QUEM FINANCIA A BAIXARIA É CONTRA A CIDADANIA : Análise Da Campanha Pela Qualidade Da Televisão (2002 A 2006)

Esta dissertação descreve e analisa a Campanha Quem Financia a Baixaria é Contra a Cidadania , no período de 2002 a 2006. A pesquisa examina as estratégias da Campanha que tem por objetivo a valorização dos direitos humanos e a dignidade do cidadão nos programas de televisão. Observa sua forma de organização, mobilização social e influência na melhoria da qualidade da programação televisiva. Discute o papel do Estado e os limites da fiscalização. Investiga, ainda, a repercussão da Campanha nas ações dos poderes constituídos: Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. Trata-se de um Estudo de Caso de natureza qualitativa. As estratégias de comunicação e as ações da Campanha mobilizaram a sociedade civil, a mídia e o Ministério Público a favor da qualidade da programação. Patrocinadores foram convencidos a não associarem suas marcas a programas de qualidade duvidosa. Emissoras de televisão aberta foram punidas e até mesmo obrigadas a substituir programas de baixa qualidade por programas independentes selecionados pelo Coletivo Intervozes. Em cinco anos de atuação, a Campanha gerou quase 30 mil denúncias contra a baixaria na TV e provocou a mudança da Classificação Indicativa para programas de televisão com a edição da Portaria 264/07 do Ministério da Justiça, publicada no dia 12 de fevereiro de 2007. A nova Portaria estabelece regras mais rígidas para o setor, com critérios já adotados em outros países e vem provocando reações dos empresários de televisão. Finalmente, a pesquisa demonstrou a dificuldade de diálogo entre os diferentes setores da sociedade civil com os empresários de televisão e o Ministério das Comunicações. Revela, ainda, que o controle social da TV aberta é necessário para garantir a qualidade da programação na televisão e que a mobilização social, quando organizada, produz resultados em benefício do interesse público.(AU)

QUEM FINANCIA A BAIXARIA É CONTRA A CIDADANIA : Análise Da Campanha Pela Qualidade Da Televisão (2002 A 2006)

Esta dissertação descreve e analisa a Campanha Quem Financia a Baixaria é Contra a Cidadania , no período de 2002 a 2006. A pesquisa examina as estratégias da Campanha que tem por objetivo a valorização dos direitos humanos e a dignidade do cidadão nos programas de televisão. Observa sua forma de organização, mobilização social e influência na melhoria da qualidade da programação televisiva. Discute o papel do Estado e os limites da fiscalização. Investiga, ainda, a repercussão da Campanha nas ações dos poderes constituídos: Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. Trata-se de um Estudo de Caso de natureza qualitativa. As estratégias de comunicação e as ações da Campanha mobilizaram a sociedade civil, a mídia e o Ministério Público a favor da qualidade da programação. Patrocinadores foram convencidos a não associarem suas marcas a programas de qualidade duvidosa. Emissoras de televisão aberta foram punidas e até mesmo obrigadas a substituir programas de baixa qualidade por programas independentes selecionados pelo Coletivo Intervozes. Em cinco anos de atuação, a Campanha gerou quase 30 mil denúncias contra a baixaria na TV e provocou a mudança da Classificação Indicativa para programas de televisão com a edição da Portaria 264/07 do Ministério da Justiça, publicada no dia 12 de fevereiro de 2007. A nova Portaria estabelece regras mais rígidas para o setor, com critérios já adotados em outros países e vem provocando reações dos empresários de televisão. Finalmente, a pesquisa demonstrou a dificuldade de diálogo entre os diferentes setores da sociedade civil com os empresários de televisão e o Ministério das Comunicações. Revela, ainda, que o controle social da TV aberta é necessário para garantir a qualidade da programação na televisão e que a mobilização social, quando organizada, produz resultados em benefício do interesse público.(AU)

A qualidade da regulação estatal no Brasil: uma análise a partir de indicadores de qualidade

