Entrepreneurial Motivations Questionnaire: AFC and CFA in academy.

Background Entrepreneurship has been considered essential to create value, being a powerful driver of economic and social development. Academy must invest in the development of entrepreneurial skills in students ("Entrepreneurial Academy"). Objective: To analyse the psychometric proprieties of the EMQ-Entrepreneurial Motivations Questionnaire. Methods Sample: 6,532 students from 17 polytechnic Institutes of Portugal. Measure: EMQ, composed by measures of Entrepreneurial motives for the business, Entrepreneurial influences, and Support Services. Results Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for Entrepreneurial-Motives-for-thebusiness (KMO = .921, X2 = 54387.94, p < .001) extracted 4 factors, explaining 53.81 % of variance (EV): F1-Family security (19.92 % EV; M= 4.07, SD = 0.67), F2-Prestige (14.60 % EV; M= 3.25, SD = 0.75), F3- Independence (13.13 % EV; M= 3.33, SD = 0.75), and F4-Realization of an opportunity (11.15 % EV; M= 4.08, SD = 0.56). This factorial structure was supported by Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), with an acceptable fit: RMSEA = .084. EFA of Entrepreneurial-Influences (KMO = .916, X2 = 60584.93, p < .001), extracted 4 factors, EV 60.08 %: F1-Resources availability (21.25 % EV; M= 3.86, SD = 0.68), F2-Stable customers and incentives (19.70 % EV; M= 3.82, SD = 0.65), F3-Social and economic instability (11.11 % EV; M= 2.96, SD = 1.06), and F4-Opportunities in the sector and residence area (8.03 % EV; M= 3.29, SD = 0.95). This factorial structure was supported by CFA, with an acceptable fit: RMSEA = .073. EFA of Support-Services (KMO = .995, X2 = 57311.43, p < .001) extracted 2 factors, EV 58.43 %: F1-Financial support (32.59 % EV; M= 3.93, SD = 0.69) and F2-Prestige (25.84 % EV; M= 3.95, SD = 0.65). This factorial structure was supported by CFA, with an acceptable fit: RMSEA = .090. The health group showed scores mostly above global average in factors. Conclusions EMQ showed adequate psychometric properties. The instrument is useful for measuring entrepreneurships motivations in health.

Factor models, VARMA processes and parameter instability with applications in macroeconomics

