Corporate Mechanisms and the Presumption of Accountability

This paper seeks to draw out this focus on form in British public administration reform by focusing on the role that the idea of the corporate form has played in reform. Drawing on the codification of Foundation Trusts in the English NHS, I argue that, while accountability ought to be considered as a 'social space' in which conduct conducive to particular interests emerges, reformers tend to regard accountability as a function of appropriate procedures and forms. The turn to the corporate form relies on a hope that it will deliver various 'accountability' benefits will emerge. This hope, I argue, is misplaced

Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain

Using ownership and control data for 890 firm‐years, this article examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern‐day standards. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was a modern‐style separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain. One major implication of our findings is that diffuse ownership was present in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it somewhat undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis. We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a London head office, non‐linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets.

Understanding Risk: Contributions from the Journal of Risk and Governance

During recent years, news headlines have been rife with criticisms of the risk management practices of public and private sector entities. These criticisms have often been accompanied by calls for greater transparency in the way government entities manage risks and communicate dangers to the public. Similarly, in the private sector, the internationalisation of economic activity has heightened concerns over the potential adverse implications of mismanagement and financial scandals, and has led to calls for greater regulation and supervision. While the responses of public sector agencies and private sector actors to these challenges have differed, they share a common acknowledgement that effective governance relies on the pro-active identification, assessment, and management of risks as well as appropriate regulatory frameworks.

This edited book covers a number of divergent topics illustrating the emergence of several novel themes in the area of economic and social risks. As a communality, these novel themes relate to the complexity in which human activity in this late stage of capitalist development is embedded. This risk-generating complexity, in turn, can be observed at several levels, including workplace hazards, governance problems within the private sector or the intersection between public and private, and in relation to the economic risks faced by larger entities such as national governments.

Understanding Risk: Recent Contributions from the Journal of Risk and Governance

Following on from the format of the previous Book Understanding Risk: Contributions from the Journal of Risk and Governance, this collection of recent contributions (including work by the editor) this book is divided in three sections .  The first section examines issues relating to corporate governance in the private sector, with emphasis being placed on issues of 'Board Decision Making,' Earnings Management and Audit Committee Effectiveness'  and ' Corporate Governance Failures.'  These contributions are complemented by the second sections which looks at governance and risk issues affecting the public sector, with a focus being places on 'Public Private Partnerships' and regulation of activities in the Life Sciences.'  Section three focuses on societal risk management in relation to health, safety and the environment.  In this context, contributions are presented in relation to major debates surrounding 'Rising Trends in Cancer Cases,' dilemmas surrounding 'Medical Self Help,' 'Mental Health Policy' and the use of 'Information Technology in Health Care.'

Corporate finance in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets: A survey

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Comparative Lessons on Corporate law and CSR: Hard Law as Solution? Do the French offer the way ahead?

This paper provides a comparative analysis of corporate law and CSR and asks whether there are lessons for Australia from corporate law and CSR developments in France. This presentation presents a summary of the provisions of the new French Act Number 2010-788 passed on 12 July 2010 – called “Grenelle 2” –. Firstly, article 225 of Law’s Grenelle 2 changes the Commercial Code to extend the reach of non-financial reporting and to ensure its pertinence. Secondly, article 227 Law’s Grenelle 2 amends certain provisions of the Commercial and Environmental Codes and incorporates into substantive law the liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries. In fine, article 224 of Law’s Grenelle 2 reinforces the pressure on the market to act in a responsible manner. It modifies article 214-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code in order to compel institutional investors (mutual funds and fund management companies) to take social, environmental and governance criteria into account in their investment policy.

The ebbing hegemon? An evolutionary perspective on the emergence of holistic governance and the efficient role of Institutional Investors in Environmental, Social and Governance issues (ESG)

This paper seeks to chronicle the roots of corporate governance form its narrow shareholder perspective to the current bourgeoning stakeholder approach while giving cognizance to institutional investors and their effective role in ESG in light of the King Report III of South Africa. It is aimed at a critical review of the extant literature from the shareholder Cadbury epoch to the present day King Report novelty. We aim to: (i) offer an analytical state of corporate governance in the Anglo-Saxon world, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Far East Asia and Africa; and (ii) illuminate the lead role the king Report of South Africa is playing as the bellwether of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance as well as guiding the role of institutional investors in ESG.

Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.

A study of behavioral finance: background, theories and application

Behavioral finance, or behavioral economics, consists of a theoretical field of research stating that consequent psychological and behavioral variables are involved in financial activities such as corporate finance and investment decisions (i.e. asset allocation, portfolio management and so on). This field has known an increasing interest from scholar and financial professionals since episodes of multiple speculative bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, practical incoherencies between economic events and traditional neoclassical financial theories had pushed more and more researchers to look for new and broader models and theories. The purpose of this work is to present the field of research, still ill-known by a vast majority. This work is thus a survey that introduces its origins and its main theories, while contrasting them with traditional finance theories still predominant nowadays. The main question guiding this work would be to see if this area of inquiry is able to provide better explanations for real life market phenomenon. For that purpose, the study will present some market anomalies unsolved by traditional theories, which have been recently addressed by behavioral finance researchers. In addition, it presents a practical application of portfolio management, comparing asset allocation under the traditional Markowitz’s approach to the Black-Litterman model, which incorporates some features of behavioral finance.

Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk

Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.

Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.