Policy processes and collective action in water reforms: the cases of Nicaragua and Suriname

Las reformas de agua en países en desarrollo suelen llevarse a cabo junto con cambios institucionales más profundos o, incluso, acompañadas de cambios constitucionales o de régimen político. Por lo tanto, los marcos institucionales adaptados a países gobernados sujetos al estado de derecho pueden no ser apropiados para contextos gobernados fundamentalmente, al menos en sus inicios, por instituciones informales o poco maduras. Esta tesis toma las reformas de agua como punto de partida y pretende contribuir a la literatura mediante una serie de análisis empíricos tanto del ámbito general como del plano individual o sujeto personal de la política del agua. En el ámbito general, el foco se pone en los factores que explican el fallo de la acción colectiva en dos contextos diferentes: 1) en la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua y 2) en el mantenimiento y revitalización de las instituciones de riego en Surinam. En el plano del individuo, la investigación se centra en las decisiones de los usuarios de los recursos y analiza el papel crítico de las variables sociales para la gestión de los recursos comunes. Para ello, el método de investigación utilizado es mixto, combinando el análisis de entrevistas, encuestas y experimentos. En el ámbito general, los resultados muestran que las principales barreras para la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua podrían tener su reflejo en el lenguaje de la Ley y, por tanto, en la forma en la que se definen y configuran las instituciones incluidas en dicha Ley. Así, la investigación demuestra que la implementación de políticas no puede ser estudiada o entendida sin tener en cuenta tanto el diseño de la propia política como el marco socio-ecológico en el que se enmarca. El contexto específico de Nicaragua remarca la importancia de considerar tanto las instituciones formales como informales en los procesos de transición política. A pesar de que las reformas de agua requieren plazos largos para su implementación, el hecho de que exista una diferencia entre las reglas tal cual se definen formalmente y las reglas que operan en la realidad merece una mayor consideración en el diseño de políticas basadas fundamentalmente en instituciones formales. En el ámbito de la conducta individual, el análisis de la acción colectiva ofrece una serie de observaciones empíricas interesantes. En el caso de Nicaragua, los resultados indican que la intensidad de las relaciones sociales, el tipo de agentes dispuestos a proporcionar apoyo social y el nivel de confianza en la comunidad son factores que explican de manera significativa la participación en la comunidad. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la gestión colectiva de riego se produzca, en la mayoría de casos, en torno a lazos familiares sugiere que las variables de capital social críticas se definen en gran medida en la esfera familiar, siendo difícil que se extiendan fuera de estos nexos. El análisis experimental de los resultados de un juego de uso de recurso común y contribución al bien público muestra que las preferencias pro-sociales de los individuos y la heterogeneidad del grupo en términos de composición por sexo son factores que explican significativamente los resultados y las decisiones de apropiación a lo largo del juego. En términos del diseño de las políticas, es fundamental tener en cuenta las dinámicas de participación y uso de los recursos comunes de manera que los niveles de cooperación puedan mantenerse en el largo plazo, lo cual, como se observa en el caso de Surinam, no es siempre posible. Finalmente, el caso de Surinam es un ejemplo ilustrativo de los procesos de acción colectiva en economías en transición. El análisis del fallo de la acción colectiva en Surinam muestra que los procesos políticos vinculados al período colonial y de independencia explican en gran medida la falta de claridad en las reglas operacionales y colectivas que gobiernan la gestión de los sistemas de riego y drenaje. Los resultados empíricos sugieren que a pesar de que la acción colectiva para la provisión de los servicios de riego y drenaje estaba bien establecida bajo el régimen colonial, la auto-organización no prosperó en un contexto dependiente del apoyo externo y regido fundamentalmente por reglas diseñadas al nivel competencial del gobierno central. El sistema socio-ecológico que se desarrolló durante la transición post-colonial favoreció, así, la emergencia de comportamientos oportunistas, y posteriormente la inoperancia de los Water Boards (WBs) creados en la época colonial. En este sentido, cualquier intento por revitalizar los WBs y fomentar el desarrollo de la auto-organización de los usuarios necesitará abordar los problemas relacionados con los patrones demográficos, incluyendo la distribución de la tierra, el diseño de instituciones y la falta de confianza en el gobierno, además de las inversiones típicas en infraestructura y sistemas de información hidrológicos. El liderazgo del gobierno, aportando empuje de arriba-abajo, es, además, otro elemento imprescindible en Surinam. ABSTRACT Water reforms in developing countries take place along deeper institutional and even constitutional. Therefore, institutional frameworks that might result in positive outcomes in countries governed by the rule of law might not fit in contexts governed mainly by informal or immature institutions. This thesis takes water reforms as the starting point and aims to contribute to the literature by presenting several conceptual and empirical analyses at both general and individual levels. At the general national level, the focus is on the factors explaining failure of collective action in two different settings: 1) in the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law and 2) in sustaining and revitalizing irrigation institutions in Suriname. At the individual level, the research focuses on the actions of resource users and analyzes the critical role of social variables for common pool resources management. For this purpose, the research presented in this thesis makes use of a mixed-method approach, combining interviews, surveys and experimental methods. Overall, the results show that major barriers for the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law have its reflection on the language of the Law and, therefore, on the way institutions are defined and configured. In this sense, our study shows that implementation cannot fruitfully be studied and understood without taking into account both the policy design and the social-ecological context in which it is framed. The specific setting of Nicaragua highlights the relevance of considering both formal and informal institutions when promoting policy transitions. Despite the unquestionable fact that water reforms implementation needs long periods of time, there is still a gap between the rules on paper and the rules on the ground that deserves further attention when proposing policy changes on the basis of formal institutions. At the level of the individual agent, the analysis of collective action provides a number of interesting empirical insights. In the case of Nicaragua, I found that the intensity of social networks, the type of agents willing to provide social support and the level of trust in the community are all significant factors in explaining collective action at community level. However, the fact that most collective irrigation relies on family ties suggests that critical social capital variables might be defined within the family sphere and making it difficult to go beyond it. Experimental research combining a common pool resource and a public good game in Nicaragua shows that individuals’ pro-social traits and group heterogeneity in terms of sex composition are significant variables in explaining efficiency outcomes and effort decisions along the game. Thus, with regard to policy design, it is fundamental to consider carefully the dynamics of agents' participation and use of common pool resources, for sustaining cooperation in the long term, which, as seen in the case and Surinam, is not always possible. The case of Suriname provides a rich setting for the analysis of collective action in transition economies. The analysis of decay of collective irrigation in Suriname shows that the lack of clear operational and collective choice rules appear to be rooted in deeper political processes that date back to the colonial period. The empirical findings suggest that despite collective action for the provision of irrigation and drainage services was well established during the colonial period, self-organization did not flourish in a context governed by colonial state-crafted rules and mostly dependent on external support. The social-ecological system developed during the post-colonial transition process favored the emergence of opportunistic behavior. In this respect, any attempt to revitalize WBs and support self-organization will need to tackle the problems derived from demographic patterns, including land allocation, institutions design and government distrust, in addition to the typical investments in both physical infrastructure and hydrological information systems. The leadership role of the government, acting as a top-down trigger, is another essential element in Suriname.

