859 resultados para Common Security and Defence Policy
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Summary. The ongoing review of the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures warrants attention. What passes as an update of an arcane and technical document masks a profoundly political debate concerning what the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be about. This policy brief summarises the main proposals and formulates a set of critical reflections. It calls for replacing the bureaucratic scheming with a more forthright political debate, and warns against sacrificing incompatible organisational cultures on the altar of the comprehensive approach. At a time when European security and prosperity trends are increasingly pointing downwards, the EEAS and the member states must look to the future and embrace, rather than resist, change.
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Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.
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On 25 and 26 June 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) will convene to discuss the implementation of their Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013. A substantial and frank debate among EU leaders is urgently needed in order to forge a lasting and credible vision for CSDP.
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This collective EU Diplomacy Paper on relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) consists of essays written by students of the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme at the College of Europe in the class on EU-NATO relations taught by Fulbright Professor Mark Sheetz in the academic year 2014-15. It seeks to provide a blueprint of what the near future of the transatlantic alliance and of the European security framework might look like. Special attention will be given to the possible effects of Finland joining NATO, Swedish-NATO relations, the question whether NATO should continue to exist at all, and finally the use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in relation with the transatlantic military alliance.
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Item 1038-A, 1038-B (microfiche)
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A tanulmányban áttekintjük az európai foglalkoztatás- és szociálpolitika kialakulását és történetét, valamint a területen alkalmazott speciális koordinációs módszert. Ezt követően a csatlakozási tárgyalások elemzésével bemutatjuk a hazai politika helyzetét a csatlakozás időpontjában. Az elmúlt időszak foglalkoztatási adatai segítségével megvizsgáljuk a hazai és európai foglalkoztatás- és szociálpolitikai intézkedések hatásait. A cikk zárásaként a magyar EU-elnökség prioritásait és az aktuális közösségi terveket vesszük szemügyre. ______ The article gives a review on the history of the common employment and social policy in the European Union, with special attention to the coordination methods used in the field. The article also analyses the accession negotiations and the domestic policy situation at that time of Hungary's accession to the EU. With the data of recent years, the effects of the Hungarian and common EU measures are also examined. Finally, the priorities of the Hungarian Presidency of the European Council along with the current common policy plans are also demonstrated.
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The objectives of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) include ways to improve the democratic and international images of the European Union (EU). The focus of the literature has so far focused on the overall treaty impact and on the EU´s international role. This paper considers instead its impact on the question of the democratic accountability of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (CSDP). This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part describes the changes the LT has made for the European Parliament (EP) in terms of its external relations. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in its foreign, security and defence policies. (3) The third part offers a preliminary analysis of the recently created Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) includes parliamentarians from the national EU parliaments. The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development in trying to bridge those existing democratic gaps, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of many such deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and of its member states.
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A criminalidade organizada opera cada vez mais em colaboração alargada, elevada mobilidade e grande diversificação nas suas formas de atuar. Após os recentes atentados terroristas em Paris e em Bruxelas as preocupações relacionadas com as ameaças à segurança da União Europeia (UE) estão cada vez mais na agenda política. O objetivo geral desta investigação foi analisar a importância que a formação comum das polícias da UE e o seu papel na Academia Europeia de Polícia (CEPOL) têm para a Guarda Nacional Republicada (GNR), compreendendo a importância desta formação na implementação da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). Esta investigação procurou uma recolha de informação adequada, possibilitando a compreensão do fenómeno em estudo, adotando uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, concretizada a partir de uma pesquisa documental e um inquérito por entrevista semiestruturada, cujos dados foram objeto de análise de conteúdo. Como resultado principal destacou-se o diagnóstico que fundamenta eventuais mudanças ou orientações que a GNR possa vir a prosseguir no âmbito da sua posição na CEPOL. Concluiu-se que a prossecução da segurança na UE exige uma adequada articulação entre a segurança interna e a segurança externa, bem como da importância das agências da UE em geral, e em particular, da CEPOL cuja missão de formação comum é essencial. Abstract: Organised crime is increasingly operating in extended collaboration, high mobility and great diversity in their ways of acting. After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels the concerns about threats to security of the European Union (EU) are increasingly on the political agenda. The general objective of this research was to analyse the importance of common training in the context of the EU's police forces and its role in the European Police College (CEPOL) have in the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), understanding the importance of this training in the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This research looked for a collection of adequate information, adopting a qualitative research strategy, enabled the understanding of the phenomenon under study, adopting a qualitative research strategy, implemented from desk research and a survey by semistructured interviews, whose data were subject to content analysis. The main result highlighted the diagnosis set that underlies any changes or guidelines that GNR is likely to continue in its position on CEPOL. It was concluded that further security in the EU requires proper coordination between internal security and external security, and the importance of EU agencies in general, and in particular CEPOL whose common training mission is essential.
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A Força de Gendarmerie Europeia ergueu-se na esfera dos países da União Europeia com forças de polícia de estatuto militar, tipo gendarmerie, com o propósito de proporcionar uma ferramenta de cooperação internacional que permitira aumentar a capacidade de gestão de crises e contribuir para o desenvolvimento da identidade europeia de segurança e defesa, bem como para o reforço da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa. Depois de dez anos passados após a plena capacidade operacional, interessa avaliar se a Organização constitui verdadeiramente um instrumento eficaz, eficiente e proveitoso para os seus Estados-Membros e para as principais organizações internacionais, bem como ponderar o seu impacto na ação externa da União Europeia. Com este objetivo, desenvolveu-se uma investigação qualitativa recorrendo ao raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo. Esquadrinharam-se questões de natureza descritiva e interpretativa, conferindo uma importância especial aos contributos facilitados pelos entrevistados, dotados de destacada relevância profissional na esfera da cooperação policial internacional. Constata-se no estudo que a Força de Gendarmerie Europeia constitui um instrumento útil para a cooperação internacional, oferecendo capacidades operacionais bem-sucedidas assentes no treino permanente, na interoperabilidade com os atores participantes e na capacidade de resposta rápida a situações de crise. Abstract: The European Gendarmerie Force stood up in the background of European Union countries with military status police forces, gendarmerie type, in order to provide a tool for international cooperation increasing crisis management capacities and contributing to the development of the European security and defence identity, in addition to strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Ten years after achieving full operational capability, it is intended to assess if the Organization actually performs an effective, efficient and profitable instrument for its Member States and the main international organizations, as well as considering its impact on external action of the European Union. With that aim, a qualitative research was developed using the hypothetical-deductive reasoning. Descriptive and interpretative issues were scoured, giving special importance to contributions provided by respondents with outstanding professional background in international police cooperation sphere. The study reveals that the European Gendarmerie Force is a useful tool for international cooperation, providing successful operational capabilities settled in permanent training, interoperability with the participating actors and in a rapid response capability to crisis situations.
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This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).
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Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.
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Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. This CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU, in the face of numerous emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security threats. The report is a record of the deliberations over several months between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence, who conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our common security and defence activities. And that member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. This report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in the view of the Task Force experts, further integration should amount to a European Defence Union.
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Shepherd, Alistair, 'Irrelevant or Indispensable? ESDP, the ?War on Terror' and the Fallout from Iraq', International Politics (2006) 43(1) pp.71-92 RAE2008
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The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.