A rank deception : a farce in two acts /

Includes original t.p.: "...as originally presented by amateurs in Charleston, S. C., January 9th, 11th, 14th and 16, 1899."

The Illinois Detection of Deception Examiners Act.

Description based on: 1985; title from cover.

Sketches of imposture : deception and credulity.

Mode of access: Internet.

The power of deception unveiled, and the man of sin revealed, in an analysis of the book of Revelations. To which is prefixed An essay on the system of man.

Edited by Joseph Churchman.

The great deception, bringing into the light the real meaning and mandate of the Harding vote as to peace,

Mode of access: Internet.

Cues to deception in a textual narrative context:lying in written witness statements

Little research has been undertaken into high stakes deception, and even less into high stakes deception in written text. This study addresses that gap. In this thesis, I present a new approach to detecting deception in written narratives based on the definition of deception as a progression and focusing on identifying deceptive linguistic strategy rather than individual cues. I propose a new approach for subdividing whole narratives into their constituent episodes, each of which is linguistically profiled and their progression mapped to identify authors’ deceptive strategies based on cue interaction. I conduct a double blind study using qualitative and quantitative analysis in which linguistic strategy (cue interaction and progression) and overall cue presence are used to predict deception in witness statements. This results in linguistic strategy analysis correctly predicting 85% of deceptive statements (92% overall) compared to 54% (64% overall) with cues identified on a whole statement basis. These results suggest that deception cues are not static, and that the value of individual cues as deception predictors is linked to their interaction with other cues. Results also indicate that in certain cue combinations, individual self-references (I, Me and My), previously believed to be indicators of truthfulness, are effective predictors of deceptive linguistic strategy at work

The effect of cognitive load on deception

The current study applied classic cognitive capacity models to examine the effect of cognitive load on deception. The study also examined whether the manipulation of cognitive load would result in the magnification of differences between liars and truth-tellers. In the first study, 87 participants engaged in videotaped interviews while being either deceptive or truthful about a target event. Some participants engaged in a concurrent secondary task while being interviewed. Performance on the secondary task was measured. As expected, truth tellers performed better on secondary task items than liars as evidenced by higher accuracy rates. These results confirm the long held assumption that being deceptive is more cognitively demanding than being truthful. In the second part of the study, the videotaped interviews of both liars and truth-tellers were shown to 69 observers. After watching the interviews, observers were asked to make a veracity judgment for each participant. Observers made more accurate veracity judgments when viewing participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task than when viewing those who did not. Observers also indicated that participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task appeared to think harder than participants who did not. This study provides evidence that engaging in deception is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. As hypothesized, having participants engage in a concurrent secondary task led to the magnification of differences between liars and truth tellers. This magnification of differences led to more accurate veracity rates in a second group of observers. The implications for deception detection are discussed.

Detecting deception: Identifying differences in liars' and truth tellers' verbal strategies

Deception research has traditionally focused on three methods of identifying liars and truth tellers: observing non-verbal or behavioral cues, analyzing verbal cues, and monitoring changes in physiological arousal during polygraph tests. Research shows that observers are often incapable of discriminating between liars and truth tellers with better than chance accuracy when they use these methods. One possible explanation for observers' poor performance is that they are not properly applying existing lie detection methods. An alternative explanation is that the cues on which these methods — and observers' judgments — are based do not reliably discriminate between liars and truth tellers. It may be possible to identify more reliable cues, and potentially improve observers' ability to discriminate, by developing a better understanding of how liars and truth tellers try to tell a convincing story. ^ This research examined (a) the verbal strategies used by truthful and deceptive individuals during interviews concerning an assigned activity, and (b) observers' ability to discriminate between them based on their verbal strategies. In Experiment I, pre-interview instructions manipulated participants' expectations regarding verifiability; each participant was led to believe that the interviewer could check some types of details, but not others, before deciding whether the participant was being truthful or deceptive. Interviews were then transcribed and scored for quantity and type of information provided. In Experiment II, observers listened to a random sample of the Experiment I interviews and rendered veracity judgments; half of the observers were instructed to judge the interviews according to the verbal strategies used by liars and truth tellers and the other half were uninstructed. ^ Results of Experiment I indicate that liars and truth tellers use different verbal strategies, characterized by a differential amount of detail. Overall, truthful participants provided more information than deceptive participants. This effect was moderated by participants' expectations regarding verifiability such that truthful participants provided more information only with regard to verifiable details. Results of Experiment II indicate that observers instructed about liars' and truth tellers' verbal strategies identify them with greater accuracy than uninstructed observers. ^

Intuition and its component parts in the heuristic processing of deception detection: Hunch, *evidence, and reliance on intuitive efficacy

Rated trust in intuitive efficacy (measured as trust, belief, use, accuracy and weighting of intuition) was investigated as a predictor of self-designated use of intuitive (hunch and hunch plus evidential belief) vs. deliberative (evidential belief and evidential belief plus hunch) deception detection judgments and actual accuracy. Twenty-nine student participants were filmed as they made true and deceptive statements about their everyday activities on a given evening (last Friday night), and college students (N=238) judged 20 (10=true, 10=deceptive) of these filmed statements as truthful or deceptive. Participants provided ratings of reliance on hunches vs. evidential belief, confidence in film judgments, intuitive efficacy, accuracy in deception detection, reliance on cues to deception, and experiences with intuition. Generalized estimated equation modeling using binary logistics demonstrated accuracy in identifying true vs. deceptive statements was predicted by film number, hunch-evidence ratings, weighting of intuition, and total cues cited. Weighting of intuition was predictive of accuracy across participants, with higher weighting predictive of higher accuracy in general. Participants who cited evidential belief plus hunch and moderate to high weighting incorrectly reversed their true vs. deceptive judgments. Accuracy for true statements was higher for hunches and hunch plus evidential belief, whereas accuracy for deceptive statements was higher for evidential belief Accuracy for participants who relied on evidential belief plus hunch was at chance. Subjective experiences underlying judgments differed by participant and type of film viewed (true vs. deceptive) and were predicted by hunch-evidence ratings, trust, use, intuitive accuracy, and total cues cited. Trust predicted increases in judging films to be true, whereas use and accuracy predicted increases in judging films as deceptive; none were predictive of accuracy. Increased number of cues cited predicted judgments of deception, whereas decreased number of cues cited predicted truth. The study concluded that participants have the capacity to self-define their judgments as subjectively vs. deliberately based, provide subjective assessments of the influence of intuitive vs. objective information on their judgments, and can apply this self-knowledge, through effective weighting of intuition vs. other types of information, in making accurate judgments of true and deceptive everyday statements.

