Law and economics in the civil law world: the case of Brazilian Courts

Conventional wisdom holds that economic analysis of law is either embryonic or nonexistent outside of the United States generally and in civil law jurisdictions in particular. Existing explanations for the assumed lack of interest in the application of economic reasoning to legal problems range from the different structure of legal education and academia outside of the United States to the peculiar characteristics of civilian legal systems. This paper challenges this view by documenting and explaining the growing use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. We argue that, given the ever-greater role of courts in the formulation of public policies, the application of legal principles and rules increasingly calls for a theory of human behavior (such as that provided by economics) to help foresee the likely aggregate consequences of different interpretations of the law. Consistent with the traditional role of civilian legal scholarship in providing guidance for the application of law by courts, the further development of law and economics in Brazil is therefore likely to be mostly driven by judicial demand.

The Map of the Courts and the Brazilian Borders

The formation of our borders are analyzed, at first presenting the question of the demarcation line of Tordesillas and the problems that led to the abandonment of this trace to adopt a configuration thatwould deal with both the actual possession of the territory (uti possidetis) as the natural borders formed by rivers and water borders. Next, the Map of the Courts is examined, having served as the basis for the Treaty of Madrid, and it determines, actually, the current configuration of our country. An analysis is made of this cartographic document, with the aid of digital cartography, which yieldeds in the quantity of existing distortions, to modeled its trait and found out how it was built.

Domain Name Transfer before Slovak and Czech Courts

In Europe, a disagreement persists in the courts about the possibility of plaintiffs to request a domain name transfer in domain name disputes. In the last ten years, Slovak and Czech courts also produced some jurisprudence on this issue. Interestingly, the BGH’s influential opinion in the shell.de decision, which denied domain name transfer as an available remedy under German law back in 2002, wasn’t initially followed. To the contrary, several Slovak and Czech decisions of lower courts allowed a domain name transfer using two different legal bases. This seemingly settled case law was rejected a few months ago by the globtour.cz decision of the Czech Supreme Court, which refused domain name transfers for the time being

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.