate governance principles on financial information, including financial reports, used by stakeholders in Thai listed companies. The results in this study show that after the Asian financial crisis corporate governance in Thailand improved especially in enforcement and disclosure, and outside/independent directors and professional organisations are playing leading roles in that process. Better corporate governance has resulted from improved internal corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced accounting standards, information disclosure, and auditing standards. New and up-dated rules, new and revised laws, and increased regulation are in the forefront of improved corporate governance. Process-related activities like monitoring, supervising, enforcing, and higher awareness have increased. Moreover, corporate governance practices are now in the spotlight throughout the financial and investment markets.

Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility disclosures : evidence from an emerging economy

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in the annual reports of Bangladeshi companies. A legitimacy theory framework is adopted to understand the extent to which corporate governance characteristics, such as managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, CEO duality and presence of audit committee influence organisational response to various stakeholder groups. Our results suggest that although CSR disclosures generally have a negative association with managerial ownership, such relationship becomes significant and positive for export-oriented industries. We also find public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence and presence of audit committee to have positive significant impacts on CSR disclosures. However, we fail to find any significant impact of CEO duality. Thus, our results suggest that pressures exerted by external stakeholder groups and corporate governance mechanisms involving independent outsiders may allay some concerns relating to family influence on CSR disclosure practices. Overall, our study implies that corporate governance attributes play a vital role in ensuring organisational legitimacy through CSR disclosures. The findings of our study should be of interest to regulators and policy makers in countries which share similar corporate ownership and regulatory structures.

Corporate governance and bank performance: evidence from Bangladesh

This study investigates the relationship between the corporate governance structure and performance of listed banks in Bangladesh. We find that board independence and board size have a significant positive impact on performance. However, female directors appear to have no impact on performance. Our evidence indicates that the extent of the managerial ownership level has a significant negative impact on bank performance. These results suggest that better corporate governance mechanisms are imperative for every banking company and should be encouraged for the interest of the investors and other stakeholders.

Corporate governance and corporate finance practices in a Kuwait Stock Exchange market listed firm: a survey to confront theory with practice

Purpose– This paper aims to explore the issue of corporate governance mechanisms by including the importance of stakeholders, primary objectives of the firm and the ownership of top financial managers of listed firms in Kuwait in the survey tool. It attempts to investigate whether theory aligns with the behaviour of financial managers in practice in an emerging market case.Design/methodology/approach– A survey was developed to focus primarily on the current corporate finance practices implemented by CFOs in listed companies in Kuwait. The target respondents are listed firms in the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (KSE). The survey includes questions on topics that are closely related to capital budgeting, capital structure, cost of capital and dividend policy. For example, the survey asks the managers how they estimate their cost of equity (CAPM or other methods) and whether the impact of the weighted average cost of equity is taken into consideration in their capital structure choices.Findings– A surprising number of firms are now widely using IRR for decision making. CAPM is also in use, whereas WACC remains the most popular method used. There is some support for the “bird‐in‐hand” dividend theory in the tax‐free environment. Firms in Kuwait do not have any particular source of capital structure choices when it comes to how best to finance their projects as is the case in the US market. Firms in Kuwait are consciously striving for maximizing profits and those managers are regarded as their most important stakeholders. This may indicate the existence of agency problems.Research limitations/implications– The limitation of this study lies in the absence of empirical investigation on how corporate finance decisions may affect firms' performance in Kuwait. Hence, empirical validation will be performed by the authors in the next stage of this research, which will form the basis for further research. Empirical validation for the impact of corporate governance on performance is needed.Practical implications– This research may benefit managers and decision makers in many aspects, including having an understanding of applying popular and the most suitable corporate finance and corporate governance techniques in the management of their companies. In this research, the authors have identified the gap between practice and academia.Originality/value– To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to examine comprehensively major areas of financial policies and practices and corporate governance in an emerging market case, especially in the Middle East. Kuwait provides a unique institutional setting in its taxation system. Therefore, this study will make a contribution to the general literature in this field.

Intellectual capital disclosures and corporate governance: an empirical examination

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Empirical examinations of the links between corporate governance and intellectual capital are underresearched, particularly from the context of emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms tend to be largely ceremonial due to family dominance. This study aims to address this gap in the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) literature by undertaking an empirical examination of the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD of Bangladeshi companies. Inter alia, the key findings of this study suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between family ownership and the extent of ICD. This research also found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the presence of audit committees are positively associated with the extent of ICD. Conversely, family duality (i.e., where the positions of CEO and chairperson are occupied by two individuals from the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of ICD.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Asset accumulation by the middle class and the poor in Latin America: political economy and governance dimensions

Includes bibliography

Is the EU’s Governance ‘Good’?: An assessment of EU governance in its partnership with ACP States. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2010

This paper examines both the processes and outcomes of governance in the context of the EU’s relationship with ACP States within the period of the Cotonou Agreement (CA). It discusses and assesses a variety of governance mechanisms, including the European Commission’s use of the governance concept, EPAs, manifestations of partner preferences, the EDF, the revision of the CA, and Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Specific examples of the wielding of each mechanism are assessed based upon two criteria: a) the extent to which the wielding of the mechanism by the EU is a manifestation of “good governance”, and b) the extent to which the EU’s wielding of the mechanism has resulted, or is likely to result, in the sustainable development of and reduction of poverty in ACP countries. The examples are chosen to illustrate contradictions between rhetoric and practice and the consequential negative (actual and potential) impact upon development in ACP States. The final section offers suggestions for improving the EU’s governance processes and their outcomes for development.