Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?

This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Cultural relativism in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council

This Working Paper aims to offer an up-to-date list of cultural relativist players and arguments with respect to human rights, constituted by China, Viet Nam, Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia and Cuba. This working paper argues that Indonesia, Iraq, Colombia and Mexico are not in the same cultural relativist group of states maintained by renowned scholars, notably Cristina Cerna and Dianne Otto. As such, apart from this form of cultural relativism based on the respect for the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, this working paper exposes two different categories of radical cultural relativism based on revolutionary discourse and/or radical Islamism, as well as targets the credibility on the latter two based on the information facilitated by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

The EU as a foreign policy actor – should human rights really be promoted in China?

La UE promou les seves normes i principis com els drets humans a tercers països també. en aquest document conceptualitza la UE en el seu poder normatiu i presenta la seva política de drets humans i alguns interpretacions alternatives dels drets humans. La qüestió de si, i en el qual el preu de la UE ha de promoure els drets humans a la Xina, tenint en compte diversos punts de conflicte i si es pot complir amb el seu paper d'un poder normatiu a la llum de diferents restriccions s'examinen. Finalment, és analitza el que això implica per a la realització limitada demanda original de la UE i el que un optimitzat. política de drets humans pot semblar

More than cheap talk? Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on human rights and democracy

Malgrat els esforços de la UE en la promoció de la democràcia i un compromís comú per la democràcia i els drets humans al EMP, no hi ha signes de convergència cap al model liberal democràtic propugnat per la UE. No obstant això, l'abast i la intensitat de la cooperació multilateral, transnacional i bilateral han augmentat constantment en tota la regió des de mitjans de 1990. La cooperació en el camp de la promoció de la democràcia es caracteritza per la forta dinàmica de normativa sectorial, i la diferenciació geogràfica, però està clarament situada en un marc regional i altament estandarditzat. Si bé la convergència política o la política sembla poc probable en el curt o mitjà termini, democràcia i drets humans estan fermament establerts en una agenda regional comú

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Latino Affairs, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Department of Human Rights - Deaf Services Commission of Iowa, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Human Rights, June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report