Parental involvement in sport: psychometric development and empirical test of a theoretical model

The purposes of the present multistudy were to develop and provide initial construct validity for measures based on the model of parental involvement in sport (Study 1) and examine structural relationships among the constructs of the model (Study 2). In Study 1 (nparents = 342, nathletes = 223), a confirmatory factor analysis was used to verify the psychometric properties of the measures. Content and construct validity were evaluated, as well individual and composite reliability. Multi-group analysis with two independent samples provided evidence of factorial invariance. In Study 2 (nparents = 754, nathletes = 438), structural equation modeling analysis supported the hypothesised model in which athletes’ perceptions of parents’ behaviours mediated the relationship between parents’ reported behaviours and the athletes’ psychological variables conducive to their achievement in sport. The findings provide support for the parental involvement in sport model and demonstrate the role of perceptions of parents’ behaviours on young athletes’ cognitions in sport.

Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy: Applications to financial and real markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Effects of hatching asynchrony on sibling negotiation, begging, jostling for position and within-brood food allocation in the barn owl Tyto alba

When siblings differ markedly in their need for food, they may benefit from signalling to each other their willingness to contest the next indivisible food item delivered by the parents. This sib-sib communication system, referred to as 'sibling negotiation', may allow them to adjust optimally to investment in begging. Using barn owl (Two alba) broods. I assessed the role of within-brood age hierarchy on sibling negotiation, and in turn on jostling for position where parents predictably deliver food (i.e. nest-box entrance), begging and within-brood food allocation. More specifically, I examined three predictions derived from a game-theoretical model of sibling negotiation where a senior and a junior sibling compete for food resources (Roulin, 2002a, Johnstone and Roulin, 2003): (1) begging effort invested by the senior sibling should be less sensitive to the junior sibling's negotiation than vice versa; (2) the junior should invest less effort in sibling negotiation than its senior sibling but a similar amount of effort in begging; and (3) within-brood food allocation should be directly related to begging but only indirectly to sibling negotiation. Two-chick broods were created and vocalization in the absence (negotiation signals directed to siblings) and presence (begging signals directed to parents) of parents was recorded. In support of the first prediction, juniors begged at a low cadence after their senior sibling negotiated intensely, probably because negotiation reflects prospective investment in begging and hence willingness to compete. In contrast, the begging of senior siblings was not sensitive to their junior sibling's negotiation. In contrast to the second prediction, juniors negotiated and begged more intensely than their senior sibling apparently because they were hungrier rather than younger. In line with the third prediction, juniors monopolized food delivered by their parents when their senior sibling begged at a low level. The begging cadence of both the junior and senior sibling, the junior's negotiation cadence, the difference in age between the two nest-mates and jostling for position were not associated with the likelihood of monopolizing food. In conclusion, sibling negotiation appears to influence begging behaviour, which, in turn, affects within-brood food allocation. Juniors may negotiate to challenge their senior siblings, and thereby determine whether seniors are less hungry before deciding to beg for food. In contrast, seniors may negotiate to deter juniors from begging.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Essays on Supply Chain Finance

I study how a larger party within a supply chain could use its superior knowledge about its partner, who is considered to be financially constrained, to help its partner gain access to cheap finance. In particular, I consider two scenarios: (i) Retailer intermediation in supplier finance and (ii) The Effectiveness of Supplier Buy Back Finance. In the fist chapter, I study how a large buyer could help small suppliers obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. In order to reduce channel costs, in recent years large buyers started to implement their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, I analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, I show that buyer intermediated financing can significantly improve supply chain performance. Using data from a large Chinese online retailer and through structural regression estimation based on the theoretical analysis, I demonstrate that buyer intermediation induces lower interest rates and wholesale prices, increases order quantities, and boosts supplier borrowing. The analysis also shows that the retailer systematically overestimates the consumer demand. Based on counterfactual analysis, I predict that the implementation of buyer intermediated financing for the online retailer in 2013 improved channel profits by 18.3%, yielding more than $68M projected savings. In the second chapter, I study a novel buy-back financing scheme employed by large manufacturers in some emerging markets. A large manufacturer can secure financing for its budget-constrained downstream partners by assuming a part of the risk for their inventory by committing to buy back some unsold units. Buy back commitment could help a small downstream party secure a bank loan and further induce a higher order quantity through better allocation of risk in the supply chain. However, such a commitment may undermine the supply chain performance as it imposes extra costs on the supplier incurred by the return of large or costly-to-handle items. I first theoretically analyze the buy-back financing contract employed by a leading Chinese automative manufacturer and some variants of this contracting scheme. In order to measure the effectiveness of buy-back financing contracts, I utilize contract and sales data from the company and structurally estimate the theoretical model. Through counterfactual analysis, I study the efficiency of various buy-back financing schemes and compare them to traditional financing methods. I find that buy-back contract agreements can improve channel efficiency significantly compared to simple contracts with no buy-back, whether the downstream retailer can secure financing on its own or not.

