Deciding between accounts of the selection task: A reply to Oaksford (2002)

In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only I out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.

Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task

Three experiments examined the influence of a second rule on the pattern of card selections on Wason's selection task. In Experiment 1 participants received a version of the task with a single test rule or one of two versions of the task with the same original test rule together with a second rule. The probability of q was manipulated in the two-rules conditions by varying the size of the antecedent set in the second rule. The results showed a significant suppression of q card and not-p card selections in the alternative-rule conditions, but no difference as a function of antecedent set size. In Experiment 2 the size of the antecendent set in the two-rules conditions was manipulated using the context of a computer printing double-sided cards. The results showed a significant reduction of q card selections in the two-rules conditions, but no effect of p set size. In Experiment 3 the scenario accompanying the rule was manipulated, and it specified a single alternative antecedent or a number of alternative antecedents. The q card selection rates were not affected by the scenario manipulation but again were suppressed by the presence of a second rule. Our results suggest that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the task and that these inferences are systematically influenced by the presence of a second rule, but are not influenced by the probabilistic characteristics of this rule. These findings are discussed in the context of decision theoretic views of selection task performance (Oaksford Chater, 1994).

The suppression of q card selections: Evidence for deductive inference in Wason's Selection Task

The results of three experiments investigating the role of deductive inference in Wason's selection task are reported. In Experiment 1, participants received either a standard one-rule problem or a task containing a second rule, which specified an alternative antecedent. Both groups of participants were asked to select those cards that they considered were necessary to test whether the rule common to both problems was true or false. The results showed a significant suppression of q card selections in the two-rule condition. In addition there was weak evidence for both decreased p selection and increased not-q selection. In Experiment 2 we again manipulated number of rules and found suppression of q card selections only. Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared one- and two-rule conditions with a two-rule condition where the second rule specified two alternative antecedents in the form of a disjunction. The q card selections were suppressed in both of the two-rule conditions but there was no effect of whether the second rule contained one or two alternative antecedents. We argue that our results support the claim that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the indicative selection task.

The Relevance Framework for Category-Based Induction: Evidence From Garden-Path Arguments

Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson. 1995) suggests that people expend cognitive effort when processing information in proportion to the cognitive effects to be gained from doing so. This theory has been used to explain how people apply their knowledge appropriately when evaluating category-based inductive arguments (Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003). In such arguments, people are told that a property is true of premise categories and are asked to evaluate the likelihood that it is also true of conclusion categories. According to the relevance framework, reasoners generate hypotheses about the relevant relation between the categories in the argument. We reasoned that premises inconsistent with early hypotheses about the relevant relation would have greater effects than consistent premises. We designed three premise garden-path arguments where the same 3rd premise was either consistent or inconsistent with likely hypotheses about the relevant relation. In Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that effort expended processing consistent premises (measured via reading times) was significantly less than effort expended on inconsistent premises. In Experiment 2 and 3, we demonstrated a direct relation between cognitive effect and cognitive effort. For garden-path arguments, belief change given inconsistent 3rd premises was significantly correlated with Premise 3 (Experiment 3) and conclusion (Experiments 2 and 3) reading times. For consistent arguments, the correlation between belief change and reading times did not approach significance. These results support the relevance framework for induction but are difficult to accommodate under other approaches.

Timing and trajectory in rhythm production

The Wing-Kristofferson movement timing model (A. M. Wing & A. B. Kristofferson, 1973a, 1973b) distinguishes central timer and motor implementation processes. Previous studies have shown that increases in interresponse interval (IRI) variability with mean IRI are due to central timer processes, not motor implementation. The authors examine whether this is true with IRI duration changes in binary rhythm production. Ten participants provided IRI and movement data in bimanual synchronous tapping under equal (isochronous) and alternating (rhythm) interval conditions. Movement trajectory changes were observed with IRI duration (300, 500, or 833 ms) and for 500-ms IRIs produced in rhythm contexts (300/500 ms, 500/833 ms). However, application of the Wing-Kristofferson model showed that duration and context effects on IRI variability were attributable largely to timer processes with relatively little effect on motor processes.

Additivity Pretraining and cue competition effects: Developmental evidence for a reasoning account of causal learning

The effect of additivity pretraining on blocking has been taken as evidence for a reasoning account of human and animal causal learning. If inferential reasoning underpins this effect, then developmental differences in the magnitude of this effect in children would be expected. Experiment 1 examined cue competition effects in children's (4- to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds) causal learning using a new paradigm analogous to the food allergy task used in studies of human adult causal learning. Blocking was stronger in the older than the younger children, and additivity pretraining only affected blocking in the older group. Unovershadowing was not affected by age or by pretraining. In experiment 2, levels of blocking were found to be correlated with the ability to answer questions that required children to reason about additivity. Our results support an inferential reasoning explanation of cue competition effects. (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved.

Perceiving and Reenacting Spatiotemporal Characteristics of Walking Sounds

Many studies have examined the processes involved in recognizing types of human action through sound, but little is known about whether the physical characteristics of an action (such as kinetic and kinematic parameters) can be perceived and imitated from sound. Twelve young healthy adults listened to recordings of footsteps on a gravel path taken from walks of different stride lengths (SL) and cadences. In 1 protocol, participants performed a real-time reenactment of the walking action depicted in a sound sample. Second, participants listened to 2 different sound samples and discriminated differences in SL. In a 2nd experiment, these procedures were repeated using synthesized sounds derived from the kinetic interactions between the foot and walking surface. A 3rd experiment examined the influence of altered cadence on participants' ability to discriminate changes in SL. Participants significantly adapted their own SL and cadence according to those depicted in both real and synthesized sounds (p <.01). However, although participants accurately discriminated between large changes in SL, these perceptions were heavily influenced by temporal factors, that is, when cadence changed between samples. These findings show that spatial attributes of action sounds can be both mimicked and discriminated, even when only basic kinetic interactions present within the action are specified. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Logic feels so good-I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning

When people evaluate syllogisms, their judgments of validity are often biased by the believability of the conclusions of the problems. Thus, it has been suggested that syllogistic reasoning performance is based on an interplay between a conscious and effortful evaluation of logicality and an intuitive appreciation of the believability of the conclusions (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). However, logic effects in syllogistic reasoning emerge even when participants are unlikely to carry out a full logical analysis of the problems (e.g., Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). There is also evidence that people can implicitly detect the conflict between their beliefs and the validity of the problems, even if they are unable to consciously produce a logical response (e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010). In 4 experiments we demonstrate that people intuitively detect the logicality of syllogisms, and this effect emerges independently of participants' conscious mindset and their cognitive capacity. This logic effect is also unrelated to the superficial structure of the problems. Additionally, we provide evidence that the logicality of the syllogisms is detected through slight changes in participants' affective states. In fact, subliminal affective priming had an effect on participants' subjective evaluations of the problems. Finally, when participants misattributed their emotional reactions to background music, this significantly reduced the logic effect.