Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.

Accounting accruals and information asymmetry in Europe

We investigate whether the positive relation between accounting accruals and information asymmetry documented for U.S. stock markets also holds for European markets, considered as a whole and at the country level. This research is relevant because this relation is likely to be affected by differences in accounting standards used by companies for financial reporting, in the traditional use of the banking system or capital markets for firm financing, in legal systems and cultural environment. We find that in European stock markets discretionary accruals are positively related with the Corwin and Schultz high-low spread estimator used as a proxy for information asymmetry. Our results suggest that the earnings management component of accruals outweighs the informational component, but the significance of the relation varies across countries. Further, such association tends to be stronger for firms with the highest levels of positive discretionary accruals. Consistent with the evidence provided by the authors, our results also suggest that the high-low spread estimator is more efficient than the closing bid-ask spread when analysing the impact of information quality on information asymmetry.

Relação entre qualidade da quditoria e manipulação de resultados

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo analisar se existe relação entre a manipulação de resultados e a qualidade da auditoria, baseado no estudo do comportamento de determinados “accruals” nas empresas portuguesas não cotadas. Nos diversos estudos existentes sobre o tema “Relação da Qualidade da Auditoria e Manipulação de Resultados”, surgem abordados muitos aspetos, nomeadamente no que respeita às motivações, às formas de manipulação e métodos de deteção que se verifica no campo da auditoria e, este trabalho, pretende abordar se o processo da auditoria é, ou não, eficaz na deteção destas práticas efetuadas pelos gestores, pois isso influencia a confiança naqueles que utilizam a informação financeira. Desta forma, o trabalho pretende basear-se nestas abordagens e complementar visões e conclusões. Neste âmbito, surgem perspetivas e informações que alertam para comportamentos de risco, assim como a sua origem, ou seja, as motivações que provocam esta prática, tanto por parte dos gestores como dos administradores. É nesta perspetiva que este trabalho se enquadra, numa sociedade contemporânea que continuadamente dá exemplos reais e concretos destas práticas. Um ponto é comum, que é o facto de a manipulação dos resultados surgir principalmente pelo motivo dos interesses e motivações por parte dos gestores em conseguirem benefícios. Na tese são abordados os incentivos que levam à manipulação no contexto português, que parecem estar relacionados com o contexto económico e fiscal, onde é desenvolvida a atividade dos agentes económicos. Outra abordagem importante no trabalho é a referência às principais metodologias de detenção da manipulação de resultados, nomeadamente os modelos baseados nos accruals e na distribuição de resultados. O modelo empírico deste estudo consiste numa regressão linear múltipla, com o objetivo de explicar a relação, entre a variável accruals discricionários e as variáveis Big4, a dimensão da empresa, o endividamento, o volume de negócios e a rendibilidade. Para complementar este estudo a análise empírica incidiu sobre 4723 empresas portuguesas não cotadas, a amostra usada foi baseada na base de dados SABI, para um período de análise entre 2011 a 2013. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que existe relação entre a qualidade da auditoria e a manipulação dos resultados concluindo que as empresas auditadas pelas Big4 apresentam accruals discricionários inferiores às restantes empresas.

Depreciation manipulation and its impact on firms' returns

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A equidade na indeminização dos danos não patrimoniais

This study examines the quantification of compensation for non-pecuniary damage, awarded by means of judicial decisions based on equity, and seeks to verify whether such calculation safeguards legal certainty and predictability when applying the law, as well as whether it observes the principles of proportionality and equality. Firstly, the limits for discretionary judgment permitted to the judge were determined, by evaluating the criteria established under the law. Then, by examining the grounds of the judicial decisions in cases that had been selected beforehand, this study sought to detect operation modes in concrete considerations of equity used by judges. The examination of the grounds on which these judicial decisions are based permitted the comprehension of the calculation method used in each case and the observation that the criteria of compensatory nature, such as the extent of the damage and the respective consequences, assumed a primary role. Despite discrepancies in viewpoints with regard to certain issues of law, the jurisprudence examined reveals that great care is taken to consider the solutions reached in similar cases, in an attempt to ensure that the different criteria applied in the quantification of compensation are given uniform relevance. The comparison of decisions, reported to cases with similar legal contours, did not reveal relevant discrepancies in the calculation criteria used, nor are they disproportionate regarding the amount of compensation awarded, which means that resorting to equity, in determining the compensation to be awarded due to nonpecuniary damage, does not jeopardize legal certainty or predictability when applying the law, and observes the principle of proportionality, which is anchored in the constitutional principle of equality. The study performed, led to the conclusion that the grounds on which judicial decisions are based, by itemising the elements which are taken into account and the criteria adopted by the judge, allow these to be taken into consideration in similar cases, contributing towards uniform interpretation and application of the law, ensuring legal certainty and predictability when resorting to equity while quantifying compensation.

A (in)existência de apoio judiciário na arbitragem administrativa: o direito de acesso à tutela jurisdicional efetiva?

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Administrativo

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization

This paper studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilization in a New Keynesian model, where the fiscal policymaker uses a distortionary taxe as the policy instrument and operates with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of the instrument. We demonstrate that longer fiscal cycles result in stronger complementarities between the optimal actions of the monetary and fiscal policymakers. When the fiscal cycle is not very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a sufficiently long fiscal cycle — one year in our model — no learnable time-consistent equilibrium exists. Constraining the fiscal policymaker in its actions may help to avoid these adverse effects.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

The effects of uncertainty about countries' compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members’ commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members’ commitment towards the SGP. Keywords: fiscal policy rules, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact, uncertainty, commitment. JEL No.: E63, F55, H62, H87