Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Relative Concerns on Visible Consumption: A Source of Economic Distortions

Do relative concerns on visible consumption give rise to economic distortions? We re-examine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) building upon their general framework but recognizing that relative concerns can only apply to visible goods (e.g., cars, clothing, jewelry) and that households consume both visible and non-visible goods. Contrary to Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), the answer to this question turns to be always affirmative: the competitive equilibrium will always be different than the socially optimal one, since individuals do not take into account the negative externality they exert on others through the consumption of the visible good, while the social planner does. If one invokes separability assumptions, then the steady state competitive equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than the socially optimal one.

Decentralised supply chain formation:a belief propagation-based approach

Decentralised supply chain formation involves determining the set of producers within a network able to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem is frequently tackled using auctions and negotiations. In this paper we show how it can be cast as an optimisation of a pairwise cost function. Optimising this class of functions is NP-hard but good approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Here we detail a LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralised message-passing between potential participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known double-auction method and an optimal centralised technique, showing several improvements: it obtains better solutions for most networks that admit a competitive equilibrium Competitive equilibrium as defined in [3] is used as a means of classifying results on certain networks to allow for minor inefficiencies in their auction protocol and agent bidding strategies. while also solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions.

Decentralized supply chain formation using max-sum loopy belief propagation

Supply chain formation is the process by which a set of producers within a network determine the subset of these producers able to form a chain to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem has been tackled in a number of ways, including auctions, negotiations, and argumentation-based approaches. In this paper we show how this problem can be cast as an optimization of a pairwise cost function. Optimizing this class of energy functions is NP-hard but efficient approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using loopy belief propagation (LBP). Here we detail a max-sum LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralized message-passing between supply chain participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known decentralized double-auction method and an optimal centralized technique, showing several improvements on the auction method: it obtains better solutions for most network instances which allow for competitive equilibrium (Competitive equilibrium in Walsh and Wellman is a set of producer costs which permits a Pareto optimal state in which agents in the allocation receive non-negative surplus and agents not in the allocation would acquire non-positive surplus by participating in the supply chain) while also optimally solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Munkavásárlás vagy dolgozóbérlés? Elmélkedés a munkaviszony közgazdasági értelmezéséről. = Purchase of work or renting of workers?

Munkaszolgáltatások adásvételeként értelmezendő-e a munkaviszony vagy dolgozók bérléseként? A közgazdaság-tudomány álláspontja következetlen: jellemzően dolgozóbérlésnek deklarálja, ugyanakkor ideálisan munkaszolgáltatások adásvételeként gondolja el. Az írás érvelése szerint e következetlenség vélhető oka az abból fakadó szaktudományi dilemma, hogy a tömeges dolgozóbérlés színtereként értelmezett munkaerőpiac versenyzői egyensúlya elvi lehetetlenség. _______ Should the employment relationship be interpreted as a form of purchase of labour services or as one of renting workers? Economics typically portrays it as the latter, but idealizes it as the former. This apparent inconsistency can presumably be attributed to the dilemma arising from the theoretical incompatibility of the core economic concept of competitive equilibrium and the reality of mass renting of people in the labour market.

The issue of macroeconomic closure revisited and extended

Léon Walras (1874) already had realized that his neo-classical general equilibrium model could not accommodate autonomous investment. Sen analysed the same issue in a simple, one-sector macroeconomic model of a closed economy. He showed that fixing investment in the model, built strictly on neo-classical assumptions, would make the system overdetermined, thus, one should loosen some neo-classical condition of competitive equilibrium. He analysed three not neo-classical “closure options”, which could make the model well determined in the case of fixed investment. Others later extended his list and it showed that the closure dilemma arises in the more complex computable general equilibrium (CGE) models as well, as does the choice of adjustment mechanism assumed to bring about equilibrium at the macro level. By means of numerical models, it was also illustrated that the adopted closure rule can significantly affect the results of policy simulations based on a CGE model. Despite these warnings, the issue of macro closure is often neglected in policy simulations. It is, therefore, worth revisiting the issue and demonstrating by further examples its importance, as well as pointing out that the closure problem in the CGE models extends well beyond the problem of how to incorporate autonomous investment into a CGE model. Several closure rules are discussed in this paper and their diverse outcomes are illustrated by numerical models calibrated on statistical data. First, the analyses is done in a one-sector model, similar to Sen’s, but extended into a model of an open economy. Next, the same analyses are repeated using a fully-fledged multisectoral CGE model, calibrated on the same statistical data. Comparing the results obtained by the two models it is shown that although, using the same closure option, they generate quite similar results in terms of the direction and – to a somewhat lesser extent – of the magnitude of change in the main macro variables, the predictions of the multi-sectoral CGE model are clearly more realistic and balanced.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing

Part 18: Optimization in Collaborative Networks

Copper and lead removal by peanut hulls: equilibrium and kinetic studies

This research work aims to study the use of peanut hulls, an agricultural and food industry waste, for copper and lead removal through equilibrium and kinetic parameters evaluation. Equilibrium batch studies were performed in a batch adsorber. The influence of initial pH was evaluated (3–5) and it was selected between 4.0 and 4.5. The maximum sorption capacities obtained for the Langmuir model were 0.21 ± 0.03 and 0.18 ± 0.02 mmol/g, respectively for copper and lead. In bi-component systems, competitive sorption of copper and lead was verified, the total amount adsorbed being around 0.21 mmol of metal per gram of material in both mono and bi-component systems. In the kinetic studies equilibrium was reached after 200 min contact time using a 400 rpm stirring rate, achieving 78% and 58% removal, in mono-component system, for copper and lead respectively. Their removal follows a pseudo-second-order kinetics. These studies show that most of the metals removal occurred in the first 20 min of contact, which shows a good uptake rate in all systems.

Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling

The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.