Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.

Simple Heuristics in a Social Game

Simple Heuristics in a Social World invites readers to discover the simple heuristics that people use to navigate the complexities and surprises of environments populated with others. The social world is a terrain where humans and other animals compete with conspecifics for myriad resources, including food, mates, and status, and where rivals grant the decision maker little time for deep thought, protracted information search, or complex calculations. Yet, the social world also encompasses domains where social animals such as humans can learn from one another and can forge alliances with one another to boost their chances of success. According to the book's thesis, the undeniable complexity of the social world does not dictate cognitive complexity as many scholars of rationality argue. Rather, it entails circumstances that render optimization impossible or computationally arduous: intractability, the existence of incommensurable considerations, and competing goals. With optimization beyond reach, less can be more. That is, heuristics--simple strategies for making decisions when time is pressing and careful deliberation an unaffordable luxury--become indispensible mental tools. As accurate as or even more accurate than complex methods when used in the appropriate social environments, these heuristics are good descriptive models of how people make many decisions and inferences, but their impressive performance also poses a normative challenge for optimization models. In short, the Homo socialis may prove to be a Homo heuristicus whose intelligence reflects ecological rather than logical rationality.

The Family Game: A Parent Education Intervention to Increase Positive Parent-Child Interactions in Parents with Learning Difficulties

Children of parents with learning difficulties (LD) are at risk for a variety of developmental problems including behavioural and psychiatric disorders. However, there are no empirically supported programs to prevent behavioural and psychiatric problems in these children. The purpose of the study was to test the effectiveness of a parenting intervention designed to teach parents with learning difficulties positive child behaviour management strategies. A multiple baseline across skills design was used with two parents, who were taught three skills: 1) clear instructions, 2) recognition of compliance and 3) correction of noncompliance. Training scores improved on each skill and maintained at a 1-month follow-up. Scores on generalization cards were high and showed maintenance, but improvements in parenting skills in the naturalistic environment were low at posttest and follow-up. Increases were seen in child compliance at posttest and 1-month follow-up. Results of pre-post social validity measures were also generally positive.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.

Find the difference! : eye tracking study on information seeking behavior using an online game

With the advent of digital era web applications have become inevitable part of our lives. We are using the web to manage even the financially or ethically sensitive issues. For this reason exploration of information seeking behavior is an exciting area of research. Current study provides insight on information seeking behavior using a classic ‘Find the Difference’ game. 50 university students between the age of 19 and 26 participated in the study. Eye movement data were recorded with a Tobii T120 device. Participants carried out 4 continuous tasks. Each task included two pictures side by side with 7 hidden differences. After finishing the tasks, participants were asked to repeat the game with the same picture set. This data collection methodology allows the evaluation of learning curves. Additionally, participants were asked about their hand preference. For the purpose of analysis the following metrics were applied: task times (including saccades), fixation count and fixation duration (without saccades). The right- and left-hand side on each picture was selected as AOI (Area of Interest) to detect side preference in connection with hand preference. Results suggest a significant difference between male and female participants regarding aggregated task times (male 58.37s respectively female 68.37s), deviation in the number of fixations and fixation duration (apparently female have less but longer fixations) and also in the distribution of fixations between AOIs. Using eyetracking data current paper highlights the similarities and differences in information acquisition strategies respectively reveals gender and education (Arts vs. Sciences) dependent characteristics of interaction.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Winning the Accreditation Game: The Library as Key Player and Hidden Gold Mine

Libraries are a central hub of information resources supporting college and university curricula. Several library strategies, cross-campus collaborations, and philosophical considerations of electronic and print offerings led to successful accreditations in business and engineering programs.

