Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.

Sobre la toma de decisiones economicas bajo incertidumbre

In this article we review the evolution of economic theory on decision making under uncertainty. After a brief reference to Expected Utility Theory, we refer to behavioural paradoxes, forcing the theorists to adopt less restrictive approaches, allowing us to explain a broader spectrum of phenomena. The complexity entailed in the new theories requires a multidimensional description of human attitudes towards risk. Nevertheless, measurement of this attitudes has not followed the desired path, with most elicitation methods remaining uni-dimensional.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

Ensaio sobre o agente racional: esparadrapos para um paciente terminal?

The Rational Agent model have been a foundational basis for theoretical models such as Economics, Management Science, Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory, mainly by the ¿maximization under constraints¿ principle, e.g. the ¿Expected Utility Models¿, among them, the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory, from Savage, placed as most influence player over theoretical models we¿ve seen nowadays, even though many other developments have been done, indeed also in non-expected utility theories field. Having the ¿full rationality¿ assumption, going for a less idealistic sight ¿bounded rationality¿ of Simon, or for classical anomalies studies, such as the ¿heuristics and bias¿ analysis by Kahneman e Tversky, ¿Prospect Theory¿ also by Kahneman & Tversky, or Thaler¿s Anomalies, and many others, what we can see now is that Rational Agent Model is a ¿Management by Exceptions¿ example, as for each new anomalies¿s presentation, in sequence, a ¿problem solving¿ development is needed. This work is a theoretical essay, which tries to understand: 1) The rational model as a ¿set of exceptions¿; 2) The actual situation unfeasibility, since once an anomalie is identified, we need it¿s specific solution developed, and since the number of anomalies increases every year, making strongly difficult to manage rational model; 3) That behaviors judged as ¿irrationals¿ or deviated, by the Rational Model, are truly not; 4) That¿s the right moment to emerge a Theory including mental processes used in decision making; and 5) The presentation of an alternative model, based on some cognitive and experimental psychology analysis, such as conscious and uncounscious processes, cognition, intuition, analogy-making, abstract roles, and others. Finally, we present conclusions and future research, that claims for deeper studies in this work¿s themes, for mathematical modelling, and studies about a rational analysis and cognitive models possible integration. .

O efeito manada nos fundos de investimento no Brasil: um teste em finanças comportamentais

Utilizando-se de uma amostra de movimentações diárias de fundos de investimento em ações, multimercados e renda fixa no Brasil, por meio de uma metodologia baseada na direção das captações líquidas de um grande número de fundos de investimento, agregados em grupos de investidores de acordo com o porte médio de seu investimento (ricos e pobres), foi encontrada forte evidência da ocorrência de efeito manada de forma heterogênea entre diferentes grupos de investidores, sendo que a intensidade do efeito manada varia de acordo com o porte do investidor, tipo de fundo e com a época. Também foi testado um viés de heurística: a ancoragem de preço, que supõe que após uma nova máxima ou mínima histórica nos preços das ações, haverá uma movimentação anormal de investidores, que acreditam ser este evento um indicador sobre os preços futuros. Encontrou-se evidência de que este fenômeno ocorre em diferentes tipos de fundos de investimento, não apenas os fundos de investimento em ações, e que tem maior impacto quando há uma nova mínima do que quando há uma cotação recorde no índice Ibovespa. Entretanto, o poder de explicação deste viés sobre o efeito manada é pequeno, e há uma série de variáveis ainda não exploradas que têm maior poder de explicação sobre o efeito manada. Desta maneira, este estudo encontrou evidências de que os pressupostos de finanças comportamentais de que a informação e as expectativas dos investidores não são homogêneas, e que os investidores são influenciáveis pelas decisões de outros investidores, estão corretos, mas que há fraca evidência que o viés de heurística de ancoragem de preço tenha papel relevante no comportamento dos investidores.

Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa--Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008).

