‘Nudging’ energy users: regulatory measures to address the risk of aggregate peak demand in European electricity markets

For decades regulators in the energy sector have focused on facilitating the maximisation of energy supply in order to meet demand through liberalisation and removal of market barriers. The debate on climate change has emphasised a new type of risk in the balance between energy demand and supply: excessively high energy demand brings about significantly negative environmental and economic impacts. This is because if a vast number of users is consuming electricity at the same time, energy suppliers have to activate dirty old power plants with higher greenhouse gas emissions and higher system costs. The creation of a Europe-wide electricity market requires a systematic investigation into the risk of aggregate peak demand. This paper draws on the e-Living Time-Use Survey database to assess the risk of aggregate peak residential electricity demand for European energy markets. Findings highlight in which countries and for what activities the risk of aggregate peak demand is greater. The discussion highlights which approaches energy regulators have started considering to convince users about the risks of consuming too much energy during peak times. These include ‘nudging’ approaches such as the roll-out of smart meters, incentives for shifting the timing of energy consumption, differentiated time-of-use tariffs, regulatory financial incentives and consumption data sharing at the community level.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Reforming the Market Design of EU Electricity Markets: Addressing the Challenges of a Low-Carbon Power Sector. CEPS Task Force Report, 27 July 2015

This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it analyses the current market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences. Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly introduced, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the current approach and the challenges in finding suitable solutions. The final chapter offers an inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force members and non-consensual options.

Bidding and Optimization Strategies for Wind-PV Systems in Electricity Markets

The variability in non-dispatchable power generation raises important challenges to the integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity power grid. This paper provides the coordinated trading of wind and photovoltaic energy to mitigate risks due to the wind and solar power variability, electricity prices, and financial penalties arising out the generation shortfall and surplus. The problem of wind-photovoltaic coordinated trading is formulated as a linear programming problem. The goal is to obtain the optimal bidding strategy that maximizes the total profit. The wind-photovoltaic coordinated operation is modeled and compared with the uncoordinated operation. A comparison of the models and relevant conclusions are drawn from an illustrative case study of the Iberian day-ahead electricity market.

Bidding and Optimization Strategies for Wind-PV Systems in Electricity Markets Assisted by CPS

The variability in non-dispatchable power generation raises important challenges to the integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity power grid. This paper provides the coordinated trading of wind and photovoltaic energy assisted by a cyber-physical system for supporting management decisions to mitigate risks due to the wind and solar power variability, electricity prices, and financial penalties arising out the generation shortfall and surplus. The problem of wind-photovoltaic coordinated trading is formulated as a stochastic linear programming problem. The goal is to obtain the optimal bidding strategy that maximizes the total profit. The wind-photovoltaic coordinated operation is modelled and compared with the uncoordinated operation. A comparison of the models and relevant conclusions are drawn from an illustrative case study of the Iberian day-ahead electricity market.

Towards a dignified and sustainable electricity generation sector in Australia : a comparative review of three models

Electricity is the cornerstone of modern life. It is essential to economic stability and growth, jobs and improved living standards. Electricity is also the fundamental ingredient for a dignified life; it is the source of such basic human requirements as cooked food, a comfortable living temperature and essential health care. For these reasons, it is unimaginable that today's economies could function without electricity and the modern energy services that it delivers. Somewhat ironically, however, the current approach to electricity generation also contributes to two of the gravest and most persistent problems threatening the livelihood of humans. These problems are anthropogenic climate change and sustained human poverty. To address these challenges, the global electricity sector must reduce its reliance on fossil fuel sources. In this context, the object of this research is twofold. Initially it is to consider the design of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (Renewable Electricity Act), which represents Australia's primary regulatory approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. This analysis is conducted by reference to the regulatory models that exist in Germany and Great Britain. Within this context, this thesis then evaluates whether the Renewable Electricity Act is designed effectively to contribute to a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector in Australia. On the basis of the appraisal of the Renewable Electricity Act, this thesis contends that while certain aspects of the regulatory regime have merit, ultimately its design does not represent an effective and coherent regulatory approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. In this regard, this thesis proposes a number of recommendations to reform the existing regime. These recommendations are not intended to provide instantaneous or simple solutions to the current regulatory regime. Instead, the purpose of these recommendations is to establish the legal foundations for an effective regulatory regime that is designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia in order to contribute to a more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production.

The operating schedule for battery energy storage companies in electricity market

This paper presents a series of operating schedules for Battery Energy Storage Companies (BESC) to provide peak shaving and spinning reserve services in the electricity markets under increasing wind penetration. As individual market participants, BESC can bid in ancillary services markets in an Independent System Operator (ISO) and contribute towards frequency and voltage support in the grid. Recent development in batteries technologies and availability of the day-ahead spot market prices would make BESC economically feasible. Profit maximization of BESC is achieved by determining the optimum capacity of Energy Storage Systems (ESS) required for meeting spinning reserve requirements as well as peak shaving. Historic spot market prices and frequency deviations from Australia Energy Market Operator (AEMO) are used for numerical simulations and the economic benefits of BESC is considered reflecting various aspects in Australia’s National Electricity Markets (NEM).

Estimating benefits of energy storage for aggregate storage applications in electricity distribution networks in Queensland

Electric Energy Storage (EES) is considered as one of the promising options for reducing the need for costly upgrades in distribution networks in Queensland (QLD). However, It is expected, the full potential for storage for distribution upgrade deferral cannot be fully realized due to high cost of EES. On the other hand, EES used for distribution deferral application can support a variety of complementary storage applications such as energy price arbitrage, time of use (TOU) energy cost reduction, wholesale electricity market ancillary services, and transmission upgrade deferral. Aggregation of benefits of these complementary storage applications would have the potential for increasing the amount of EES that may be financially attractive to defer distribution network augmentation in QLD. In this context, this paper analyzes distribution upgrade deferral, energy price arbitrage, TOU energy cost reduction, and integrated solar PV-storage benefits of EES devices in QLD.