Possible consequences of increasing life expectancy in Brazil: the perspective of a European historical demographer

Those over sixty years of age accounted for 6.6% of the total population of Brazil in 1985, in the Federal Republic of Germany this proportion was 20.3% in 1984. As early as 1950 it had been 14.5%. This proportion will not even be reached in Brazil in the year 2000 when persons aged sixty years and older are only projected to make up 8.8% of the total population. Similarly, in 1982/84 life expectancy at birth in the Federal Republic was 70.8 years for men and 77.5 for women; in Brazil the figures for 1980/85 were, by contrast, "only" 61.0 and 66.0. Against this background it is easy to understand why the discussion concerning an ageing society with its many related medical, economic, individual and social problems has been so slow in coming into its own in Brazil. As important as a more intensive consideration of these aspects may be in Brazil at present, they are, nevertheless, only one side of the story. For a European historical demographer with a long-term perspective of three of four hundred years, the other side of the story is just as important. The life expectancy which is almost ten years lower in Brazil is not a result of the fact that no one in Brazil lives to old age. In 1981 people sixty-five years and older accounted for 34.4% of all deaths! At the same time infants accounted for only 22.1% of total mortality. They are responsible, along with the "premature" deaths among youths and adults, for the low, "average" life expectancy figure. In Europe, by contrast, these "premature" deaths no longer play much of a role. In 1982/84 more than half of the women (52.8%) in the Federal Republic of Germany lived to see their eightieth birthdays and almost half of the men (47.3%) lived to see their seventy-fifth. Our biological existence is guaranteed to an extent today that would have been unthinkable a few generations ago. Then, the classic troika of "plague, hunger and war" threatened our forefathers all the time and everywhere. The radical transition from the formerly uncertain to a present-day certain lifetime, which is the result of the repression of "plague, hunger and war", led to unexpected consequences for our living together. Our forefathers were forced to live in closely knit Gemeinschaften in the interest of physical survival and to subordinate their egoistic goals to a common value, but now these pressures have, for the most part, fallen away. Correspondingly, this much more certain EGO has taken center stage. An ever greater number of us chooses to live life as single beings: the number of marriages is lower every year; the number of divorces is on the increase; in Berlin (West) more than half (sic! 52.3%) of all households are already composed on only one person. For the last dozen years the annual number of births in the Federal Republic has been insufficient to ensure population replacement. Not a population explosion but rather the opposite, a population implosion, is our problem. Human beings do not appear to be "social animals", as was axiomatically assumed for so long. They were only forced to behave as such for as long as "plague, hunger and war" forced them to do so. When these life endangering conditions no longer exist and life becomes certain even without their being integrated into a Gemeinschaft then humans suddenly show themselves more and more to be independent single beings. It is not the percentage of the population that is over sixty or sixty-five that is decisive in this context but rather how certain adults perceive their biological lives to be, since they are the ones who organize their lives, who build communities or who are ever more often willing only to enter into means-to-an-end personal unions without lasting or close ties and mutual responsibilities. There are many signs which seem to point to a development in this direction in Brazil as well. More and more adults in Brazil are caught up in the deep-seated transition from an uncertain to a certain lifetime. A third of them die after having reached their sixty-fifth birthday. It therefore seems to me to be high time that one began to give more consideration to the other side of the story in Brazil as well. And who is more suited intensively to consider the long-term perspectives than those engaged in the public health sector in whose competence, after all, such aspects, as "life certainty", "life expectancy" and "age at death" belong?

Trends in healthy life expectancy among older Brazilian women between 1998 and 2008

OBJECTIVE To analyze conditional and unconditional healthy life expectancy among older Brazilian women.METHODS This cross-sectional study used the intercensal technique to estimate, in the absence of longitudinal data, healthy life expectancy that is conditional and unconditional on the individual’s current health status. The data used were obtained from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (National Household Sample Survey) of 1998, 2003, and 2008. This sample comprised 11,171; 13,694; and 16,259 women aged 65 years or more, respectively. Complete mortality tables from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics for the years 2001 and 2006 were also used. The definition of health status was based on the difficulty in performing activities of daily living.RESULTS The remaining lifetime was strongly dependent on the current health status of the older women. Between 1998 and 2003, the amount of time lived with disability for healthy women at age 65 was 9.8%. This percentage increased to 66.2% when the women already presented some disability at age 65. Temporal analysis showed that the active life expectancy of the women at age 65 increased between 1998-2003 (19.3 years) and 2003-2008 (19.4 years). However, life years gained have been mainly focused on the unhealthy state.CONCLUSIONS Analysis of conditional and unconditional life expectancy indicated that live years gained are a result of the decline of mortality in unhealthy states. This pattern suggests that there has been no reduction in morbidity among older women in Brazil between 1998 and 2008.

Life expectancy without depression increases among Brazilian older adults

ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE To estimate life expectancy with and without depressive symptoms in older adults for the years 2000 and 2010. METHODS We evaluated individuals aged 60 years or older (n = 1,862 in 2000 and n = 1,280 in 2010), participants of the Saúde, Bem-Estar e Envelhecimento (SABE – Health, Wellbeing and Aging) study in in Sao Paulo, Southeastern Brazil. Depression was measured using the shorter version of the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS-15); respondents scoring ≥ 6 were classified as having depression. Estimates of life expectancy with and without depression were obtained using the Sullivan method. RESULTS Data from 2000 indicate that 60-year-old men could expect to live, on average, 14.7 years without depression and 60-year-old women could expect to live 16.5 years without depression. By 2010, life expectancy without depression had increased to 16.7 years for men and 17.8 years for women. Expected length of life with depression differed by sex, with women expected to live more years with depression than men. CONCLUSIONS Between 2000 and 2010, life expectancy without depression in Sao Paulo increased. However, older adults in Brazil, especially older women, still face a serious burden of mental illness.

A conceptual model for sheet-flow drawn from rapid granular flow theories

33rd IAHR Congress: Water Engineering for a Sustainable Environment

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism (Long version)

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism.

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism

Marx and the writers that followed him have produced a number of theories of the breakdown of capitalism. The majority of these theories were based on the historical tendencies: the rise in the composition of capital and the share of capital and the fall in the rate of profit. However these theories were never modeled with main stream rigour. This paper presents a constant wage model, with capital, labour and land as factors of production, which reproduces the historical tendencies and so can be used as a foundation for the various theories. The use of Chaplygins theorem in the proof of the main result also gives the paper a technical interest.

The Greying Church: The Impact of Life Expectancy on Religiosity

Many churches are concerned about older and dwindling congregations. We develop a theoretical framework to explain not only the downward trend in church attendance, but also the increase in the proportion of older people in the congregations. Religiosity depends positively on the expected social and spiritual benefits attached to religious adherence, as well as the probability of entering heaven in the afterlife. While otherworldly compensation in terms of salvation and spiritual benefits motivates religiosity, the costs of formal religion in terms of time allocated to communal activities and foregone income work in the opposite direction. We show that higher life expectancy discounts expected benefits in the afterlife and is hence likely to lead to postponement of religiosity. For this reason, religious organizations should be prepared to attract older members to their congregations, while emphasizing contemporaneous religious benefits to increase overall church attendance.