Climate change in game theory

The study provides an overview of the application possibilities of game theory to climate change. The characteristics of games are adapted to the topics of climate and carbon. The importance of uncertainty, probability, marginal value of adaptation, common pool resources, etc. are tailored to the context of international relations and the challenge of global warming.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

An Institutional, Socio-economic, and Legal Analysis of Fisheries Co-management and Regulation in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica

Marine Areas for Responsible Artisanal Fishing (AMPR) have emerged as a new model for co-managing small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica, one that involves collaboration between fishers, government agencies and NGOs. This thesis aims to examine the context for collective action and co-management by small-scale fishers; evaluate the design, implementation, and enforcement of AMPRs; and conduct a linguistic analysis of fisheries legislation. The present work relies on the analysis of several types of qualitative data, including interviews with 23 key informants, rapid rural assessments, and legal documents. Findings demonstrate the strong influence of economic factors for sustaining collective action, as well as the importance of certain types of external organizations for community development and co-management. Additionally, significant enforcement gaps and institutional deficiencies were identified in the work of regulating agencies. Legal analysis suggests that mechanisms for government accountability are unavailable and that legal discourse reflects some of the most salient problems in management.

Adapting prospective structural analysis to strengthen sustainable management and capacity building in community-based natural resource management contexts

Local communities collectively managing common pool resources can play an important role in sustainable management, but they often lack the skills and context-specific tools required for such management. The complex dynamics of social-ecological systems (SES), the need for management capacities, and communities’ limited empowerment and participation skills present challenges for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) strategies. We analyzed the applicability of prospective structural analysis (PSA), a strategic foresight tool, to support decision making and to foster sustainable management and capacity building in CBNRM contexts and the modifications necessary to use the tool in such contexts. By testing PSA in three SES in Colombia, Mexico, and Argentina, we gathered information regarding the potential of this tool and its adaptation requirements. The results suggest that the tool can be adapted to these contexts and contribute to fostering sustainable management and capacity building. It helped identify the systems’ dynamics, thus increasing the communities’ knowledge about their SES and informing the decision-making process. Additionally, it drove a learning process that both fostered empowerment and built participation skills. The process demanded both time and effort, and required external monitoring and facilitation, but community members could be trained to master it. Thus, we suggest that the PSA technique has the potential to strengthen CBNRM and that other initiatives could use it, but they must be aware of these requirements.