As primeiras agências reguladoras foram criadas a partir da segunda metade dos anos 1990, e a mais recente delas, em 2005. Com as agências surgiram também os atores privados regulados, os usuários e consumidores, e uma nova forma de interação entre os Poderes Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. Esses atores participam e dão forma ao processo de aprendizagem institucional das agências. Passado o período de criação e após quase duas décadas de existência, é necessária uma visão crítica sobre as agências. Propõe-se, então, um método de avaliação regulatória a partir de três variáveis que serão decompostas em diversas subvariáveis (quesitos a serem respondidos objetivamente). A primeira variável, institucionalização, mede as regras aplicáveis à própria agência: características dos mandatos dos dirigentes, autonomia decisória, autonomia financeira e de gestão de pessoal. A segunda, procedimentalização, ocupa-se do processo de tomada de decisão da agência e de sua transparência. Ambas as variáveis procuram medir as agências do ponto de vista formal, a partir de normas aplicáveis (leis, decretos, resoluções, portarias etc.), e pela prática regulatória, com base nos fatos ocorridos demonstrados por meio de documentos oficiais (decretos de nomeação, decisões, relatórios de atividade das próprias agências etc.). A última variável, judicialização, aponta as várias vezes em que a decisão administrativa muda de status e o nível de confirmação dessas decisões pelo Poder Judiciário. O modelo teórico de avaliação das agências ora apresentado é aplicado e testado em três setores que são submetidos à regulação econômica e contam com forte presença de atores sociais e empresa estatal federal. Assim, as agências analisadas foram: Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica ANEEL, Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações ANATEL e Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil ANAC. Em termos gerais, não é possível garantir a existência de um isoformismo entre essas agências, nem mesmo entre agências criadas em momentos diferentes e por presidentes distintos. Também não foi possível demonstrar que a interferência política seja uma marca de um único governo. A ANATEL, a melhor avaliada das três agências, destaca-se pelo rigor de suas normas que seu processo decisório reflete. A ANEEL e a ANAC tiveram uma avaliação mediana já que apresentaram avaliação sofrível quanto ao processo, mas mostraram ter instituições (regras) um pouco melhores.

A manual for the use of the General Court.

Contains rules of both branches of the General Court, the constitution of the commonwealth and that of the United States, lists of executive, legislative and judicial departments of the state, etc.

QUEM FINANCIA A BAIXARIA É CONTRA A CIDADANIA : Análise Da Campanha Pela Qualidade Da Televisão (2002 A 2006)

Esta dissertação descreve e analisa a Campanha Quem Financia a Baixaria é Contra a Cidadania , no período de 2002 a 2006. A pesquisa examina as estratégias da Campanha que tem por objetivo a valorização dos direitos humanos e a dignidade do cidadão nos programas de televisão. Observa sua forma de organização, mobilização social e influência na melhoria da qualidade da programação televisiva. Discute o papel do Estado e os limites da fiscalização. Investiga, ainda, a repercussão da Campanha nas ações dos poderes constituídos: Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. Trata-se de um Estudo de Caso de natureza qualitativa. As estratégias de comunicação e as ações da Campanha mobilizaram a sociedade civil, a mídia e o Ministério Público a favor da qualidade da programação. Patrocinadores foram convencidos a não associarem suas marcas a programas de qualidade duvidosa. Emissoras de televisão aberta foram punidas e até mesmo obrigadas a substituir programas de baixa qualidade por programas independentes selecionados pelo Coletivo Intervozes. Em cinco anos de atuação, a Campanha gerou quase 30 mil denúncias contra a baixaria na TV e provocou a mudança da Classificação Indicativa para programas de televisão com a edição da Portaria 264/07 do Ministério da Justiça, publicada no dia 12 de fevereiro de 2007. A nova Portaria estabelece regras mais rígidas para o setor, com critérios já adotados em outros países e vem provocando reações dos empresários de televisão. Finalmente, a pesquisa demonstrou a dificuldade de diálogo entre os diferentes setores da sociedade civil com os empresários de televisão e o Ministério das Comunicações. Revela, ainda, que o controle social da TV aberta é necessário para garantir a qualidade da programação na televisão e que a mobilização social, quando organizada, produz resultados em benefício do interesse público.(AU)

The unintended [or intended?] political consequences of electoral systems: The case of Bolivia

The present study was concerned with evaluating one basic institution in Bolivian democracy: its electoral system. The study evaluates the impact of electoral systems on the interaction between presidents and assemblies. It sought to determine whether it is possible to have electoral systems that favor multipartism but can also moderate the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation by producing the necessary conditions for coalition building. ^ This dissertation utilized the case study method as a methodology. Using the case of Bolivia, the research project studied the variations in executive-legislative relations and political outcomes from 1985 to the present through a model of executive-legislative relations that provided a typology of presidents and assemblies based on the strategies available to them to bargain with each other for support. A complementary model that evaluated the state of their inter-institutional interaction was also employed. ^ Results indicated that executive-legislative relations are profoundly influenced by the choice of the electoral system. Similarly, the project showed that although the Bolivian mixed system for legislative elections, and executive formula favor multipartism, these electoral systems do not necessarily engender executive-legislative confrontation in Bolivia. This was mainly due to the congressional election of the president, and the formulas utilized to translate the popular vote into legislative seats. However, the study found that the electoral system has also allowed for anti-systemic forces to emerge and gain political space both within and outside of political institutions. ^ The study found that government coalitions in Bolivia that are promoted by the system of congressional election of the president and the D'Hondt system to allocate legislative seats have helped ameliorate one of the typical problems of presidential systems in Latin America: the presence of a minority government that is blocked in its capacity to govern. This study was limited to evaluating the impact of the electoral system, as the independent variable, on executive-legislative interaction. However, the project revealed a need for more theoretical and empirical work on executive-legislative bargaining models in order to understand how institutional reforms can have an impact on the incentives of presidents and legislators to form coherent coalitions. ^

Actores y factores del contexto institucional que permiten entender la discusión y aprobación de la Ley 975 de 2005

El trabajo de investigación es un estudio de caso que pretende analizar la forma en que factores del contexto institucional y la capacidad de influencia de ciertos actores se reflejan en la discusión y aprobación de la Ley 975 de 2005. Factores del contexto institucional y la capacidad de influencia sobre las posiciones asumidas por los actores políticos y sociales en las diferentes etapas del proceso legislativo y sobre las decisiones que se tomaron para la aprobación de la Ley, en torno a dos elementos fundamentales de ésta que son el delito político y la rebaja de penas. Para ello, se tiene en cuenta el enfoque neo-institucional y el concepto de agencia.

