Brèves observations sur la consécration constitutionnelle d’un droit de retrait volontaire = Brief comments on the constitutional recognition of the right to withdraw. Research Papers in Law, 5/2004.

No abstract.

The Right to Participation of Minorities and Irish Travellers

The idea of participation is becoming increasingly important in international human rights law and recent political and constitutional theory. There is an emerging international law right of minorities to participate in public life. There are many problems though with putting this right into practice. It is not enough to offer formal opportunities for representation or even to facilitate more participatory processes. This article explores how participation is more easily proclaimed than practised by examining the position of one ethnic minority, Travellers, in a liberal democracy, Ireland. While there are many formal opportunities for participation, these do not necessarily result in effective participation on a basis of equality, and may still result in decisions which fail to consider the Traveller culture and identity. Travellers still suffer from an imbalance of power in these arrangements. There are hopeful avenues to pursue in improving participation, the role of civil society and the use of a dialogue between non-governmental organisations and international organisations to put pressure on a national government, including special representation to offset the disadvantages of traditional representative democracy and emphasising the role of special parliamentary bodies; and the need to address the politics of recognition so as to strengthen the hand of disadvantaged groups such as Travellers.

Judicial Creativity in Constitutional Interpretation

The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.

Right to Maintenance Under Criminal Law - A Critical Study

Some study has been made earlier, but no attempt has ever been made to make the study comprehensive and comparative. There exists also no information as to the working of the system. Hence the work is undertaken to provide first hand knowledge of the legal institutions that had handled and now handles annually large masses of deprived and neglected population. An investigation is also necessary to know the legal and social characteristics of the jurisdiction enjoined on the court so that this will help compare the law in the statute with the law and practice. The evaluation of the working system in the changed social atmosphere is also an urgent need of the hour

"Right to Personal Liberty Under the Indian Constitution - With Special Reference to Judicial Process"

The nature and extent of protection secured to personal liberty has been a subject matter of great controversy and debate. The expression "procedure established by law" as a standard of protection for personal liberty has been looked upon as highly unsatisfactory and inadequate. For, unlike the specific attributes of liberty that are separately guaranteed under Art.19, ‘personal liberty‘ as guaranteed by Art.21 does not obligate the .Legislature to comply with the requirements of justice and reasonableness as and when it enchroaches upon that right. Though the concept of ‘personal liberty‘ has received an evolutive and expansive meaning through judicial process, the standard of protection which the judicial process could secure to personal liberty through the interpretation of Art.21 has been far from satisfactory Even after four decades of judicial process in the interpretation of Art.21 the problem of evolving a just and adequate standard of protection for personal liberty in that Article continues to be 21 crucial constitutional issue, craving for a. satisfactory solution. And the present study is a humble attempt to unravel this problem and to Search for a reasonable solution.

The rights to a hearing and to a lawful judge in the spanish constitutional system

Right to Audience and Right to a Lawful Judge are presumed to be two of the most important guaranties for the rule of law. Both liberties are established in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as “fundamental rights”, and they are included as a part of a most generic right: the right to due process of law. Along this text, I will try to show its content and significance, according to the sentences of the Spanish “Tribunal Constitucional”, passed through more than 25 years.

Delimitation of the Right to Life by Healthcare Professionals: Up to what point should the right to life be protected?

This article explores the medical care standard required by law for terminally illpatients and the possibility of limiting therapeutic efforts while respecting the duediligence expected from doctors. To this end, circumstances are identified in whichthe doctor is forced to choose between two possible actions: to guarantee the right tolife by continuing treatment, or to limit the right to healthcare by limiting therapeuticefforts. Two cases taken from English Common Law were reviewed that decided onthe factual problem at hand. In our country, the Constitutional Court established aline of jurisprudence on the role of the doctor in deciding whether or not to continuetreatment for a terminally ill person. Lastly, jurisprudence precedents are presentedalong with a comparative analysis of the solutions given in Great Britain andin Colombia.

Fundamental Right to Freedom of Conscience without Objection? Some Notes for its Recognition as a Fundamental Guarantee

Conscientious objection is defined as the ability to depart from statutory mandates because of intimate convictions based on ethical or religious convictions. A discussion of this issue presents the conflict between the idea of a State concerned with the promotion of individual rights or the protection of general interests and an idea of law based on the maintenance of order and against a view of the law as a means to claim the protection of minimum conditions of the person. From this conflict is drawn the possibility to argue whether conscientious objection should be guaranteed as a fundamental right of freedom of conscience or as a statutory authority legislatively conferred upon persons. This paper sets out a discussion around the two views so as to develop a position that is more consistent with the context of social and constitutional law.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

Privacy--the collection, use, and computerization of personal data : joint hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Privacy and Information Systems of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, second session ... June 18, 19, and 20, 1974

Hearings held on S. 3418, 3633, 3116, 2810, and 2542.

A ‘right to have rights’ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

This paper discusses the Court’s reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of ‘sharedness’ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charter’s overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charter’s provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the ‘right to have rights’ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition.

Minimum Vital of Drinking Water in the Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court

The minimum vital of drinking water for vulnerable people isprotected by the Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence,locally and nationally. The Constitutional Court has created asolid jurisprudential line on the right to water in relation to thesuspension of water supply service for the customer’s failure topay for the service; this Court has also defined the conditionsnecessary for the companies to refrain from suspending serviceand the minimum amount necessary for survival. Compliance withthese sentences has been limited to the orders pronounced to thebenefit of the company that provides such service, including theexecution of payment agreements for accessing the water supply.The implementation of the free minimum vital of drinking water inColombia has been defined through targeting and requirements thatare set only to benefit market laws, such as payment agreements,except for Bogota that, from the point of view of human rights,has proposed the respect for the minimum vital of drinking waterfor all social strata.