China's 'two Koreas' policy : achievements and contradictions

China has long maintained a keen interest in events on the Korean peninsula, which Beijing considers to fall within the Sinic sphere of interest. The PRC has maintained a decades-long alliance with North Korea, and also achieved a rapprochement with South Korea, with whom China enjoys a burgeoning economic relationship. The PRC’s pursuit of a ‘two Koreas’ policy has tested Beijing’s diplomatic mettle during the past decade. In and of itself, the maintenance of strong ties to both Koreas represents a significant achievement. By reviewing recent developments in Chinese diplomacy towards the peninsula, this article highlights both the achievements and contradictions inherent in Beijing’s two-Korea policy. North Korea has risked China’s wrath by pursuing a nuclear deterrent, and by refusing to enact market reforms. In the case of the South, the government of Lee Myung-bak has strengthened its alliance with the U.S. and also sought to compensate for its growing economic interdependence with China by seeking FTAs with other states, including the U.S. The sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 presents an opportunity to reflect on China’s efforts to balance its ties with both Koreas.

An overview of China's one child policy and health consequences on society

In 1979, China implemented the one child policy to stifle the burden of the massive demographic growth cast on the future economic development and quality of living conditions. At the time, a quarter of the world's population resided in China and occupied only 7 percent of the world's arable land (The World Factbook, 2006). The government set the target total population to about 1.4 billion for the year 2010 and to significantly reduce the natural increase rate. First this overview paper will describe population demographics and economy of China's society. This paper will also investigate what the one child policy entails and how it is implemented. Furthermore, the consequences of the policy in regard to population growth, sex ratio, marital discrepancies, adverse health of mother and child, aging population, and pension coverage will be examined. Finally, future recommendations and an alternative policy will be postulated to increase the effectiveness of the policy and improve its effects on health. ^

The Flowchart Model of Cluster Policy: The Automobile Industry Cluster in China

This paper proposes a general model of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy and applies this model to Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. The flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an action plan for prioritizing policy measures in a time-ordered series. We reached the following two conclusions. First,we clarified the effects of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota on agglomeration in Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. Second, we established that local governments play a crucial role in successful industrial cluster policy, and that the mayor of the local government should be offered incentives in order to target industrial clustering and implement cluster policy.

Chinese Intellectuals and China`s Policy toward Japan

This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model. First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their international patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position; nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined. Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept "patriotic dilemma" is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.

Bank versus non-bank credit in the United States, Europe and China. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2012/07, 5 June 2013

In the wake of recent crisis developments in the US and Europe, non-bank credit channels have often been portrayed as 'shadow banking' and have been considered primarily through the lens of the risks they may pose to financial stability. However, the debate about financial system structures remains immature, in large part due to lack of reliable and comparable data. The available evidence actually points towards a correlation between the development of non-bank credit and higher resilience against systemic risk, at least in developed economies. Policy should aim at better statistical information, and at strengthening the infrastructure for the gradual development of sustainable nonbank credit provision.

The Role of Civil Society Dialogue in the EU-China Cooperation on Renewable Energy. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/05/December 2012

Summary. Expanding EU-China institutional cooperation in the energy sector has been matched by a parallel process of stronger economic ties between European and Chinese companies in the renewable energy (RE) sector (particularly wind and photovoltaics). While the foundation of early EU-China institutional relations was based primarily on trade cooperation, international efforts to mitigate climate change and the common challenge of decreasing energy dependence in a sustainable manner brought a new dimension to their partnership in the energy sector in the mid 90s. Although the role of EU-China energy cooperation has grown tremendously in the context of EU external trade policy and EU strategy to boost its energy independence and international climate policy, the potential of civil society collaboration in this partnership has remained rather unexploited. Based on major civil society initiatives in the RE field that have been developed in recent years, this policy brief argues that civil society dialogue between China and EU could be an important driving force in deepening EU-China cooperation on RE and a bridge towards a more sustainable future.

Monetary policy and the over-investment cycle: China as an extreme case. CEPS Commentary, 27 August 2015

Against the background of the severe turbulence that is hitting global stock markets, Daniel Gros examines the looming slowdown in the Chinese economy in this CEPS Commentary, which he attributes to an underlying ‘real’ domestic investment/savings imbalance. Given the magnitude of this imbalance, Gros thinks it is unlikely to be solved by monetary policy and that the best that can be hoped for is that the central banks will manage to ‘paper over’ some of the unavoidable symptoms in credit markets.

Don’t Go Protectionist! Trade and Investment Relations between the EU and China. Asia Policy Brief 2012/1, June 2012

The European Parliament has proposed the creation of a body to monitor foreign – in particular Chinese – investment in the EU. The initiative, driven by fears of unfair competition and a hidden political agenda behind Chinese investments, should be rejected. There are better ways to promote openness and transparency in Sino-European economic relations.

The Importance of Being Earnest: The green economy and sustainable development in China. Asia Policy Brief 2012/02, November 2012

China's past economic development model has not been sustainable, at least in environmental terms. In recent years, the Chinese government has dedicated considerable time, planning energy, policy and rhetoric to "green" issues. However, there is a risk that this trend will be stalled by struggles related to pending economic problems and the upcoming leadership transition. Consequently, the international community should acknowledge China’s achievements in terms of environmental policy and cooperation as one way of serving the global public interest.

Neue Führung, alte Probleme –der Generationswechsel an Chinas politischer Spitze/New management, old problems - Generational change in China. Asia Policy Brief 2012/03, December 2012

Mit dem Ende des 18. Parteitags der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) Mitte November kam auch die erste Phase des chinesische Führungswechsels zum Abschluss. Die wichtigste Aufgabe der Partei während dieser Phase war es, den ständigen Ausschuss des Politbüros, also das oberste beschlussfassende Organ der Partei, zu wählen. Zusätzlich zur Ernennung von sieben Spitzenpolitikern umfasst der Wechsel auch die Wahl eines neuen Politbüros und des Zentralkomitees als Vertretung der 83 Millionen Parteimitglieder.

China's new Government: Priorities, Programs, Reform Signals. Asia Policy Brief 2013/02, May 2013

Never before has any change of leadership in China drawn this much international attention. The composition of the new party and state leadership in China is the result of many years of probing and negotiating within the top levels of the Communist Party. New priorities and leadership styles may cause fundamental shifts in the mechanisms of governance during the decade that China’s new leadership will be in control. Thus, the installation of a new government in China has potentially stronger long-term effects than most government turnovers in Western Democracies.