Competition, oligopoly and technological change in the construction industry: the Argentine case

Includes bibliography

Industria del algodón en México y el oligopolio transnacional en su comercialización = Mexican cotton industry and the transnational cotton marketing oligopoly

Incluye Bibliografía

Oligopolio transnacional en la industria de café y el caso de Colombia = Transnational oligopoly in the coffee industry and the case of Colombia

Incluye Bibliografía

A Comparison of Two-Market Bertrand Duopoly and Two-Market Cournot Duopoly

In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that market. All four choices are made simultaneously. In a two-market Cournot duopoly, the firms choose quantities rather than prices.It is well known that in the one-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits will be lower and quantities higher than Cournot equilibrium prices, profits and quantities.We find a quite different consequence of price undercutting in two-market duopoly. In the two-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibria are in continuous mixed strategies, while every Cournot duopoly has an equilibrium in pure strategies, or in strategies that are pure in each market.

Oligopoly Model of a Debit Card Network

JEL Classification: G21, L13.

A kompetitív piac közelítése sokszereplős Cournot-oligopóliumokkal

Mikroökonómia tankönyvekből és példatárakból ismert, hogy egy homogén termékű Cournot-oligopol piacon a termelők számának növelésével közelíthető a kompetitív piac. Az iskolapéldában lineáris keresleti görbét és állandó egységköltséget tételeznek fel. Az irodalomban több munka is foglalkozik az említett feltételek enyhítésével. Jelen dolgozatban egy új, egyszerű approximációs tételt igazolunk. Az első szakaszban áttekintjük a Cournot-oligopol játék egyensúlyának egzisztenciájára és a kompetitív piac Cournot-oligopóliumokkal történő approximálhatóságára vonatkozó eredményeket. Az egyensúly létezésével kapcsolatos eredményeket felhasználjuk a második szakaszban található approximációs tételünkhöz, amit aztán összevetünk az irodalomban található approximációs tételekkel.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm

We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.

Losses from Horizontal Merger: an Extension to a Successive Oligopoly Model with Product Differentiation

This paper generalizes the model of Salant et al. (1983; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 185–199) to a successive oligopoly model with product differentiation. Upstream firms produce differentiated goods, retailers compete in quantities, and supply contracts are linear. We show that if retailers buy from all producers, downstream mergers do not affect wholesale prices. Our result replicates that of Salant's, where mergers are not profitable unless the size of the merged firm exceeds 80 per cent of the industry. This result is robust to the type of competition.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...

Rates of change : online distribution as disruptive technology in the film industry

Much debate in media and communication studies is based on exaggerated opposition between the digital sublime and the digital abject: overly enthusiastic optimism versus determined pessimism over the potential of new technologies. This inhibits the discipline's claims to provide rigorous insight into industry and social change which is, after all, continuous. Instead of having to decide one way or the other, we need to ask how we study the process of change.This article examines the impact of online distribution in the film industry, particularly addressing the question of rates of change. Are there genuinely new players disrupting the established oligopoly, and if so with what effect? Is there evidence of disruption to, and innovation in, business models? Has cultural change been forced on the incumbents? Outside mainstream Hollywood, where are the new opportunities and the new players? What is the situation in Australia?

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.

Predicting price-tag for customized goods

We discuss a dynamic pricing model which will aid automobile manufacturer in choosing the right price for customer segment. Though there is oligopoly market structure, the customers get "locked" into a particular technology/company which virtually makes the situation akin to a monopoly. There are associated network externalities and positive feedback. The key idea in monopoly pricing lies in extracting the customer surplus by exploiting the respective elasticities of demand. We present a Walrasian general equilibrium approach to determine the segment price. We compare the prices obtained from optimization model with that from Walrasian dynamics. The results are encouraging and can serve as a critical factor in Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and thereby effectively manage the lock-in.

Optimal advertisement-innovation mix for maximizing the discounted flow of profit

Due to boom in telecommunications market, there is hectic competition among the cellular handset manufacturers. As cellular manufacturing industry operates in an oligopoly framework, often price-rigidity leads to non-price wars. The handset manufacturing firms indulge in product innovation and also advertise their products in order to achieve their objective of maximizing discounted flow of profit. It is of interest to see what would be the optimal advertisement-innovation mix that would maximize the discounted How of profit for the firms. We used differential game theory to solve this problem. We adopted the open-loop solution methodology. We experimented for various scenarios over a 30 period horizon and derived interesting managerial insights.