The conditional performance of euro bond funds: evidence from Portugal during the debt crisis

This paper evaluates the performance of a survivorship bias-free data set of Portuguese funds investing in Euro-denominated bonds by using conditional models that consider the public information available to investors when the returns are generated. We find that bond funds underperform the market significantly and by an economically relevant magnitude. This underperformance cannot be explained by the expenses they charge. Our findings support the use of conditional performance evaluation models, since we find strong evidence of both time-varying risk and performance, dependent on the slope of the term structure and the inverse relative wealth variables. We also show that survivorship bias has a significant impact on performance estimates. Furthermore, during the European debt crisis, bond fund managers performed significantly better than in non-crisis periods and were able to achieve neutral performance. This improved performance throughout the crisis seems to be related to changes in funds’ investment styles.

Eurozone Network Connectedness During Calm and Crisis: Evidence from the MTS Platform for Interdealer Trading of European Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the connectedness of the Eurozone sovereign debt market over the period 2005–2011. By employing measures built from the variance decompositions of approximating models we are able to define weighted, directed networks that enable a deeper understanding of the relationships between the Eurozone countries. We find that connectedness in the Eurozone was very high during the calm market conditions preceding the global financial crisis but decreased dramatically when the crisis took hold, and worsened as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis emerged. The drop in connectedness was especially prevalent in the case of the peripheral countries with some of the most peripheral countries deteriorating into isolation. Our results have implications for both market participants and regulators.

How the ship of fools was ship-wrecked - The Irish crisis and response

For a decade and half the Irish economy was the poster-boy of Europe. With substantial growth rates, an open economy, flexible labour markets and low levels of taxation, Ireland was seen as evidence of the success of neoliberal policies. Yet in the matter of a few short years Ireland has turned into a one of the peripheral black-holes (along with Greece and Portugal) that are threatening to bring down the whole Eurozone project. Given this context the paper will address two key questions. Firstly how did the much eulogised Celtic Tiger fall so far and so fast? And, secondly, what has been the government’s response to the fall and crash of the Irish economy? These two questions will be addressed through both a general historical analysis of the developments of Irish society up to the crash in 2008 and then the responses to it. Secondly by an analysis of two specific elements of that development; namely the much discussed low corporation tax rate and the failure of social housing to deliver decent affordable homes for those at the bottom of society. The third element is a review of the banking and sovereign debt crisis that led to the IMF/EU deal in November 2010 and a brief outlining of its implications for public finances, especially the question of default. The paper concludes by placing the Irish crisis in a global context.

Economic Vulnerability and the Severity of Debt Problems::An Analysis of the Irish EU-SILC 2008

In this article, using Ireland where debt issues are of particular salience, as a test case, we seek to locate over-indebtedness and the severity of debt problems in the context of the broader economic circumstances of households. In doing so, we first identify an economically vulnerable segment of households and then explore the debt experience of vulnerable and non-vulnerable households. Our analysis reveals a striking contrast between the debt experiences of less than one in five households defined as economically vulnerable and all others. Financial exclusion, relating to access to a bank account and a credit card, was found to increase debt levels. However, such effects were modest. The impact of economic vulnerability seems to be largely a consequence of its relationship to a wide
range of socio-economic attributes and circumstances. The manner in which a potential debt crisis
unfolds will be shaped by the broader socio-economic structuring of life-chances. Any attempt to
respond to such problems by concentrating on financial exclusion or household behaviour or, indeed,
triggering factors without taking the wider social structuring of economic vulnerability is likely to be
both seriously misguided and largely ineffective.

Mota-Engil new prospects of growth: Overcoming the financial crisis

The 2008 global financial crisis caused the collapse of business key sectors, declines in consumer wealth and a fall in economic activity resulting in a global recession. In some European countries, the 2008 crisis contributed to a sovereign-debt crisis which had a strong impact in Southern European countries. The construction sector was particularly affected, with budget cuts disturbing public investment and no financing available for private constructors. This report intends to explain how Mota-Engil, faced this situation of low growth, and which strategies were adopted by the management to overcome the difficult economic conjecture, mainly in its domestic market: Portugal. The report is organized as a case-study. The first part, the case narrative, is subdivided into 6 parts, and the second part is the teaching note. The teaching note is constituted by the four questions and their respective responses.

Análisis de la crisis financiera de estados unidos (2007-2008) y la crisis de deuda (2011): su relación e impacto sobre uno de los fundamentales de la economía colombiana, la tasa de cambio

Este documento presenta una perspectiva de como una economía pequeña y abierta (en temas comerciales y de inversión) como la colombiana, se ve afectada por choques que sufren economías grandes como la estadounidense. Durante el periodo de estudio la economía de Estados Unidos sufrió dos choques: primero la crisis de las hipotecas subprime en los años 2007-2008; luego la crisis de deuda soberana de Estados Unidos en 2011. Estos dos choques afectaron la economía colombiana. En ambos casos, se puede establecer un hecho clave que detonó las crisis. En el primero, la entrada en el capítulo 11 de protección a bancarrotas por parte de Lehman Brothers, el 15 de septiembre de 2008. En el segundo, el detonante fue la baja de la calificación de la deuda soberana de Estados Unidos por parte de Standard and Poor´s el 5 de agosto de 2011. Estos días claves en las crisis, afectaron los principales índices de la bolsa de Estados Unidos, especialmente los relacionados con la actividad financiera, luego es de suponer que posiblemente también afectaron fundamentales de la economía colombiana como lo es la tasa de cambio peso-dólar (USD/COP). Este documento tiene como objeto principal, establecer el impacto de las crisis Norteamericana de 2007-2008 y de 2011, sobre la economía colombiana, específicamente sobre la tasa de cambio USD/COP. El documento también, analiza las causas que generaron dichas crisis en Estados Unidos, haciendo énfasis en la falta de regulación y control por parte de las instituciones del gobierno en la crisis de las hipotecas subprime. De igual forma se analiza el papel de las firmas calificadoras de riesgo, en la crisis de deuda estadounidense.

Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods

In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk managers and financial regulators.

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.

The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the emerging markets

A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.

International trade in Latina America and the Caribbean 2009: crisis and recovery

Includes bibliography

Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives

Includes bibliography

Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent financial crisis to Central America through trade finance

Includes Bibliography

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.