Darfur Region, Sudan, 1880 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Carta originale della Spedizione Borghese-Matteucci : nel Kordofan e Dar For secondo i rilievi del sottotenente A.M. Massari e le Esplorazioni anteriori, costrutta e disegnata da Guido Cora. It was published by Istituto Geografico Guido Cora in 1881. This dataset is georeferenced for the map covering the Darfur region, Sudan. Scale 1:3,000,000. Map in Italian.The original map contains multiple maps on one sheet. Because the map images are non-contiguous and possibly at differing scales, each map image was georeferenced separately. Please see the 'cross references' section for other maps on this sheet.The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the 'Africa Lambert Conformal Conic' projection. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as exploration routes of Giovanni Borghese, Pellegrino Matteucci, and A.M. Massari (with dates of locations), drainage, cities, towns and villages, territorial boundaries, and more. Relief is shown by hachures and spot heights. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection and the Harvard University Library as part of the Open Collections Program at Harvard University project: Organizing Our World: Sponsored Exploration and Scientific Discovery in the Modern Age. Maps selected for the project correspond to various expeditions and represent a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes.

Responsibility to protect or Trojan Horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.

The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur

Governments that have endorsed the 'sovereignty as responsibility' approach have shown little inclination to protect civilians suffering at the hands of their own government in the Sudanese province of Darfur. After providing an overview of Darfur's crisis and international society's feeble response, we explore why the strongest advocates of 'sovereignty as responsibility', the NATO and EU states, failed to seriously contemplate military intervention. We suggest that three main factors help explain the West's unwillingness to intervene in Darfur: increased scepticism about the West's humanitarian interventionism, especially after the invasion of Iraq; Western strategic interests in Sudan; and the relationship between the crisis in Darfur and Sudan's other civil wars. We conclude that the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention remains weak and strongly contested, and that advocates of the 'responsibility to protect' approach have yet to persuade their governments to help save populations in danger.

The UN Security Council and the question of humanitarian intervention in Darfur

This article explores the different moral and legal arguments used by protagonists in the debate about whether or not to conduct a humanitarian intervention in Darfur. The first section briefly outlines four moral and legal positions on whether there is (and should be) a right and/or duty of humanitarian intervention: communitarianism, restrictionist and counter-restrictionist legal positivism and liberal cosmopolitanism. The second section then provides an overview of the Security Council's debate about responding to Darfur's crisis, showing how its policy was influenced by both normative concerns and hard-nosed political calculations. The article concludes by asking what Darfur's case reveals about the legitimacy and likelihood of humanitarian intervention in such catastrophes and the role of the UN Security Council as the primary authorising body for the use of international force. The authors argue that this case demonstrates that for the cosmopolitan/counter-restrictionist case to prevail pivotal states need to put humanitarian emergencies on the global agenda and express a willingness to act without Council authorisation, though the question of how to proceed in cases where the Council is deadlocked remains vexed.

Utrata bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego jako źródło wewnętrznych konfliktów zbrojnych w Darfurze

Zgodnie z definicją wypracowaną w ramach ONZ, bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe istnieje gdy ludzie mają nieprzerwanie zapewniony „fizyczny i ekonomiczny dostęp do wystarczającej, bezpiecznej i bogatej w składniki odżywcze żywności”. Artykuł wyjaśnia kształtowanie się koncepcji bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego oraz wyodrębnienie jego trzech wymiarów – tj. międzynarodowego, narodowego i odnoszącego się do gospodarstwa domowego. Celem jest analiza międzyplemiennych konfliktów i wojny domowej w Darfurze w kontekście rywalizacji o zasoby zapewniające bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe mieszkańcom tej sudańskiej prowincji.

Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court

Many prosecutors and commentators have praised the victim provisions at the International Criminal Court (ICC) as 'justice for victims', which for the first time include participation, protection and reparations. This book critically examines the role of victims in international criminal justice, drawing from human rights, victimology, and best practices in transitional justice.

Drawing on field research in Northern Uganda, Luke Moffet explores the nature of international crimes and assesses the role of victims in the proceedings of the ICC, paying particular attention to their recognition, participation, reparations and protection. The book argues that because of the criminal nature and structural limitations of the ICC, justice for victims is symbolic, requiring State Parties to complement the work of the Court to address victims' needs.

In advancing an innovative theory of justice for victims, and in offering solutions to current challenges, the book will be of great interest and use to academics, practitioners and students engaged in victimology, the ICC, transitional justice, or reparations.

Au nom de l'humanité? : histoire, droit, éthique et politique de l'intervention militaire justifiée par des raisons humanitaires

Réalisé en cotutelle avec le Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, pour un doctorat en études politiques.

Les motivations des acteurs étatiques dans les interventions humanitaires : les États-Unis face aux cas du Rwanda (1994), du Kosovo (1999) et du Darfour (2003 à 2008)

Ce mémoire vise à comprendre les motivations des États à intervenir militairement dans un autre État pour mettre fin aux violations graves des droits de l’homme tel que le nettoyage ethnique et le génocide. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre pourquoi il y a eu une variation dans la position américaine face aux cas de génocide au Rwanda en 1994, au Kosovo en 1999 et au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. À partir d’une approche réaliste en Relations Internationales qui met l’accent sur l’intérêt national égoïste comme facteur principal explicatif du comportement des États, nous procédons à l’étude des cas de la position américaine lors de trois crises humanitaires. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre la non intervention des États-Unis lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, l’intervention américaine au Kosovo en 1999, et enfin la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. En somme, nos études de cas démontrent que c’est l’intérêt national qui motive les États d’intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir lors des cas de nettoyage ethnique ou de génocide. D’une part, lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, les États-Unis ne sont pas intervenus car l’intérêt national interprété comme le repli sur les affaires internes américaines ne serait pas maximisé par l’intervention militaire. Ensuite, l’intervention des États-Unis et de l’OTAN au Kosovo en 1999 est expliquée par l’intérêt national américain dans un contexte de l’après guerre froide d’approfondir son engagement sécuritaire en Europe et de préserver sa position hégémonique et son prestige sur la scène internationale, d’assurer la stabilité régionale et de préserver la crédibilité de l’OTAN. Finalement, l’intérêt national défini en termes de sécurité dans un contexte de la guerre au terrorisme explique la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008.