Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

The effect of synchronized group activities on pain threshold as a predictor of cooperation

Recent research suggests that participating in vigorous synchronized physical activity may result in elevated levels of endorphins, which may in turn affect social bonding (Cohen et. al., 2009). The present research aimed to examine whether or not the change in pain tolerance would be able to predict participants’ willingness to cooperate after statistically controlling for the groups’ condition. Participants were asked to run on a treadmill for 30 minutes under one of two conditions (control vs. synchronized). Prior to and after the run participants underwent a pain tolerance test. Once completed, a second activity was introduced to the participants; a cooperative game. A public goods game was used to measure an individual’s willingness to cooperate. The results showed the synchronized condition was able to predict that participants cooperated more during the public goods game (p = .009), however the change in pain threshold was unable to significantly predict cooperation (p = .32).

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Agreements with overlapping coalitions

Dans certaines circonstances, des actions de groupes sont plus performantes que des actions individuelles. Dans ces situations, il est préférable de former des coalitions. Ces coalitions peuvent être disjointes ou imbriquées. La littérature économique met un fort accent sur la modélisation des accords où les coalitions d’agents économiques sont des ensembles disjoints. Cependant on observe dans la vie de tous les jours que les coalitions politiques, environnementales, de libre-échange et d’assurance informelles sont la plupart du temps imbriquées. Aussi, devient-il impératif de comprendre le fonctionnement économique des coalitions imbriquées. Ma thèse développe un cadre d’analyse qui permet de comprendre la formation et la performance des coalitions même si elles sont imbriquées. Dans le premier chapitre je développe un jeu de négociation qui permet la formation de coalitions imbriquées. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre et je développe un algorithme pour calculer les allocations d’équilibre pour les jeux symétriques. Je montre que toute structure de réseau peut se décomposer de manière unique en une structure de coalitions imbriquées. Sous certaines conditions, je montre que cette structure correspond à une structure d’équilibre d’un jeu sous-jacent. Dans le deuxième chapitre j’introduis une nouvelle notion de noyau dans le cas où les coalitions imbriquées sont permises. Je montre que cette notion de noyau est une généralisation naturelle de la notion de noyau de structure de coalitions. Je vais plus loin en introduisant des agents plus raffinés. J’obtiens alors le noyau de structure de coalitions imbriquées que je montre être un affinement de la première notion. Dans la suite de la thèse, j’applique les théories développées dans les deux premiers chapitres à des cas concrets. Le troisième chapitre est une application de la relation biunivoque établie dans le premier chapitre entre la formation des coalitions et la formation de réseaux. Je propose une modélisation réaliste et effective des assurances informelles. J’introduis ainsi dans la littérature économique sur les assurances informelles, quatre innovations majeures : une fusion entre l’approche par les groupes et l’approche par les réseaux sociaux, la possibilité d’avoir des organisations imbriquées d’assurance informelle, un schéma de punition endogène et enfin les externalités. Je caractérise les accords d’assurances informelles stables et j’isole les conditions qui poussent les agents à dévier. Il est admis dans la littérature que seuls les individus ayant un revenu élevé peuvent se permettre de violer les accords d’assurances informelles. Je donne ici les conditions dans lesquelles cette hypothèse tient. Cependant, je montre aussi qu’il est possible de violer cette hypothèse sous d’autres conditions réalistes. Finalement je dérive des résultats de statiques comparées sous deux normes de partage différents. Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle où les groupes homogènes sont construits sur la base de relations de confiance préexistantes. Ces groupes sont imbriqués et représentent des ensembles de partage de risque. Cette approche est plus générale que les approches traditionnelles de groupe ou de réseau. Je caractérise les accords stables sans faire d’hypothèses sur le taux d’escompte. J’identifie les caractéristiques des réseaux stables qui correspondent aux taux d’escomptes les plus faibles. Bien que l’objectif des assurances informelles soit de lisser la consommation, je montre que des effets externes liés notamment à la valorisation des liens interpersonnels renforcent la stabilité. Je développe un algorithme à pas finis qui égalise la consommation pour tous les individus liés. Le fait que le nombre de pas soit fini (contrairement aux algorithmes à pas infinis existants) fait que mon algorithme peut inspirer de manière réaliste des politiques économiques. Enfin, je donne des résultats de statique comparée pour certaines valeurs exogènes du modèle.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Studying economics reduces overexploitation in a common resource experiment

This paper studies the economic behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economic experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR, taking into account the influence of economics training on the learning process of individuals, regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economics knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.