Avec les avancements de la technologie de l'information, les données temporelles économiques et financières sont de plus en plus disponibles. Par contre, si les techniques standard de l'analyse des séries temporelles sont utilisées, une grande quantité d'information est accompagnée du problème de dimensionnalité. Puisque la majorité des séries d'intérêt sont hautement corrélées, leur dimension peut être réduite en utilisant l'analyse factorielle. Cette technique est de plus en plus populaire en sciences économiques depuis les années 90. Étant donnée la disponibilité des données et des avancements computationnels, plusieurs nouvelles questions se posent. Quels sont les effets et la transmission des chocs structurels dans un environnement riche en données? Est-ce que l'information contenue dans un grand ensemble d'indicateurs économiques peut aider à mieux identifier les chocs de politique monétaire, à l'égard des problèmes rencontrés dans les applications utilisant des modèles standards? Peut-on identifier les chocs financiers et mesurer leurs effets sur l'économie réelle? Peut-on améliorer la méthode factorielle existante et y incorporer une autre technique de réduction de dimension comme l'analyse VARMA? Est-ce que cela produit de meilleures prévisions des grands agrégats macroéconomiques et aide au niveau de l'analyse par fonctions de réponse impulsionnelles? Finalement, est-ce qu'on peut appliquer l'analyse factorielle au niveau des paramètres aléatoires? Par exemple, est-ce qu'il existe seulement un petit nombre de sources de l'instabilité temporelle des coefficients dans les modèles macroéconomiques empiriques? Ma thèse, en utilisant l'analyse factorielle structurelle et la modélisation VARMA, répond à ces questions à travers cinq articles. Les deux premiers chapitres étudient les effets des chocs monétaire et financier dans un environnement riche en données. Le troisième article propose une nouvelle méthode en combinant les modèles à facteurs et VARMA. Cette approche est appliquée dans le quatrième article pour mesurer les effets des chocs de crédit au Canada. La contribution du dernier chapitre est d'imposer la structure à facteurs sur les paramètres variant dans le temps et de montrer qu'il existe un petit nombre de sources de cette instabilité. Le premier article analyse la transmission de la politique monétaire au Canada en utilisant le modèle vectoriel autorégressif augmenté par facteurs (FAVAR). Les études antérieures basées sur les modèles VAR ont trouvé plusieurs anomalies empiriques suite à un choc de la politique monétaire. Nous estimons le modèle FAVAR en utilisant un grand nombre de séries macroéconomiques mensuelles et trimestrielles. Nous trouvons que l'information contenue dans les facteurs est importante pour bien identifier la transmission de la politique monétaire et elle aide à corriger les anomalies empiriques standards. Finalement, le cadre d'analyse FAVAR permet d'obtenir les fonctions de réponse impulsionnelles pour tous les indicateurs dans l'ensemble de données, produisant ainsi l'analyse la plus complète à ce jour des effets de la politique monétaire au Canada. Motivée par la dernière crise économique, la recherche sur le rôle du secteur financier a repris de l'importance. Dans le deuxième article nous examinons les effets et la propagation des chocs de crédit sur l'économie réelle en utilisant un grand ensemble d'indicateurs économiques et financiers dans le cadre d'un modèle à facteurs structurel. Nous trouvons qu'un choc de crédit augmente immédiatement les diffusions de crédit (credit spreads), diminue la valeur des bons de Trésor et cause une récession. Ces chocs ont un effet important sur des mesures d'activité réelle, indices de prix, indicateurs avancés et financiers. Contrairement aux autres études, notre procédure d'identification du choc structurel ne requiert pas de restrictions temporelles entre facteurs financiers et macroéconomiques. De plus, elle donne une interprétation des facteurs sans restreindre l'estimation de ceux-ci. Dans le troisième article nous étudions la relation entre les représentations VARMA et factorielle des processus vectoriels stochastiques, et proposons une nouvelle classe de modèles VARMA augmentés par facteurs (FAVARMA). Notre point de départ est de constater qu'en général les séries multivariées et facteurs associés ne peuvent simultanément suivre un processus VAR d'ordre fini. Nous montrons que le processus dynamique des facteurs, extraits comme combinaison linéaire des variables observées, est en général un VARMA et non pas un VAR comme c'est supposé ailleurs dans la littérature. Deuxièmement, nous montrons que même si les facteurs suivent un VAR d'ordre fini, cela implique une représentation VARMA pour les séries observées. Alors, nous proposons le cadre d'analyse FAVARMA combinant ces deux méthodes de réduction du nombre de paramètres. Le modèle est appliqué dans deux exercices de prévision en utilisant des données américaines et canadiennes de Boivin, Giannoni et Stevanovic (2010, 2009) respectivement. Les résultats montrent que la partie VARMA aide à mieux prévoir les importants agrégats macroéconomiques relativement aux modèles standards. Finalement, nous estimons les effets de choc monétaire en utilisant les données et le schéma d'identification de Bernanke, Boivin et Eliasz (2005). Notre modèle FAVARMA(2,1) avec six facteurs donne les résultats cohérents et précis des effets et de la transmission monétaire aux États-Unis. Contrairement au modèle FAVAR employé dans l'étude ultérieure où 510 coefficients VAR devaient être estimés, nous produisons les résultats semblables avec seulement 84 paramètres du processus dynamique des facteurs. L'objectif du quatrième article est d'identifier et mesurer les effets des chocs de crédit au Canada dans un environnement riche en données et en utilisant le modèle FAVARMA structurel. Dans le cadre théorique de l'accélérateur financier développé par Bernanke, Gertler et Gilchrist (1999), nous approximons la prime de financement extérieur par les credit spreads. D'un côté, nous trouvons qu'une augmentation non-anticipée de la prime de financement extérieur aux États-Unis génère une récession significative et persistante au Canada, accompagnée d'une hausse immédiate des credit spreads et taux d'intérêt canadiens. La composante commune semble capturer les dimensions importantes des fluctuations cycliques de l'économie canadienne. L'analyse par décomposition de la variance révèle que ce choc de crédit a un effet important sur différents secteurs d'activité réelle, indices de prix, indicateurs avancés et credit spreads. De l'autre côté, une hausse inattendue de la prime canadienne de financement extérieur ne cause pas d'effet significatif au Canada. Nous montrons que les effets des chocs de crédit au Canada sont essentiellement causés par les conditions globales, approximées ici par le marché américain. Finalement, étant donnée la procédure d'identification des chocs structurels, nous trouvons des facteurs interprétables économiquement. Le comportement des agents et de l'environnement économiques peut varier à travers le temps (ex. changements de stratégies de la politique monétaire, volatilité de chocs) induisant de l'instabilité des paramètres dans les modèles en forme réduite. Les modèles à paramètres variant dans le temps (TVP) standards supposent traditionnellement les processus stochastiques indépendants pour tous les TVPs. Dans cet article nous montrons que le nombre de sources de variabilité temporelle des coefficients est probablement très petit, et nous produisons la première évidence empirique connue dans les modèles macroéconomiques empiriques. L'approche Factor-TVP, proposée dans Stevanovic (2010), est appliquée dans le cadre d'un modèle VAR standard avec coefficients aléatoires (TVP-VAR). Nous trouvons qu'un seul facteur explique la majorité de la variabilité des coefficients VAR, tandis que les paramètres de la volatilité des chocs varient d'une façon indépendante. Le facteur commun est positivement corrélé avec le taux de chômage. La même analyse est faite avec les données incluant la récente crise financière. La procédure suggère maintenant deux facteurs et le comportement des coefficients présente un changement important depuis 2007. Finalement, la méthode est appliquée à un modèle TVP-FAVAR. Nous trouvons que seulement 5 facteurs dynamiques gouvernent l'instabilité temporelle dans presque 700 coefficients.

