Orders for sale:the creditor and the family home : part one

This, the first part of a two-part article on the discretionary powers of the courts to order a sale of the family home at the request of a secured creditor, considers whether the enactment of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 s.15 has led judicial decision making to favour the interests of the co-owner of the home. Reviews cases heard since the coming into force of the Act, looking at the factors taken into account when balancing the interests of the creditor and debtor, including the continued need to have a family home, the availability of other assets to pay off the debt, the size of the debt and the likelihood of repayment.

Orders for sale:the creditor and the family home : part 2

This, the second part of a two-part article on the discretionary powers of the courts to order a sale of the family home at the request of a secured creditor, continues the review begun in part one of common factors taken into account by the courts in post-1996 cases when balancing the interest of the creditor and debtor. Considers the availability of alternative accommodation, the health of the parties, the right to private and family life, the age of the parties, hardship a sale would cause other family members and delay on the part of the creditor in prosecution of proceedings to recover its debt.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of "haircut", which is size of creditor losses. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Emerging markets and the international financial architecture: a blueprint for reform

If emerging markets are to achieve their objective of joining the ranks of industrialized, developed countries, they must use their economic and political influence to support radical change in the international financial system. This working paper recommends John Maynard Keynes's "clearing union" as a blueprint for reform of the international financial architecture that could address emerging market grievances more effectively than current approaches. Keynes's proposal for the postwar international system sought to remedy some of the same problems currently facing emerging market economies. It was based on the idea that financial stability was predicated on a balance between imports and exports over time, with any divergence from balance providing automatic financing of the debit countries by the creditor countries via a global clearinghouse or settlement system for trade and payments on current account. This eliminated national currency payments for imports and exports; countries received credits or debits in a notional unit of account fixed to national currency. Since the unit of account could not be traded, bought, or sold, it would not be an international reserve currency. The credits with the clearinghouse could only be used to offset debits by buying imports, and if not used for this purpose they would eventually be extinguished; hence the burden of adjustment would be shared equally - credit generated by surpluses would have to be used to buy imports from the countries with debit balances. Emerging market economies could improve upon current schemes for regionally governed financial institutions by using this proposal as a template for the creation of regional clearing unions using a notional unit of account.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

A treatise on the police and crimes of the metropolis. Also an account of the courts of justice and prisons of London; and an inquiry into the causes of the increse in crime; the tendency of the debtor laws; and into the present state of the licensed victuallers' trade: with suggestions for the improvement of the protective institutions of the metropolis, and the prevention of offenses.

Mode of access: Internet.

Austrian debt settlement. Hearings ... 70th Cong., 1sst sess. on H.J. Res. 247, to authorize the Secretary of the treasury to cooperate with the other relief creditor governments in making it possible for Austria to float a loan in order to obtain funds for the furtherance of its reconstruction program, and to conclude an agreement for the settlement of the indebtedness of Austria to the United States. April 10, 1928.

Mode of access: Internet.

O poder de iniciativa do credor no Processo de Insolvência

Dissertação de Mestrado em Solicitadoria

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.

Os efeitos do processo de insolvência nas relações patrimoniais entre os cônjuges

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Judiciário

Productivity, Preferences and UIP deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (i) traded and non-traded sectors; (ii) financial market incompleteness; (iii) preference shocks; (iv) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (v) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.