Budgetary treatment of deposit insurance : a framework for reform /

Item 1005-C

Federal Crop Insurance Program Expands in 2016 and 2017 to Cover More Organic Crops

Organic agriculture represents one of the fastest growing segments of U.S. agriculture (USDA-RMA). With this in mind, the USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) continues to expand crop insurance options for organic growers. In 2016 and 2017, organic producers in Maryland will see additional crops with organic crop insurance options. Increasing crop insurance options will allow this segment of producers new opportunities to manage their risks.

International Coordination in Cross-Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects

Bail-in is quickly becoming a predominant approach to banking resolution. The EU Bank Recovery Resolution Directive and the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s single point of entry strategy envisage creditors’ recapitalisations
to resolve a failing financial institution. However, this legislation focuses on the domestic aspects of bail-in, leaving the question of how it is applied
to a cross-border banking group open. Cross-border banking resolution has been historically subject to coordination failures, which have resulted in disorderly resolutions with dangerous systemic effects. The goal of this article is to assess whether bail-in is subject to the same coordination problems that affect other resolution tools, and to discuss the logic of international legal cooperation in bail-in policies. We demonstrate that, in spite of the evident benefit in terms of fiscal sustainability, bail-in suffers from complex coordination problems which, if not addressed, might lead to regulatory arbitrage and lengthy court battles, and, ultimately, may disrupt resolutions. We argue that only a binding legal regime can address those problems. In doing so, we discuss the recent Financial Stability
Board’s proposal on cross-border recognition of resolution action, and the role of international law in promoting cooperation in banking resolution.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

Apple loss adjustment standards handbook.

Mode of access: Internet.

Potato handbook.

Mode of access: Internet.

General information series.

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual report to Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Small grains handbook.

"FCIC 30430-1."

Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt Corrective Action. CEPS Policy Brief No. 282, 18 September 2012

The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking Union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. However, on a number of issues the Commission’s chosen path raises questions that should be brought out in the open and fully recognized before final deliberation by the Council.

Temporomandibular disorders/myoarthropathy of the masticatory system. Costs of dental treatment and reimbursement by Swiss federal insurance agencies according to the Health Care Benefits Ordinance (KLV)

The goal of the study was to calculate the direct costs of therapy for patients with MAP. This retrospective study included 242 MAP patients treated at the Department of Prosthodontics of the University of Bern between 2003 and 2006. The following parameters were collected from the clinical charts: chief complaint, diagnosis, treatment modalities, total costs, costs of the dental technician, number of appointments, average cost per appointment, length of treatment, and services reimbursed by health insurance agencies. The average age of the patients was 40.4 ± 17.3 years (76.4% women, 23.6% men). The chief complaint was pain in 91.3% of the cases, TMJ noises (61.2%) or limitation of mandibular mobility (53.3%). Tendomyopathy (22.3%), disc displacement (22.4%), or a combination of the two (37.6%) were more often diagnosed than arthropathy alone (7.4%). Furthermore, 10.3% of the MAP patients had another primary diagnosis (tumor, trauma, etc.). Patients were treated with counseling and exercises (36.0%), physiotherapy (23.6%), or occlusal splints (32.6%). The cost of treatment reached 644 Swiss francs for four appointments spread over an average of 21 weeks. In the great majority of cases, patients can be treated with inexpensive modalities. 99.9% of the MAP cases submitted to the insurance agencies were reimbursed by them, in accordance with Article 17d1-3 of the Swiss Health Care Benefits Ordinance (KLV) and Article 25 of the Federal Health Insurance Act (KVG). The costs of treatment performed by dentists remain modest. The more time-consuming services, such as providing information, counseling and instructions, are poorly remunerated. This aspect should be re-evaluated in a future revision of the tariff schedule.

Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System. CEPS Policy Brief No. 287, 17 April 2013.

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is too politically sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks. Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible also for resolution. Experience has shown banking systems are more stable if deposit insurers are also responsible for resolution. The approach proposed here could thus be also used to design the ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM) which is being discussed as a complement to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis.

The savings and loan crisis [microform] : field hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session, San Francisco, CA, January 12 and 13, 1989.

"Serial no. 101-3."

The federal Securities act manual : a treatise based on the federal Securities act of 1933 and the Corporation of foreign bondholders act, 1933, with forms, rules and regulations /

Double diagram mounted on front lining-paper.

Mercados interbancarios no colateralizados e información asimétrica: un mecanismo para lograr la participación plena de los bancos deficitarios cuando existen altos niveles y dispersión del riesgo de contraparte

En este trabajo se proponen dos tipos de contratos para los préstamos interbancarios con el fin de que los bancos suavicen sus choques de liquidez a través del mercado interbancario. En particular, se estudia la situación en la que los bancos con faltantes de liquidez que tienen bajo riesgo de crédito abandonan el mercado debido a que la tasa de interés es alta en relación a su fuente alterna de financiamiento. La asimetría en la información acerca del riesgo de crédito impide que los bancos con excedentes de liquidez ajusten la tasa de interés considerando el riesgo de su contraparte. Dado lo anterior, se diseñan dos contratos para los créditos interbancarios que se diferencian en las tasas de interés cobradas. Así, siempre que un banco constituya un depósito podrá obtener liquidez a bajas tasas de interés; en la situación contraria la tasa será más elevada.