Origins and efficiency of the electric industry regulation in Spain, 1910-1936

The aim of this paper is to discover the origins of utility regulation in Spain, and to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, its characteristics and the impact of regulation on consumers and utilities. Madrid and the Madrilenian utilities are taken as a case study. The electric industry in the period studied was a natural monopoly2. Each of the three phases of production, generation, transmission and distribution, had natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the most efficient form to generate, transmit and distribute electricity was the monopoly because one firm can produce a quantity at a lower cost than the sum of costs incurred by two or more firms. A problem arises because when a firm is the single provider it can charge prices above the marginal cost, at monopoly prices. When a monopolist reduces the quantity produced, price increases, causing the consumer to demand less than the economic efficiency level, incurring a loss of consumer surplus. The loss of the consumer surplus is not completely gained by the monopolist, causing a loss of social surplus, a deadweight loss. The main objective of regulation is going to be to reduce to a minimum the deadweight loss. Regulation is also needed because when the monopolist fixes prices at marginal cost equal marginal revenue there would be an incentive for firms to enter the market creating inefficiency. The Madrilenian industry has been chosen because of the availability of statistical information on costs and production. The complex industry structure and the atomised demand add interest to the analysis. This study will also provide some light on the tariff regulation of the period which has been poorly studied and will complement the literature on the US electric utilities regulation where a different type of regulation was implemented.

Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency

During the recent period of economic crisis, many countries have introduced scrappage schemes to boost the sale and production of vehicles, particularly of vehicles designed to pollute less. In this paper, we analyze the impact of a particular scheme in Spain (Plan2000E) on vehicle prices and sales figures as well as on the reduction of polluting emissions from vehicles on the road. We considered the introduction of this scheme an exogenous policy change and because we could distinguish a control group (non-subsidized vehicles) and a treatment group (subsidized vehicles), before and after the introduction of the Plan, we were able to carry out our analysis as a quasi-natural experiment. Our study reveals that manufacturers increased vehicle prices by the same amount they were granted through the Plan (1,000 €). In terms of sales, econometric estimations revealed an increase of almost 5% as a result of the implementation of the Plan. With regard to environmental efficiency, we compared the costs (inverted quantity of money) and the benefits of the program (reductions in polluting emissions and additional fiscal revenues) and found that the Plan would only be beneficial if it boosted demand by at least 30%.

Physicochemical aspects and efficiency of albuterol nebulization: comparison of three aerosol types in an in vitro pediatric model.

BACKGROUND: Advances in nebulizer design have produced both ultrasonic nebulizers and devices based on a vibrating mesh (vibrating mesh nebulizers), which are expected to enhance the efficiency of aerosol drug therapy. The aim of this study was to compare 4 different nebulizers, of 3 different types, in an in vitro model using albuterol delivery and physical characteristics as benchmarks. METHODS: The following nebulizers were tested: Sidestream Disposable jet nebulizer, Multisonic Infra Control ultrasonic nebulizer, and the Aerogen Pro and Aerogen Solo vibrating mesh nebulizers. Aerosol duration, temperature, and drug solution osmolality were measured during nebulization. Albuterol delivery was measured by a high-performance liquid chromatography system with fluorometric detection. The droplet size distribution was analyzed with a laser granulometer. RESULTS: The ultrasonic nebulizer was the fastest device based on the duration of nebulization; the jet nebulizer was the slowest. Solution temperature decreased during nebulization when the jet nebulizer and vibrating mesh nebulizers were used, but it increased with the ultrasonic nebulizer. Osmolality was stable during nebulization with the vibrating mesh nebulizers, but increased with the jet nebulizer and ultrasonic nebulizer, indicating solvent evaporation. Albuterol delivery was 1.6 and 2.3 times higher with the ultrasonic nebulizer and vibrating mesh nebulizers devices, respectively, than with the jet nebulizer. Particle size was significantly higher with the ultrasonic nebulizer. CONCLUSIONS: The in vitro model was effective for comparing nebulizer types, demonstrating important differences between nebulizer types. The new devices, both the ultrasonic nebulizers and vibrating mesh nebulizers, delivered more aerosolized drug than traditional jet nebulizers.

Education, Equity and Distributive Beliefs: Evidences from the Chilean Case

During the year 2011, Chile has been scenario of several student's demonstrations claiming for more equity in the access to the higher education. The high support to the protests by the side of the general population (nearly 89% of approval in public opinion polls) seems to suggest the existence of a large consensus about the weaknesses of the Chilean educative model, a model that would challenge the traditional ideals of meritocracy and social mobility that are at the core of the educational systems in modern societies. In this context, a question that remains open is to what extent these claims are mostly based on consensual equality ideals, or whether they are influenced by individual socio-economic determinants vis-à-vis rational motives. Using data of the social inequality module International Social Survey Program (ISSP) of 2009, this research analyzes perceptions and beliefs about education and the distributive system as well as the influence of income and educational variables, through a structural equation modeling framework. Preliminary results indicate the presence of socioeconomic cleavages in relation to the fairness of the educational system, questioning the assumption about a normative consensus.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism- based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Access, equity and social cohesion: evaluation of intersectoral strategies for people experiencing homelessness

Objective To understand and evaluate the work of intersectoral assistance on the insertion and the flow of people in situation of street with severe mental illness in public services of Mental Health. Method A case study developed from ten visits to a night shelter between March and April 2012. For data collection, the participant observation and semi-structured interviews were carried out with four sheltered individuals, as well as non-directive group interviews with five technicians of the social-assistance services. Results Were analyzed using Content Analysis and developing a Logic Model validated with the professionals involved. Conclusion The social assistance services are the main entry of this clientele in the public network of assistance services, and the Mental Health services have difficulty in responding to the specificities of the same clientele and in establishing intersectoral work.


Equity considerations in health care: An axiomatic bargaining approach

The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.

Contagion and efficiency in gross and net interbank payment systems

The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.