840 resultados para EMPLOYMENT CREATION


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Los documentos del Seminario fueron publicados por UNESCO en 1961 con el título: La urbanización en América Latina/Urbanization in Latin America

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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This paper shows that liquidity constraints restrict jobcreation even when labor markets are flexible. In a dynamicmodel of labor demand, I show that in an environment of imperfect capital and imperfect labor markets, firms usetemporary contracts to relax financial constraints. Evidence for the predictions of the model is presented using Spanish data from the CBBE (Central de Balances del Banco de España - Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). It is shown that firms substitute temporary laborfor permanent one and use less debt as their financial position improves. In particular, it is rejected that Spanish firms operate in an environment of free capital markets and of no labor adjustment costs. The labor reform of 1984, which created temporary contracts, implied to some extent a relaxation of liquidity constraints.Accordingly, firms used these contracts more extensivelyand used less debt; however, as capital markets continueto be imperfect, permanent job creation continues to beslow. Consequently, relaxation of liquidity constraints should also be part of a job creation strategy.

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This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

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Includes bibliography

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Includes bibliography