Alívio de sobrecargas em redes de transmissão com o auxílio de geradores distribuídos

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Alocação de perdas e custos pelo uso do sistema de transmissão

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

ARBOT: augmented reality system for teaching logic algorithmic

This article purposes the ARBot, a system that has as main objective the presentation of concepts of logic for students of elementary and secondary education. The system was developed using the technology known as Augmented Reality (AR), which allows complement the actual environment where the user is, by adding virtual objects. In this scenario the RA created from a virtual game interface is used, through which cognitive challenges are presented. To solve these challenges, users must set up three-dimensional virtual characters using visual language. As a result it follows that, in a playful way, concepts of algorithms and programming are assimilated by users. In addition, the system enables two users to interact in a cooperative game mode. In cooperative mode, the system focuses on collaborative learning, since it allows users to jointly solve the cognitive challenge presented by the system.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom

What some view as overly-generous funding of the Scottish parliament results from Scotland.s credible threat to secede from the United Kingdom. Scotland is shown to benefit from a second mover advantage in a non-cooperative sequential game over the allocation of public funds. Various reform proposals are criticized for not recognizing that reform of Scottish government finances must be consistent with Scotland.s credible threat. Fiscal autonomy -- in which the Scottish parliament finances a much greater proportion of its spending from Scottish-sourced taxes, is demonstrated to be a viable reform within the existing political context and, in some circumstances, could remove Scotland.s second mover advantage. We also use a cooperative bargaining game model to demonstrate that an Australian style grants commission would not be a viable reform in the British context.

On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

Servicio Web para gestión de juego cooperativo sobre desarrollo humano

Este Proyecto Fin de Carrera (PFC) tiene como objetivos el análisis, diseño e implementación de un sistema web que permita a los usuarios familiarizarse con el Índice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH), publicado anualmente por Naciones Unidas, ofreciendo un servicio de gestión y descarga de una aplicación móvil relacionada con dicho índice. La aplicación móvil es un juego educativo basado en preguntas sobre el IDH de los países, desarrollada en paralelo con este proyecto. El servicio web implementado en este proyecto facilita tanto la descarga, administración y actualización de contenidos como la interacción entre los usuarios. El sistema está formado por un servidor web, una base de datos de usuarios y contenidos y un portal web desde el cual puede descargarse la aplicación móvil, realizar consultas sobre estadísticas de juego y conocer el IDH sin necesidad de jugar. El buscador avanzado que ha sido desarrollado para conocer el IDH permite al usuario adquirir destrezas y entrenarse por sí solo para mejorar sus resultados de juego. Los administradores del sistema tienen la capacidad de gestionar el contenido del portal, los usuarios que solicitan darse de alta y la funcionalidad ofrecida, es decir, actualización del juego, foros y noticias. La instalación del sistema implementado en un servidor web ha permitido su verificación exitosa así como la provisión del servicio de información y sensibilización sobre el IDH, actualizado mediante la información de Naciones Unidas, motivación original del proyecto. ABSTRACT This Final Year Project takes as targets the analysis, design and implementation of a web system that allows to the users to familiarize with the Human Development Index (HDI), published annually by United Nations, offering a service of management and download a mobile application associated with that index. The mobile application is an educational game based on questions on the IDH of the countries, developed in parallel with this project. The web service implemented by means of this Project facilitates download, administration and update of contents and the interaction between the users across the cooperative game. The system consists of a web server, a database of users and content and a web portal from which you can download the mobile application, perform queries on game statistics, or discover the HDI without need for play. The advanced search engine that has been developed for the HDI allows the user to purchase and train for skills to improve their game results. System administrators have the ability to manage the content of the portal, users requesting register and the functionality offered, i.e., update to the game, forums and news. The installation of the system that was implemented has allowed successful verification and the provision of an information and awareness on the HDI, updated with the information from the United Nations, original motivation of the project.

