1000 resultados para Crime Series


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Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

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Background: A sharp reduction in heroin supply in Australia in 2001 was followed by a large but transient increase in cocaine use among injecting drug users (IDU) in Sydney. This paper assesses whether the increase in cocaine use among IDU was accompanied by increased rates of violent crime as occurred in the United States in the 1980s. Specifically, the paper aims to examine the impact of increased cocaine use among Sydney IDU upon police incidents of robbery with a weapon, assault and homicide. Methods: Data on cocaine use among IDU was obtained from the Illicit Drug Reporting System (IDRS). Monthly NSW Police incident data on arrests for cocaine possession/ use, robbery offences, homicides, and assaults, were obtained from the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Time series analysis was conducted on the police data series where possible. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from law enforcement and health agencies about the impacts of cocaine use on crime and policing. Results: There was a significant increase in cocaine use and cocaine possession offences in the months immediately following the reduction in heroin supply. There was also a significant increase in incidents of robbery where weapons were involved. There were no increases in offences involving firearms, homicides or reported assaults. Conclusion: The increased use of cocaine among injecting drug users following the heroin shortage led to increases in violent crime. Other States and territories that also experienced a heroin shortage but did not show any increases in cocaine use did not report any increase in violent crimes. The violent crimes committed did not involve guns, most likely because of its stringent gun laws, in contrast to the experience of American cities that have experienced high rates of cocaine use and violent crime.

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Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

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Crime possesses a dual nature deriving from its portrayal in the media leading to duplicity in the act of witnessing crime which by showing reality inevitably transforms it into a different kind of reality. The direct relationship with the Gothic genre is very naturally justified by real crime seeming to replicate fictional crime and vice versa, thus originating various forms of the lack of distinction between reality itself and fictional reality, or between truth and falsehood, which many writers and artists associated with Gothic aesthetics have always relied on, and numerous examples of this can be found in the works of Edgar Poe, Patricia Highsmith, Chuck Palahniuk and many others. While real crime may take the Gothic novel as its prototype, it turns out that nowadays television has taken on this role. Examples of this phenomenon are the recent symptoms of obsessive dependence on TV series such as C.S.I., Criminal Minds, The X Files, The Following and Dexter, showing a tendency for television series to replace Gothic novels, thus revealing a perverse attraction for witnessing violence through the same means that transmit the daily news featuring violent events in different scenarios of war all over the world.