Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Political representation in Switzerland : democratic or plutocratic ?

Les inégalités économiques se traduisent-elles dans des inégalités politiques à travers le processus de représentation électorale? Telle est la question centrale de cette thèse qui s'attache, par ailleurs, à investiguer les mécanismes qui tendent à produire une représentation biaisée des préférences politiques des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique. Focalisé sur le cas de la Suisse et faisant usage des données de l'enquête postélectorale Selects de 2007, ce travail démontre que sur les rares sujets qui divisent les citoyens selon des clivages économiques - la redistribution des richesses et la sécurité sociale en particulier - les élus à l'Assemblée fédérale ont des préférences qui reflètent mieux les opinions des citoyens les plus riches. Cette sous-représentation des opinions des citoyens modestes et de ceux faisant partie du centre de la distribution des revenus peut en partie être attribuée à des différences dans les taux de participation et de connaissance politiques entre ces groupes de citoyens. La thèse met également en évidence le rôle joué par la représentation descriptive - autrement dit, la similitude en termes de statut économique entre les représentants et les représentés - dans la représentation des opinions et intérêts des citoyens. Par ailleurs, la structure du système partisan en Suisse ne reflétant pas la multidimensionnalité des préférences politiques des citoyens, les électeurs ne parviennent pas à traduire la complexité de leurs préférences politiques dans un choix de vote, ce qui, dans la configuration actuelle des forces politiques, tend à favoriser l'élection de représentants aux opinions proches de la droite sur les questions économiques. Enfin, une analyse de la représentation politique au niveau cantonal tend à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle le manque de régulation en matière de financement des partis en Suisse pourrait partiellement expliquer les inégalités dans la représentation des opinions politiques des citoyens aux revenus distincts. - Do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities through electoral representation? This is the central research question of this thesis, which also investigates the mechanisms that lead to potential economically based inequalities in the representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and making use of data provided by the post- electoral survey Selects 2007, this research demonstrates that regarding the rare policy domains in which the preferences of citizens are clearly linked to economic cleavages - redistribution and social security in particular - members of the Federal Assembly have policy preferences that best reflect the policy preferences of richer citizens. The under-representation of the opinions of relatively poor citizens and of those being the in the middle of the income distribution can be to some extent be explained by differences in political participation and political information across income groups. The thesis also puts forward the role played by descriptive representation - the similarity between representatives and represented in terms of their socioeconomic status - for the representation of citizens' preferences and interests. In addition, the structure of the party system in Switzerland does not reflect the multidimensionality of policy preferences among citizens who, as a result, have a hard time translating their complex preferences into a vote choice. Given the configuration of political actors, this tends to favour the election of representatives from the right who do not represent the preferences of their voters on economic issues. Finally, an analysis of representation at the cantonal level tends to confirm that the lack of party finance regulations in Switzerland may partially explain inequalities in the representation of citizens with different levels of income.