744 resultados para Corporate governance, agency costs, directors


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This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

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This study is an examination of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The research examines the significance of several corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics as potential determinants of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. Our primary analysis provides evidence of a significant association between timely corporate internet reporting and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board independence. Our findings provide evidence that boards with less cross directorships, more experience in terms of the average age of directors, and lower length in service for executive directors provide more timely corporate internet reporting. We find that board independence is negatively associated with timely corporate internet reporting. Follow-up analysis provides additional evidence of a significant association between the timeliness of corporate internet reporting and board experience. The evidence indicates that role duality and block ownership are associated with less timely corporate internet reporting. Our findings also reveal strengths and weaknesses in the Internet reporting of U.K. listed companies. Companies need to voluntarily focus on improving the timeliness dimension of their corporate internet reporting so that the EU and U.K. accounting regulators do not replace recommendations with regulations. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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This paper critically evaluates the paradigm, theory, and methodology that dominate research on related party transactions (RPTs). RPTs have been debated in the literature whether they are a facet of conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders or they are normal efficient transactions that help the firms to achieve asset utilization. Literature has been widely interested in studying the association between corporate governance and RPTs especially that according to the agency theory it is assumed that corporate governance as a monitoring tool should impede the negative consequences of RPTs and ensure they are conducted to achieve better asset utilization.

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Research Question/Issue - Which forms of state control over corporations have emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based economies and what are their implications for corporate governance? We assess the literature on variation and evolution of state control in transition economies, focusing on corporate governance of state-controlled firms. We highlight emerging trends and identify future research avenues. Research Findings/Insights - Based on our analysis of more than 100 articles in leading management, finance, and economics journals since 1989, we demonstrate how research on state control evolved from a polarized approach of public–private equity ownership comparison to studying a variety of constellations of state capitalism. Theoretical/Academic Implications - We identify theoretical perspectives that help us better understand benefits and costs associated with various forms of state control over firms. We encourage future studies to examine how context-specific factors determine the effect of state control on corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications - Investors and policymakers should consider under which conditions investing in state-affiliated firms generates superior returns.

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The beginning of the 21st century was plagued with unprecedented instances of corporate fraud. In an attempt to address apparent non-existent or “broken” corporate governance policies, sweeping measures of financial reporting reform ensued, having specific requirements relating to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between audit committees and external auditors, and procedures concerning auditors’ assessment of client risk. The purpose of my dissertation is to advance knowledge about “good” corporate governance by examining the association between meeting-or-beating analyst forecasts and audit fees, audit committee compensation, and audit committee tenure and “busyness”. Using regression analysis, I found the following: (1) the frequency of meeting-or-just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with audit fees, (2) the extent by which a firm exceeds analysts’ forecasts is positively (negatively) associated with audit committee compensation that is predominately equity-based (cash-based), and (3) the likelihood of repeatedly meeting-or-just beating analyst forecasts is positively associated with audit committee tenure and “busyness”. These results suggest that auditors consider clients who frequently meet-or-just beat forecasts as being less “risky”, and clients that frequently just miss as being more “risky”. The results also imply that cash-based director compensation is more successful in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting oversight role, that equity-based compensation motivates independent audit committee directors to focus on short-term performance thereby aligning their interests with management, and that audit committee director tenure and the degree of director “busyness” can affect an audit committee member’s effectiveness in providing financial reporting oversight. Collectively, my dissertation provides additional insights regarding corporate governance practices and informs policy-makers for future relevant decisions.^

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The present research aims to analyse the impact of corporate governance and cultural dimensions in dividend policy. The corporate governance and dividend policy have a close relationship, in that both are evidenced in literature to mitigate agency problems. Cultural factors are also related to agency problems. The existence of agency problems and their solutions differs across countries and it is related to the implementation of the mechanisms of governance. So, cultural factors may have influence on corporate governance and dividend policy. Our sample consists in 1 232 companies belonging to the main indices of 38 countries classified as emerging or developed. To measure the quality of firm level corporate governance, we use the ASSET4 Corporate Governance Performance Index, developed by Thomson Reuters, and as proxy of culture we use three cultural dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede, namely uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and indulgence. We obtained significant empirical evidence that firms with high quality of corporate governance pay higher dividends. With regard to cultural factors, we confirm that in countries with high levels of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, the dividend payout ratio is lower. On the other hand, countries with high level of indulgence have higher dividend payout ratio. However, we verify that the impact of cultural effects is minimized when the firms have a high quality level of corporate governance. Additionally, we found that the impact of corporate governance and cultural factors in dividend policy differs when dealing with emerging or developed countries.

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Nos seus vinte anos de existência, o sistema brasileiro de previdência complementar acumulou ativos de mais de 70 bilhões de reais. Existe um crescente debate sobre o papel que os fundos de pensão podem desempenhar na economia brasileira. Alimenta-se uma esperança de que eles possam contribuir em três áreas fundamentais: (a) financiamento do desenvolvimento, (b) expansão dos mercados de capitais e (c) democratização do capital (desconcentração da estrutura de propriedade corporativa). Este trabalho procura extrair da experiência dos países industrializados algumas perspectivas que possam contribuir para o debate em torno do crescimento e atuação de fundos de pensão nos mercados emergentes.

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The main purpose of this study is to analyse the changes caused by the global financial crisis on the influence of board characteristics on corporate results, in terms of corporate performance, corporate risk-taking, and earnings management. Sample comprises S&P 500 listed firms during 2002-2008. This study reveals that the environmental conditions call for different behaviour from directors to fulfil their responsibilities and suggests changes in normative and voluntary guidelines for improving good practices in the boardroom.

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The family involvement in firms is observable is most economies around the world, although there are significant differences among these countries, not only regarding its predominance in these economies, but also in what refers to the levels of involvement of the family in business. This research aims at understanding the family-based firms’ management when compared to non family based, with particular regards to the forms of corporate governance. This analysis is based on case studies and on secondary data found in the literature to support the findings from the empirical research. The data was collected via face to face in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs from the furniture and the events organisation industries (where the family is predominantly present in the furniture but not on the events organisation industry) and with industry and regional business associations. The case studies used in this research allowed the comparison between the Portuguese firms when the family plays an important role in business and those in which the family is absent. It has been found that there are important differences in businesses in countries/industries/local productive systems in which the family is seen as a dominant institution in the society (where businesses are based on strong ties; there is a harmonious relationship between the family members; and the family is accepted locally and dominates the firm organization) and on situations in which the family plays a more marginal role in the society. In fact, the family brings special characteristics to the business, in terms of management, corporate governance, inter and intra firm relationships and succession. Our findings confirm other empirical studies’ results found in the literature. Thus, this article provides a discussion on the factors that play a role in the form of corporate governance structure in family firms highlighting the pros and cons of organising the firm around the family.