Revisiting the Relationship between Income Distribution and Economic Growth

La mayoría de los modelos que exploran la relación entre la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso y el crecimiento económico, postulan la existencia de una correlación negativa entre las dos que es generada a través de diferentes mecanismos. Paralelamente a los modelos teóricos, un número importante de estudios empíricos han tratado de evaluar esta relación. De este esfuerzo ha surgido un consenso amplio que valida la existencia de dicha relación negativa. No obstante, estudios recientes basados en el uso de datos de panel han producido el resultado contrario, documentando la presencia de una relación positiva entre desigualdad y crecimiento. El examen del debate generado a partir de estos resultados, así como el trabajo empírico adelantado en este estudio, indican que las estimaciones obtenidas en diversos trabajos pueden no ser tan robustas como se creía En consecuencia, se sugiere que la realización de estudios de caso por país puede ser una mejor vía para explorar este tema.

Economic crises in England, 1270-1520: a statistical approach

The chapter examines how far medieval economic crises can be identified by analysing the residuals from a simultaneous equation model of the medieval English economy. High inflation, falls in gross domestic product and large intermittent changes in wage rates are all considered as potential indicators of crisis. Potential causal factors include bad harvests, wars and political instability. The chapter suggests that crises arose when a combination of different problems overwhelmed the capacity of government to address them. It may therefore be a mistake to look for a single cause of any crisis. The coincidence of separate problems is a more plausible explanation of many crises.

Common currency and economic integration in Mercosur

A América Latina tem uma longa história de tentativas de alcançar uma integração regional, embora seu sucesso tenha sido modesto. Este trabalho procura mostrar que isso essencialmente ocorre não tanto pelas práticas protecionistas nos vários países, mas devido à falta de uma moeda comum, ou, pelo menos, de uma taxa de câmbio rigorosamente administrada. Os autores analisaram o critério da área ótima de moeda que mostra ser prudente aumentar a integração econômica antes de tentar implementar a coordenação das taxas de câmbio. Entretanto, nós mostramos que no Mercosul já existem as condições mínimas para começar a trabalhar nessa direção. A diminuição da instabilidade cambial pode encorajar a entrada de investimentos e o comércio nas economias latino-americanas. Os autores também desenvolveram um exercício simplificado para entender como poderia ser viável alcançar estabilidade da taxa de câmbio em nos dois maiores países da região (Brasil e Argentina) e avançar na adoção de uma moeda comum.