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Deception

The current study applied classic cognitive capacity models to examine the effect of cognitive load on deception. The study also examined whether the manipulation of cognitive load would result in the magnification of differences between liars and truth-tellers. In the first study, 87 participants engaged in videotaped interviews while being either deceptive or truthful about a target event. Some participants engaged in a concurrent secondary task while being interviewed. Performance on the secondary task was measured. As expected, truth tellers performed better on secondary task items than liars as evidenced by higher accuracy rates. These results confirm the long held assumption that being deceptive is more cognitively demanding than being truthful. In the second part of the study, the videotaped interviews of both liars and truth-tellers were shown to 69 observers. After watching the interviews, observers were asked to make a veracity judgment for each participant. Observers made more accurate veracity judgments when viewing participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task than when viewing those who did not. Observers also indicated that participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task appeared to think harder than participants who did not. This study provides evidence that engaging in deception is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. As hypothesized, having participants engage in a concurrent secondary task led to the magnification of differences between liars and truth tellers. This magnification of differences led to more accurate veracity rates in a second group of observers. The implications for deception detection are discussed.

Sociophonetic deception: the elements of vocal disguise

The focus of my research is vocal disguise within forensic linguistics. Specifically, I answer the question of what individuals are most likely to do with their voice when they do not want to be recognized by a listener. I also focus on whether specific sociolinguistic characteristics – gender and place of origin – have an effect on the disguise choices that individuals make. My research has found that participants show a preference for altering pitch and/or duration across conditions, as well as taking on a foreign accent. Gender and origin were found to be significant for respect to differences in duration, and significance was also found between origin and pitch. These results suggest that disguise might contain elements of style shifting, and that a speaker's choice is more systematic than random.

Untangling a Web of Lies: Exploring Automated Detection of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication

Safeguarding organizations against opportunism and severe deception in computer-mediated communication (CMC) presents a major challenge to CIOs and IT managers. New insights into linguistic cues of deception derive from the speech acts innate to CMC. Applying automated text analysis to archival email exchanges in a CMC system as part of a reward program, we assess the ability of word use (micro-level), message development (macro-level), and intertextual exchange cues (meta-level) to detect severe deception by business partners. We empirically assess the predictive ability of our framework using an ordinal multilevel regression model. Results indicate that deceivers minimize the use of referencing and self-deprecation but include more superfluous descriptions and flattery. Deceitful channel partners also over structure their arguments and rapidly mimic the linguistic style of the account manager across dyadic e-mail exchanges. Thanks to its diagnostic value, the proposed framework can support firms’ decision-making and guide compliance monitoring system development.

What Heraclitus and Parmenides have in common on Reality and Deception

It is usually assumed that Heraclitus is, exclusively, the philosopher of flux, diversity and opposition while Parmenides puts the case for unity and changelessness. However, there is a significant common understanding of things (though in differing contexts), not simply an accidental similarity of understanding. Both philosophers, critically, distinguish two realms: on the one hand, there is the one, common realm, identical for all, which is grasped by the ‘logos that is common’(Heraclitus) or the steady nous (Parmenides) that follows a right method in order to interpret the real. On the other hand, the realm of multiplicity seen and heard by the senses, when interpreted by ‘barbarian souls’, is not understood in its common unity. Analogously, when grasped by the wandering weak nous it does not comprehend the real’s basic unity. In this paper I attempt to defend the thesis that both thinkers claim that the common logos (to put it in Heraclitean terms) or the steady intellect (to say it with Parmenides) grasp and affirm the unity of the real.

Kids, counsellors and troubles-telling : morality-in-action in talk on an Australian children’s helpline

This chapter investigates one instance of ‘morality-in-action’, which transpires when children describe their troubles to the adult counsellors at Kids Help Line, an Australian national helpline that deals specifically with callers aged approximately 5-18 years. We focus, in particular, on how a young female caller who has forged a medical certificate in relation to a problem with school attendance, determines both what to report, and how this should be disclosed. Throughout the call, the moral implications of the troubles talk are delicately managed by both caller and counsellor. The call takes the form of an extended story (Labov & Waletzky, 1997) that includes a preface (‘I have some problems at school’), an orientation (“I was sick, went to the doctor, stayed home”), a complicating action (“I went back to school and photocopied my certificate from last time”), result (“I got caught”) and evaluation (“I don’t know why it happened”). As the account unfolds, we observe how both the student and counsellor seek to make sense of these actions. While this account is partly about deception, both the caller and counsellor delicately sidestep naming this action, precluding this implication. For example, the counsellor lets stand the caller’s main assessment of the trouble. He simply asks, “so what happened then,” when the caller reports that her forgery was discovered. The caller, from the very beginning of the call, seeks to find out why she could have done this, “you see I don’t know why it happened”. As the call unfolds, the counsellor follows the opening provided by the caller and they put forward motives for consideration. By agreeing that the motives are to be explored, the act takes on a character other than deception.