Governança de recursos de base comum e capacidade adaptativa de comunidades de fundos de pasto

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, 2015.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Fenced in: Common property struggles in the management of communal rangelands in central Eastern Cape Province, South Africa

This paper takes as its starting point the assertion that current rangeland management in the central Eastern Cape Province (former Ciskei) of South Africa, is characterised primarily by an ‘open access’ approach. Empirical material drawn from three case-study communities in the region is used to examine the main barriers to management of rangeland as a ‘commons’. The general inability to define and enforce rights to particular grazing resourses in the face of competing claims from ‘outsiders’, as well as inadequate local institutions responsible for rangeland management are highlighted as being of key importance. These are often exacerbated by lack of available grazing land, diffuse user groups and local political and ethnic divisions. Many of these problems have a strong legacy in historical apartheid policies such as forced resettlement and betterment planning. On this basis it is argued that policy should focus on facilitating the emergence of effective, local institutions for rangeland management. Given the limited grazing available to many communities in the region, a critical aspect of this will be finding ways to legitimise current patterns of extensive resource use, which traverse existing ‘community’ boundaries. However, this runs counter to recent legislation, which strongly links community management with legal ownership of land within strict boundaries often defined through fencing. Finding ways to overcome this apparent disjuncture between theory and policy will be vital for the effective management of common pool grazing resources in the region.

Alpine Common Property Institutions under Change: Conditions for Successful and Unsuccessful Collective Action by Alpine Farmers in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland

The protection and sustainable management of alpine summer pastures has been stated as a goal in Swiss national law since 1996, and direct payments from the state for summer pasturing have been tied to sustainability criteria since 2000. This reflects the increasing value of the alpine cultural landscape as a public good. However, provision of this public good remains in the hands of local farmers and their local common pool resource (CPR) institutions for managing alpine pastures. These institutions are increasingly struggling to maintain their institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the work needed to maintain the pastures. This paper examines two cases of local CPR institutions for managing alpine pastures in the Swiss Canton of Grisons that manifest different institutional developments in light of changing conditions. The differences in how these institutions reacted to change and the impacts this has had on the provision of the CPR are explained by focusing on relative prices, bargaining power, and ideology as drivers of institutional change that are often neglected within common property research. Key words: summer pasture management, institutional change, bargaining power, ideology

Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

This article presents constitutionality as a new approach for analyzing bottom-up institution-building processes emphasizing local perceptions and local agency in common pool resource management. Using four case studies—fisheries in Zambia; pasture and forestry in Mali; fisheries in Indonesia; forestry in Bolivia—this approach analyzes examples of local institution building differing from top-down imposed participation. Our analysis highlights six components of constitutionality: emic perceptions of the need for new institutions, participatory processes of negotiation, preexisting institutions as a basis for institution building, outside catalyzing agents, recognition of local knowledge, and higher level acknowledgment of the new institutions.

Reserva extrativista Acaú-Goiana: tragédia comum ou decisão coletiva?

In recent years we have observed, in Brazil, the expansion of democratic spaces, providing the use of participatory management strategies in common-pool areas. However, the existence of a co-management model does not guarantee its practice, neither that it will prevent the depletion of common features characterizing the tragedy proposed by Hardin. In this work we analysed the management of Acaú-Goiana RESEX which is located in the cities of Acaú (PB) and Goiana (PE), eight years after its legal creation. We evaluated how much the users of RESEX possess information (even if non formalized) regarding the common use of area and whether they exhibit collectivist values. We used as an interpretative tool the facilitators principles of common resource management (PGRC) identified by Elinor Ostrom and the questionnaire of human values proposed by Schwartz. The human values questionnaire was applied to 240 individuals, half beneficiary and the other half non-beneficiary, only the beneficiaries were submitted to the questionnaire of PGRC. Interviews were conducted in the period of May to September 2014. We tested three hypotheses: 1) The degree of dependence from RESEX resources will play an important role on indirect knowledge of the PGRC; 2) the inclusion of individuals in a communal area (RESEX) increases collectivists values; 3) higher collectivist value rates increases knowledge of PGRC. To this end, we defined levels of socio-economic dependence of RESEX resources, knowledge of PGRC and individual values. GLM statistic analysis of mean comparison and correlation were employed. Our results showed that the knowledge on six of the seven items analyzed in the basic principles (PGRC) is still low. The extended land area and the high number of users may be exerting a detrimental effect on the development of a co-management. Contrary to expected, it was not the dependency who influenced knowledge on the PGRC, but the time spent in contact with the RESEX. This indicates that direct contact with the environment, not the dependence of it, that raises awareness about PGRC. According to our hypothesis, individuals with collectivist values showed greater knowledge of PGRC and reduced hours of work within the RESEX, indicating a greater tendency of individuals refrain their use of the common resource. Individualistic values correlated with less knowledge of a PGRC. Among the beneficiaries, individuals with higher individualistic values had higher monthly income, while among non-beneficiaries there was no such correlation, demonstrating the economic advantages of individualism (free-riding) in situations of non-private use of resources. Our data emphasize the importance of guiding the main actors in the development of a co-participatory management in the direction of the basic principles, and to develop collectivist values among users of a common good can raise awareness of these principles.