Cognitive strategies for reducing energy consumption in wireless sensor networks

El consumo energético de las Redes de Sensores Inalámbricas (WSNs por sus siglas en inglés) es un problema histórico que ha sido abordado desde diferentes niveles y visiones, ya que no solo afecta a la propia supervivencia de la red sino que el creciente uso de dispositivos inteligentes y el nuevo paradigma del Internet de las Cosas hace que las WSNs tengan cada vez una mayor influencia en la huella energética. Debido a la tendencia al alza en el uso de estas redes se añade un nuevo problema, la saturación espectral. Las WSNs operan habitualmente en bandas sin licencia como son las bandas Industrial, Científica y Médica (ISM por sus siglas en inglés). Estas bandas se comparten con otro tipo de redes como Wi-Fi o Bluetooth cuyo uso ha crecido exponencialmente en los últimos años. Para abordar este problema aparece el paradigma de la Radio Cognitiva (CR), una tecnología que permite el acceso oportunista al espectro. La introducción de capacidades cognitivas en las WSNs no solo permite optimizar su eficiencia espectral sino que también tiene un impacto positivo en parámetros como la calidad de servicio, la seguridad o el consumo energético. Sin embargo, por otra parte, este nuevo paradigma plantea algunos retos relacionados con el consumo energético. Concretamente, el sensado del espectro, la colaboración entre los nodos (que requiere comunicación adicional) y el cambio en los parámetros de transmisión aumentan el consumo respecto a las WSN clásicas. Teniendo en cuenta que la investigación en el campo del consumo energético ha sido ampliamente abordada puesto que se trata de una de sus principales limitaciones, asumimos que las nuevas estrategias deben surgir de las nuevas capacidades añadidas por las redes cognitivas. Por otro lado, a la hora de diseñar estrategias de optimización para CWSN hay que tener muy presentes las limitaciones de recursos de estas redes en cuanto a memoria, computación y consumo energético de los nodos. En esta tesis doctoral proponemos dos estrategias de reducción de consumo energético en CWSNs basadas en tres pilares fundamentales. El primero son las capacidades cognitivas añadidas a las WSNs que proporcionan la posibilidad de adaptar los parámetros de transmisión en función del espectro disponible. La segunda es la colaboración, como característica intrínseca de las CWSNs. Finalmente, el tercer pilar de este trabajo es teoría de juegos como algoritmo de soporte a la decisión, ampliamente utilizado en WSNs debido a su simplicidad. Como primer aporte de la tesis se presenta un análisis completo de las posibilidades introducidas por la radio cognitiva en materia de reducción de consumo para WSNs. Gracias a las conclusiones extraídas de este análisis, se han planteado las hipótesis de esta tesis relacionadas con la validez de usar capacidades cognitivas como herramienta para la reducción de consumo en CWSNs. Una vez presentada las hipótesis, pasamos a desarrollar las principales contribuciones de la tesis: las dos estrategias diseñadas para reducción de consumo basadas en teoría de juegos y CR. La primera de ellas hace uso de un juego no cooperativo que se juega mediante pares de jugadores. En la segunda estrategia, aunque el juego continúa siendo no cooperativo, se añade el concepto de colaboración. Para cada una de las estrategias se presenta el modelo del juego, el análisis formal de equilibrios y óptimos y la descripción de la estrategia completa donde se incluye la interacción entre nodos. Con el propósito de probar las estrategias mediante simulación e implementación en dispositivos reales hemos desarrollado un marco de pruebas compuesto por un simulador cognitivo y un banco de pruebas formado por nodos cognitivos capaces de comunicarse en tres bandas ISM desarrollados en el B105 Lab. Este marco de pruebas constituye otra de las aportaciones de la tesis que permitirá el avance en la investigación en el área de las CWSNs. Finalmente, se presentan y discuten los resultados derivados de la prueba de las estrategias desarrolladas. La primera estrategia proporciona ahorros de energía mayores al 65% comparados con una WSN sin capacidades cognitivas y alrededor del 25% si la comparamos con una estrategia cognitiva basada en el sensado periódico del espectro para el cambio de canal de acuerdo a un nivel de ruido fijado. Este algoritmo se comporta de forma similar independientemente del nivel de ruido siempre que éste sea espacialmente uniformemente. Esta estrategia, a pesar de su sencillez, nos asegura el comportamiento óptimo en cuanto a consumo energético debido a la utilización de teoría de juegos en la fase de diseño del comportamiento de los nodos. La estrategia colaborativa presenta mejoras respecto a la anterior en términos de protección frente al ruido en escenarios de ruido más complejos donde aporta una mejora del 50% comparada con la estrategia anterior. ABSTRACT Energy consumption in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is a known historical