Review of Caribbean economic and social performance in the 1980's and 1990's

Includes bibliography

Economic growth in Latin America in the late 20th century: evidence and interpretation

Includes bibliography

Social dimensions of macroeconomic policy: report of the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations

Introduction The social agenda is long-term in nature, in the sense that poverty alleviation along with a better distribution of income, wealth and opportunities are long-term goals. A sound macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, has to do largely with the consistent management of short-term policy instruments pursuing a sustainable and predictable pace for aggregate economic variables and major prices (wages, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates). In spite of the different arena and rationale in which they play, there are strong links between the two. First and most obvious, macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform are more likely to be sustainable when they are equitable. Second, social intervention —i.e., policies, programmes and reforms aimed at improving social performance in the long run—, needs stable funding which is not always available in view of macroeconomic constraints. Third, macroeconomic instability —especially episodes of recession or hyperinflation— increases poverty and inequality, while restoring macroeconomic equilibrium does not restore previous social balances. Finally, there is no unique macroeconomic policy mix to tackle a given situation, and the policy options may not be neutral from a social standpoint. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, together with structural reform, have major consequences for the social wellbeing of societies, not only in terms of protection against shocks and crises but also in terms of equity. Many, if not all, of the necessary social policies are of a domestic nature. This report thus concentrates on domestic strategies aimed at maximizing the linkages between consistent macroeconomic policies and social progress. Pursuing them, however, depends to a considerable extent on the international enabling environment in which the global financial system, the unsettled debt crisis and increasing ODA flows play a significant role. Countries operate in a world economy where market players everywhere immediately scrutinize domestic monetary, financial or fiscal policy decisions and the performance of exchange rate regimes of individual countries. Under these conditions, the room for manoeuvre of policymakers has become considerably constrained. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly complex to incorporate the social dimensions into such policy decisions, to the extent that external analysts consider that authorities are sacrificing sound macroeconomic policies. The main message of the report is that the expediency of short-term economic efficiency as embedded in much of the advice on macroeconomic stability needs to be tempered by long-term development objectives. The report starts with a short historical background which describes the ascendancy of macroeconomic policies over social development policies (chapter I). It continues with an evaluation of the relation between macroeconomic consistency and social effort (chapter II), and the importance of sustainable and stable growth for social progress (chapter III). The report then turns to the need for an equity-enhancing growth strategy (chapter IV) and an analysis of the priorities of social policies in an integrated approach to growth (chapter V). The final chapter adds some final institutional remarks.

Why is there so much economic insecurity in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

Towards an integrated vision for dealing with instability and risk

Includes bibliography

Political instability, institutional quality and social conflict in the Andes

Includes bibliography

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

The Penetration of Financial Instability in Agricultural Credit and Leveraging. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 2, September 2011

This paper describes the aggregate rural capital markets of the EU and the main differences between the markets of its member countries. The results of our study suggest that the agricultural credit markets are still quite segmented and the segments are country- rather than currency- or region specific. Financial instability in Europe is also penetrating the agricultural sector and the variation of interest rates for agricultural credit is increasing across countries. Perhaps the most dramatic signal of growing financial instability is that the financial leverage (gearing rate) of European farms rose in 2008 by almost 4 percentage points, from 14 to 18%. The 4 percentage-point annual rise was twice the 2 percentage-point rise observed during the economic recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across countries does not, however, reflect the distribution of country-specific risk premiums in the manner that they are observed in government bond yields. Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial situation in the public sector and in which the bond markets are encumbered with high country-specific risk premiums, the agricultural sector is not directly exposed to a very large risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not so highly leveraged. For example in Greek and Spanish agriculture, the financial leverage (gearing) rate is only 0.6% and 2.2% respectively, while the highest gearing rates are found elsewhere (in Denmark), reaching 50%.