Larval activity levels and delayed metamorphosis affect post-larval performance in the colonial, ascidian Diplosoma listerianum

It is becoming widely recognized that extending the larval period of marine invertebrates, especially of species with non-feeding larvae, can affect post-larval performance. As these carry-over effects are presumed to be caused by the depletion of larval energy reserves, we predicted that the level of larval activity would also affect post-larval performance. This prediction was tested with the cosmopolitan colonial ascidian Diplosoma listerianum in field experiments in southern Australia. Diplosoma larvae, brooded in the parent colony, are competent to settle immediately after spawning, and they remain competent to metamorphose for > 15 h. Some larvae were induced to metamorphose 0 to 6 h after release, whilst others were induced to swim actively by alternating light and dark periods for up to 3 h prior to metamorphosis. Juvenile colonies were then transplanted to a subtidal field site in Port Phillip Bay and left to grow for up to 3 wk. Extending the larval period and increasing the amount of swimming both produced carry-over effects on post-larval performance. Colonies survived at different rates among experiments, but larval experience did not affect survival rates. Delays in metamorphosis and increased swimming activity did, however, reduce colony growth rates dramatically, resulting in 50% fewer zooids per colony. Moreover, such colonies produced initial zooids with smaller feeding structures, with the width of branchial baskets reduced by 10 to 15%. These differences in branchial basket size persisted and were still apparent in newly budded zooids 3 wk after metamorphosis. Our results suggest that, for D. listerianum, larval maintenance, swimming, and metamorphosis all use energy from a common pool, and increases in the allocation to maintenance or swimming come at the expense of post-larval performance.

Redes Políticas y Solución de Dilemas de Acción Colectiva: Estudio de la gestión de recursos hídricos compartidos en dos cuencas lacustres de la provincia de Córdoba

El objetivo general de este proyecto es examinar cómo las estructuras de las redes políticas que se forman para gestionar recursos hídricos compartidos en la provincia de Córdoba disponen las actitudes cooperativas de los actores que participan en dichas redes. Dado el deterioro de los recursos hídricos en el país este proyecto cobra importancia, debido a que trabaja desde el supuesto que las actitudes cooperativas facilitan –aunque no de manera lineal- el logro de políticas que protejan efectivamente dichos recursos. Los objetivos específicos para el primer año del proyecto son: 1. Identificar los actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales activos en los últimos cinco años en los procesos de gestión de recursos hídricos en las cuencas de los lagos San Roque, y Los Molinos (ambos ubicados en la provincia de Córdoba), 2. Identificar las demandas de coordinación y cooperación por parte de dichos actores, 3. Describir las características estructurales de las redes de gestión de los recursos hídricos y su relación con la percepción de los actores acerca de los problemas a enfrentar en las cuencas. El estudio de las redes de gestión en las dos cuencas lacustres seleccionadas es relevante desde el punto de vista de la generación de conocimiento aplicado sobre estos cuerpos de agua que constituyen un ejemplo típico de “recursos compartidos” (common-pool resource) donde la falta de actividades de cooperación y/o coordinación entre los usuarios del recurso se traducen en dilemas de acción colectiva

What underlies localization and urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to analyze why firms in some industries locate in specialized economic environments (localization economies) while those in other industries prefer large city locations (urbanization economies). To this end, we examine the location decisions of new manufacturing firms in Spain at the city level and for narrowly defined industries (three-digit level). First, we estimate firm location models to obtain estimates that reflect the importance of localization and urbanization economies in each industry. In a second step, we regress these estimates on industry characteristics that are related to the potential importance of three agglomeration theories, namely, labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers. Localization effects are low and urbanization effects are high in knowledge-intensive industries, suggesting that firms (partly) locate in large cities to reap the benefits of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. We also find that localization effects are high in industries that employ workers whose skills are more industry-specific, suggesting that industries (partly) locate in specialized economic environments to share a common pool of specialized workers.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.