Um modelo fuzzy-dea-game para estratégias de produção sob incerteza

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Imaginary irishness: the feminine in dramatisations of the Paster Rising in Sean O’Casey’s the plough and the stars and Tom Murphy’s The Patriot Game

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Winning On for the Gipper: Diversity Strategies and Initiative at Notre Dame

One of the enduring images linked to the University of Notre Dame is that of injured football player George Gipp imploring Coach Knute Rockne to "Win One for the Gipper. " Similarly, people of color and conscience at Notre Dame struggle with formidable challenges in implementing diversity into areas of faculty retention, university initiatives and community outreach, all while remaining sane. The panelists will discuss innovative successes and continuing efforts that can be adapted by others seeking a game plan for diversity.

Fidelity and game-based technology in management education

This study explores educational technology and management education by analyzing fidelity in game-based management education interventions. A sample of 31 MBA students was selected to help answer the research question: To what extent do MBA students tend to recognize specific game-based academic experiences, in terms of fidelity, as relevant to their managerial performance? Two distinct game-based interventions (BG1 and BG2) with key differences in fidelity levels were explored: BG1 presented higher physical and functional fidelity levels and lower psychological fidelity levels. Hypotheses were tested with data from the participants, collected shortly after their experiences, related to the overall perceived quality of game-based interventions. The findings reveal a higher overall perception of quality towards BG1: (a) better for testing strategies, (b) offering better business and market models, (c) based on a pace that better stimulates learning, and (d) presenting a fidelity level that better supports real world performance. This study fosters the conclusion that MBA students tend to recognize, to a large extent, that specific game-based academic experiences are relevant and meaningful to their managerial development, mostly with heightened fidelity levels of adopted artifacts. Agents must be ready and motivated to explore the new, to try and err, and to learn collaboratively in order to perform.

Livelihood and Community Development: LforS learning and simulation game

Up to 15 people can participate in the game, which is supervised by a moderator. Households consisting of 1-5 people discuss options for diversification of household strategies. Aim of the game: By devising appropriate strategies, households seek to stand up to various types of events while improving their economic and social situation and, at the same time, taking account of ecological conditions. The annual General Community Meeting (GCM) provides an opportunity for households to create a general set-up at the local level that is more or less favourable to the strategies they are pursuing. The development of a community investment strategy, to be implemented by the GCM, and successful coordination between households will allow players to optimise their investments at the household level. The household who owns the most assets at the end of the game wins. Players participate very actively, as the game stimulates lively and interesting discussions. They find themselves confronted with different types of decision-making related to the reality of their daily lives. They explore different ways to model their own household strategies and discuss risks and opportunities. Reflections on the course of the game continually refer to the real-life situations of the participants.

Sustainable Pasture Management : LforS learning and simulation game

Three teams consisting of 2 to 5 persons each play the game. Each team represents a farm. Each team decides jointly on its strategy. In annual meetings in winter, the farm teams jointly discuss, evaluate and decide on how to proceed and actions to be taken. The farms make use of three different pasture areas (village pasture, intensive pasture and summer pasture) for grazing their livestock. The carrying capacity of each pasture area is different and varies according to the season. In each season, the farms have to decide on how many livestock units to graze on which pasture. Overgrazing and pasture degradation occur if the total number of livestock units exceeds the carrying capacity of a specific pasture area. Overgrazing results in a reduction of pasture productivity. To diversify and improve their livelihood strategy farms can make individual investments to increase productivity at the farm level, eg. in fodder production or in income generating activities. At the community level, collective investments can be made which may influence livestock and household economy, e.g. rehabilitate and improve pasture productivity, improve living conditions on remote pastures etc. Events occurring in the course of the game represent different types of (risk) factors such as meteorology, market, politics etc. that may positively or negatively influence livestock production and household economy. A sustainable management of pastures requires that farms actively regulate the development of their herds, that they take measures to prevent pasture degradation and to improve pasture productivity, and that they find a balance between livestock economy and other productive activities. The game has a double aim: a) each farm aims at its economic success and prosperity, and b) the three farm teams jointly have to find and implement strategies for a sustainable use of pasture areas.