948 resultados para Efficiency. DEA. Contracts. Transaction costs. Oil industry


Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Includes bibliography

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The objective of this work is to analyze the importance of the user-producer interaction for the innovative process of the Brazilian oil industry from the 2000s. To do so, we selected two of the three providers installed in Brazil that produce the set of valves used in the oil wellhead to control its production, set which is called wet Christmas tree (WCT), the Norway's Aker Solutions and the American FMC Technologies. The results of this analysis indicate not only the development of the oil industry in Brazil is marked by a strategy of cooperative innovation, but they also reveal the importance of geographical proximity and direct cooperation, especially between the centers of engineering and research and development of companies. Furthermore, these partnerships are not limited to the adaptation of products to new needs, but they also include the development of new systems. © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

In this paper we point some aspects of workers activities in offshore units in the oil industry. These units became more verticalized and have a greater number of operating systems. Our goal is to present the main difficulties that workers face in these units.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Neste estudo foram analisados os programas de fomento florestal das empresas do segmento de celulose. O objetivo é identificar a participação do fomento florestal no suprimento de madeira e as dimensões definidas nos contratos desses programas. Para o estudo utilizou-se o referencial teórico da nova economia institucional, particularmente a teoria dos contratos incompletos de longo prazo e dos custos de transação. Utilizou-se a abordagem qualitativa da pesquisa exploratória e descritiva. Para isso, após estudo documental sobre o ambiente regulatório e institucional do setor florestal, realizou-se a coleta de dados primários por meio de questionário semiestruturado, encaminhado por meio eletrônico a dirigentes e técnicos de onze empresas produtoras de celulose escolhidas intencionalmente. Os resultados mostram que o fomento florestal ocupa a segunda posição na matriz de suprimento de madeira para processamento da indústria de celulose como mecanismo de substituição da integração vertical, pela coordenação vertical por meio de contratos de longo prazo. Indicam, também, que a participação dos programas de fomento florestal e do mercado no suprimento de madeira para processamento está crescendo. O fomento visa a facilitar o acesso a recursos, associados ao cultivo florestal, reduzindo os custos associados à imobilização em terras, fomentando o aumento da oferta de madeira para processamento. As empresas estruturam modalidades diferentes dos programas de fomento para adequar os incentivos aos produtores de acordo com o porte de suas propriedades. Excetuando-se o fomento de extensão, os demais programas de fomento usam a opção de compra da produção.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

No abstract available.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.