problem that has been addressed from different areas and on many levels. But this problem should not only be approached from the point of view of their own efficiency for survival. A major portion of communication traffic has migrated to mobile networks and systems. The increased use of smart devices and the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) give WSNs a great influence on the carbon footprint. Thus, optimizing the energy consumption of wireless networks could reduce their environmental impact considerably. In recent years, another problem has been added to the equation: spectrum saturation. Wireless Sensor Networks usually operate in unlicensed spectrum bands such as Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands shared with other networks (mainly Wi-Fi and Bluetooth). To address the efficient spectrum utilization problem, Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged as the key technology that enables opportunistic access to the spectrum. Therefore, the introduction of cognitive capabilities to WSNs allows optimizing their spectral occupation. Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs) do not only increase the reliability of communications, but they also have a positive impact on parameters such as the Quality of Service (QoS), network security, or energy consumption. These new opportunities introduced by CWSNs unveil a wide field in the energy consumption research area. However, this also implies some challenges. Specifically, the spectrum sensing stage, collaboration among devices (which requires extra communication), and changes in the transmission parameters increase the total energy consumption of the network. When designing CWSN optimization strategies, the fact that WSN nodes are very limited in terms of memory, computational power, or energy consumption has to be considered. Thus, light strategies that require a low computing capacity must be found. Since the field of energy conservation in WSNs has been widely explored, we assume that new strategies could emerge from the new opportunities presented by cognitive networks. In this PhD Thesis, we present two strategies for energy consumption reduction in CWSNs supported by three main pillars. The first pillar is that cognitive capabilities added to the WSN provide the ability to change the transmission parameters according to the spectrum. The second pillar is that the ability to collaborate is a basic characteristic of CWSNs. Finally, the third pillar for this work is the game theory as a decision-making algorithm, which has been widely used in WSNs due to its lightness and simplicity that make it valid to operate in CWSNs. For the development of these strategies, a complete analysis of the possibilities is first carried out by incorporating the cognitive abilities into the network. Once this analysis has been performed, we expose the hypotheses of this thesis related to the use of cognitive capabilities as a useful tool to reduce energy consumption in CWSNs. Once the analyses are exposed, we present the main contribution of this thesis: the two designed strategies for energy consumption reduction based on game theory and cognitive capabilities. The first one is based on a non-cooperative game played between two players in a simple and selfish way. In the second strategy, the concept of collaboration is introduced. Despite the fact that the game used is also a non-cooperative game, the decisions are taken through collaboration. For each strategy, we present the modeled game, the formal analysis of equilibrium and optimum, and the complete strategy describing the interaction between nodes. In order to test the strategies through simulation and implementation in real devices, we have developed a CWSN framework composed by a CWSN simulator based on Castalia and a testbed based on CWSN nodes able to communicate in three different ISM bands. We present and discuss the results derived by the energy optimization strategies. The first strategy brings energy improvement rates of over 65% compared to WSN without cognitive techniques. It also brings energy improvement rates of over 25% compared with sensing strategies for changing channels based on a decision threshold. We have also seen that the algorithm behaves similarly even with significant variations in the level of noise while working in a uniform noise scenario. The collaborative strategy presents improvements respecting the previous strategy in terms of noise protection when the noise scheme is more complex where this strategy shows improvement rates of over 50%.

Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and sorting

The Tiebout Hypothesis asserts that, when it is efficient to have multiple jurisdictions providing local public goods, then competition between jurisdictions for residents will lead to a near-optimal outcome. Research from cooperative game theory both provides a foundation for the hypothesis and extends the hypothesis to diverse situations where small groups of participants are effective.