The role of business model in computer game development organizations

The computer game industry has grown steadily for years, and in revenues it can be compared to the music and film industries. The game industry has been moving to digital distribution. Computer gaming and the concept of business model are discussed among industrial practitioners and the scientific community. The significance of the business model concept has increased in the scientific literature recently, although there is still a lot of discussion going on on the concept. In the thesis, the role of the business model in the computer game industry is studied. Computer game developers, designers, project managers and organization leaders in 11 computer game companies were interviewed. The data was analyzed to identify the important elements of computer game business model, how the business model concept is perceived and how the growth of the organization affects the business model. It was identified that the importance of human capital is crucial to the business. As games are partly a product of creative thinking also innovation and the creative process are highly valued. The same applies to technical skills when performing various activities. Marketing and customer relationships are also considered as key elements in the computer game business model. Financing and partners are important especially for startups, when the organization is dependent on external funding and third party assets. The results of this study provide organizations with improved understanding on how the organization is built and what business model elements are weighted.

Model of a game for improving integrated decisions in production management

This paper presents the results obtained with a business game whose model represents the decision making process related to two moments at an industrial company. The first refers to the project of the industrial plant, and the second to its management. The game model was conceived so the player's first decision would establish capacity and other parameters such as quantities of each product to produce, marketing expenses, research and development, quality, advertising, salaries, if purchases will be made in installments or in cash, if there will be credit sales and how many installments will be allowed and the number of workers in the assembly area. An experiment was conducted with employees of a Brazilian company. Data obtained indicate that the players have lack of contents, especially in finances. Although these results cannot be generalized, they confirm prior results with undergraduate and graduate students and they indicate the need for reinforcement in this undergraduate area. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Regional differences of outpatient physician supply as a theoretical economic and empirical generalized linear model

BACKGROUND: Regional differences in physician supply can be found in many health care systems, regardless of their organizational and financial structure. A theoretical model is developed for the physicians' decision on office allocation, covering demand-side factors and a consumption time function. METHODS: To test the propositions following the theoretical model, generalized linear models were estimated to explain differences in 412 German districts. Various factors found in the literature were included to control for physicians' regional preferences. RESULTS: Evidence in favor of the first three propositions of the theoretical model could be found. Specialists show a stronger association to higher populated districts than GPs. Although indicators for regional preferences are significantly correlated with physician density, their coefficients are not as high as population density. CONCLUSIONS: If regional disparities should be addressed by political actions, the focus should be to counteract those parameters representing physicians' preferences in over- and undersupplied regions.

A System Dynamics-Based Simulation Experiment for Testing Mental Model and Performance Effects of Using the Balanced Scorecard

This study develops a theoretical model that explains the effectiveness of the balanced scorecard approach by means of a system dynamics and feedback learning perspective. Presumably, the balanced scorecard leads to a better understanding of context, allowing managers to externalize and improve their mental models. We present a set of hypotheses about the influence of the balanced scorecard approach on mental models and performance. A test based on a simulation experiment that uses a system dynamics model is performed. The experiment included three types of parameters: financial indicators; balanced scorecard indicators; and balanced scorecard indicators with the aid of a strategy map review. Two out of the three hypotheses were confirmed. It was concluded that a strategy map review positively influences mental model similarity, and mental model similarity positively influences performance.

A VLF to UHF propagation model for evaluation of high-speed railway electromagnetic interference in RF monitoring base-stations

Considering that recent european high-speed railway system has a traction power system of kV 50 Hz, which causes electromagnetic emission for the outside world, it is important to dimension the railway system emissions, using a frequency/distance dependent propagation model. This paper presents an enhanced theoretical model for VLF to UHF propagation, railway system oriented. It introduces the near field approach (crucial in low frequency propagation) and also considers the source characteristics and type of measuring antenna. Simulations are presented, and comparisons are set with earlier far field models. Using the developed model, a real case study was performed in partnership with Refer Telecom (portuguese telecom operator for railways). The new propagation model was used in order to predict the future high-speed railway electromagnetic emissions in the Lisbon north track. The results show the model's prediction capabilities and also its applicability to realistic scenarios.

Electrorheology study of a series of LC cyanobiphenyls: Experimental and theoretical treatment

In this work we study the electro-rheological behaviour of a series of four liquid crystal (LC) cyanobiphenyls with a number of carbon atoms in the alkyl group, ranging from five to eight (5CB–8CB). We present the flow curves for different temperatures and under the influence of an external electric field, ranging from 0 to 3 kV/mm, and the viscosity as a function of the temperature, for the same values of electric field, obtained for different shear rates. Theoretical interpretation of the observed behaviours is proposed in the framework of the continuum theory of Leslie–Ericksen for low molecular weight nematic LCs. In our analysis, the director alignment angle is only a function of the ratio between the shear rate and the square of the electric field – boundary conditions are neglected. By fitting the theoretical model to the experimental data, we are able to determine some viscosity coefficients and the dielectric anisotropy as a function of temperature. To interpret the behaviour of the flow curves near the nematic–isotropic transitions, we apply the continuum theory of Olmsted–Goldbart, which extends the theory of Leslie–Ericksen to the case where the degree of alignment of the LC molecules can also vary.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Inovação como fator de competitividade da cadeia de valor da moda

Tese de Doutoramento em Engenharia Têxtil