Alocação dinâmica ótima com momentos de ordem superior para a estratégia de carry trade

O objetivo do presente trabalho é verificar se, ao levar-se em consideração momentos de ordem superior (assimetria e curtose) na alocação de uma carteira de carry trade, há ganhos em relação à alocação tradicional que prioriza somente os dois primeiros momentos (média e variância). A hipótese da pesquisa é que moedas de carry trade apresentam retornos com distribuição não-Normal, e os momentos de ordem superior desta têm uma dinâmica, a qual pode ser modelada através de um modelo da família GARCH, neste caso IC-GARCHSK. Este modelo consiste em uma equação para cada momento condicional dos componentes independentes, explicitamente: o retorno, a variância, a assimetria, e a curtose. Outra hipótese é que um investidor com uma função utilidade do tipo CARA (constant absolute risk aversion), pode tê-la aproximada por uma expansão de Taylor de 4ª ordem. A estratégia do trabalho é modelar a dinâmica dos momentos da série dos logartimos neperianos dos retornos diários de algumas moedas de carry trade através do modelo IC-GARCHSK, e estimar a alocação ótima da carteira dinamicamente, de tal forma que se maximize a função utilidade do investidor. Os resultados mostram que há ganhos sim, ao levar-se em consideração os momentos de ordem superior, uma vez que o custo de oportunidade desta foi menor que o de uma carteira construída somente utilizando como critérios média e variância.

Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

A consumption CAPM with a reference level

We study an intertemporal asset pricing model in which a representative consumer maximizes expected utility derived from both the ratio of his consumption to some reference level and this level itself. If the reference consumption level is assumed to be determined by past consumption levels, the model generalizes the usual habit formation specifications. When the reference level growth rate is made dependent on the market portfolio return and on past consumption growth, the model mixes a consumption CAPM with habit formation together with the CAPM. It therefore provides, in an expected utility framework, a generalization of the non-expected recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin (1989). When we estimate this specification with aggregate per capita consumption, we obtain economically plausible values of the preference parameters, in contrast with the habit formation or the Epstein-Zin cases taken separately. All tests performed with various preference specifications confirm that the reference level enters significantly in the pricing kernel.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Integral representation with convex capacities that are squeeze of (additive) probability measures

In this paper I will investigate the conditions under which a convex capacity (or a non-additive probability which exhibts uncertainty aversion) can be represented as a squeeze of a(n) (additive) probability measure associate to an uncertainty aversion function. Then I will present two alternatives forrnulations of the Choquet integral (and I will extend these forrnulations to the Choquet expected utility) in a parametric approach that will enable me to do comparative static exercises over the uncertainty aversion function in an easy way.

Asymmetric preferences in investment decisions in the Brazilian financial market

The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.

Stima dei parametri di modelli idrologici mediante ottimizzazione dell’utilità

Tradizionalmente, l'obiettivo della calibrazione di un modello afflussi-deflussi è sempre stato quello di ottenere un set di parametri (o una distribuzione di probabilità dei parametri) che massimizzasse l'adattamento dei dati simulati alla realtà osservata, trattando parzialmente le finalità applicative del modello. Nel lavoro di tesi viene proposta una metodologia di calibrazione che trae spunto dell'evidenza che non sempre la corrispondenza tra dati osservati e simulati rappresenti il criterio più appropriato per calibrare un modello idrologico. Ai fini applicativi infatti, può risultare maggiormente utile una miglior rappresentazione di un determinato aspetto dell'idrogramma piuttosto che un altro. Il metodo di calibrazione che viene proposto mira a valutare le prestazioni del modello stimandone l'utilità nell'applicazione prevista. Tramite l'utilizzo di opportune funzioni, ad ogni passo temporale viene valutata l'utilità della simulazione ottenuta. La calibrazione viene quindi eseguita attraverso la massimizzazione di una funzione obiettivo costituita dalla somma delle utilità stimate nei singoli passi temporali. Le analisi mostrano come attraverso l'impiego di tali funzioni obiettivo sia possibile migliorare le prestazioni del modello laddove ritenute di maggior interesse per per le finalità applicative previste.

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.

Voter Participation in the 1998 Bundestag Elections: A Theoretical Modification and Empirical Application of Downs’ Theory of Voter Participation

This article seeks to contribute to the illumination of the so-called 'paradox of voting' using the German Bundestag elections of 1998 as an empirical case. Downs' model of voter participation will be extended to include elements of the theory of subjective expected utility (SEU). This will allow a theoretical and empirical exploration of the crucial mechanisms of individual voters' decisions to participate, or abstain from voting, in the German general election of 1998. It will be argued that the infinitely low probability of an individual citizen's vote to decide the election outcome will not necessarily reduce the probability of electoral participation. The empirical analysis is largely based on data from the ALLBUS 1998. It confirms the predictions derived from SEU theory. The voters' expected benefits and their subjective expectation to be able to influence government policy by voting are the crucial mechanisms to explain participation. By contrast, the explanatory contribution of perceived information and opportunity costs is low.