La incidencia de los cupos indicativos en las relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo en la Ley anual de presupuesto

El propósito de este trabajo es analizar la incidencia que tienen los llamados cupos indicativos sobre las relaciones entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo, ubicados en el contexto de discusión y aprobación de la ley anual de presupuesto. El mecanismo conocido anteriormente como auxilios parlamentarios, hoy ha evolucionado y recibe el nombre de cupos indicativos. La investigación se divide en tres momentos: Marco legal de la ley anual de presupuesto y el derecho presupuestario en Colombia, el origen y evolución de los cupos indicativos durante los momentos históricos del derecho presupuestario. Finalmente, la incidencia de los cupos indicativos en las relaciones ejecutivo – legislativo.

The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process

A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process. Restrictive asylum policies instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim. From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes hat international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of states in international law or as the authority of governments under domestic constitutions.

Legislative policy, law and competitiveness: a mysterious and difficult relationship in the EU

The Lisbon Agenda places Europe in a uniquely difficult position globally, most particularly as an example of a social and regulatory experiment which many consider to be doomed to failure. The drive towards economic competitiveness has led to a focus on regulation and its effect on entrepreneurship, productivity and business growth but assessing this relationship is complex for a number of reasons. First, not all regulatory effects can be predicted precisely in relation to behavioural outcomes. Path-dependency scholars have also demonstrated that the regulation will have varying effects depending on context. Second, theoretically it is clear that many non-regulatory factors may contribute to economic and competitive success. Third, there is evidence of internal conflict within the Commission as to the relative importance of the Lisbon goals. Finally, the experience of distinct Member States presents challenges both for assessment and prescriptive remedies. The Commission has estimated that the cost of regulatory compliance obligations on businesses in the EU is between 4% and 6% of gross domestic product and that 15% of this figure is avoidable 'red tape' (the term used specifically to signify unnecessary compliance burdens). This article proposes to assess the likely outcomes of de-regulation as we rapidly approach 2010, the year for attainment of the Lisbon goals.

Changing dynamics of the interinstitutional relationships between executive and legislature power in Colombia (2002/2006)

This paper describes the relationship between the executive and legislative branches during the first government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. We will focus on reviewing the legislative output of each branch of power, along with the effectiveness and efficiency they showed as promoters of this production. We will review the impact they had on the legislative agenda setting and on the control of the legislative process  itself, making a diachronic analysis in which each legislature is used as a unit. Thus, we will try to identify the presence (or not) of some kind of pattern interactions,  and we will evaluate, at one hand, the existence of hierarchical and transactional trends, and, on the other, the different types of balances produced  between them.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Executive functions in 5- to 8-year olds: Developmental changes and relationship to academic achievement

Pronounced improvements in executive functions (EF) during preschool years have been documented in cross-sectional studies. However, longitudinal evidence on EF development during the transition to school and predictive associations between early EF and later school achievement are still scarce. This study examined developmental changes in EF across three time-points, the predictive value of EF for mathematical, reading and spelling skills and explored children's specific academic attainment as a function of early EF. Participants were 323 children following regular education; 160 children were enrolled in prekindergarten (younger cohort: 69 months) and 163 children in kindergarten (older cohort: 78.4 months) at the first assessment. Various tasks of EF were administered three times with an interval of one year each. Mathematical, reading and spelling skills were measured at the last assessment. Individual background characteristics such as vocabulary, non-verbal intelligence and socioeconomic status were included as control variables. In both cohorts, changes in EF were substantial; improvements in EF, however, were larger in preschoolers than school-aged children. EF assessed in preschool accounted for substantial variability in mathematical, reading and spelling achievement two years later, with low EF being especially associated with significant academic disadvantages in early school years. Given that EF continue to develop from preschool into primary school years and that starting with low EF is associated with lower school achievement, EF may be considered as a marker or risk for academic disabilities.

Cities and villages. : A compilation of general laws of the state of Illinois, governing and regualting the powers and duties and the exercise therof by cities and villages, with explanatory annotations digesting the decions of the Supreme and Appellate courts to date and with numerous practical and approved precedents and forms, useful in carrying on the details of executive and legislative business. /

Mode of access: Internet.

Abstracts of publications, 1967-1975 : intergovernmental programs : local government, state government--executive, state government--legislative, S & T resources /

"NSF-76-16."