The committee on public information : a transmedia war propaganda campaign

This thesis develops an understanding of how propaganda entered the realm of journalism and popular culture in the United States during World War I through an examination of materials created by the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI was a US governmental propaganda organisation created during World War I to persuade the nation to mobilise for war. Three of its divisions were chosen for this study: the Division of News (DoN), the Division of Four Minute Men (FMM) and the Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP). Chapter 1 provides a general context for the thesis, outlines the research questions and details previous research on the CPI. Chapter 2 outlines the methods of analysis for interpreting the case study chapters and provides contextual information. The case studies are presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These chapters are structured in the order of context, medium and content, and contain historical contextual information about each particular division, medialogical aspects of its propagated form and thematic groupings created from close reading of CPI materials. A semiotic analysis in the Peircian tradition is also performed on visual forms of propaganda in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses how the expectations of persuasion, truth and amusement relate to each other when mediated in culture, using Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere. This further develops an understanding of propaganda as a cultural system in relation to other cultural systems – in this case, journalism and popular culture. Chapter 7 provides conclusions about the study, outlines relative strengths and weaknesses regarding the selection and deployment of methods, makes recommendations for future research, and summarises the key contributions of the thesis.

The Committee on Public Information : a transmedia war propaganda campaign

This article summarises a PhD dissertation of the same name. It develops an understanding of how propaganda entered journalism and popular culture in the United States during World War I through an examination of materials created by the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Three CPI divisions were studied: The Division of News, the Four Minute Men, and the Division of Pictorial Publicity. The methodology of archival contextualisation was created, bringing together the methods of close reading, discourse-historical contextualisation, and Piercian semiotics. A summary of relevant literature is interspersed with thematic historical developments that impacted the relationship between propaganda, journalism and popular culture. This review outlines a gap in knowledge about the archival materials as well as the relationship between propaganda, journalism and popular culture from this period. A discussion about how the expectations of persuasion, truth and amusement relate to each other when mediated in culture, using Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere further develops an understanding of propaganda as a cultural system in relation to other cultural systems – in this case, journalism and popular culture. Findings from the study include that the CPI created a transmedia war propaganda campaign, which enabled propaganda to successfully draw entertainment value from popular culture and credibility from journalism in order to influence public opinion.

Submission to the Joint Select Committee on Cyber Safety. Inquiry into the Cybersafety of Seniors.

This submission addresses the following terms of reference: 1) the nature, prevalence and level of cybersafety risks and threats experienced by senior Australians; 2) the impact and implications of those risks and threats on access and use of information and communication technologies by senior Australians; 3) the adequacy and effectiveness of current government and industry initiatives to respond to those threats, including education initiatives aimed at senior Australians; 4) best practice safeguards, and any possible changes to Australian law, policy or practice that will strengthen the cybersafety of senior Australians.

Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015

We argue that safeguards are necessary to ensure human rights are adequately protected. All systems of blocking access to online content necessarily raise difficult and problematic issues of infringement of freedom of speech and access to information. Given the importance of access to information across the breadth of modern life, great care must be taken to ensure that any measures designed to protect copyright by blocking access to online locations are proportionate. Any measures to block access to online content must be carefully tailored to avoid serious and disproportionate impact on human rights. This means first that the measures must be effective and adapted to achieve a legitimate purpose. The experience of foreign jurisdictions suggests that this legislation is unlikely to be effective. Unless and until there is clear evidence that the proposed scheme is likely to increase effective returns to Australian creators, this legislation should not be introduced. Second, the principle of proportionality requires ensuring that the proposed legislation does not unnecessarily burden legitimate speech or access to information. As currently worded, the draft legislation may result in online locations being blocked even though they would, if operated in Australia, not contravene Australian law. This is unacceptable, and if introduced, the law should be drafted so that it is clearly limited only to foreign locations where there is clear and compelling evidence that the location would authorise copyright infringement if it were in Australia. Third, proportionality requires that measures are reasonable and strike an appropriate balance between competing interests. This draft legislation provides few safeguards for the public interest or the interests of private actors who would access legitimate information. New safeguards should be introduced to ensure that the public interest is well represented at both the stage of the primary application and at any applications to rescind or vary injunctions. We recommend that: The legislation not be introduced unless and until there is compelling evidence that it will have a real and significant positive impact on the effective incomes of Australian creators. The ‘facilitates an infringement’ test in s 115A(1)(b) should be replaced with ‘authorises infringement’. The ‘primary purpose’ test in s 115A(1)(c) should be replaced with: “the online location has no substantial non-infringing uses”. An explicit role for public interest groups as amici curiae should be introduced. Costs of successful applications should be borne by applicants. Injunctions should be valid only for renewable two year terms. Section 115A(5) should be clarified, and cl (b) and (c) be removed. The effectiveness of the scheme should be evaluated in two years.

The Australia-Chile free trade agreement 2008: Intellectual property and development. A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA)

Australia and South Korea have signed a new free trade agreement - the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). Is it a fair trade fairytale? Or is it a dirty deal done dirt cheap? Or somewhere in between? It is hard to tell, given the initial secrecy of the negotiations, and the complexity of the texts of the agreement There has been much debate in Parliament over the transparency of the trade agreement; the scope of market access provided under the deal; the impact of the investment chapter, with its investor-state dispute settlement clause; the intellectual property chapter; the environment chapter; its impact upon public health; and the labor rights chapter. KAFTA provides an indication of the approach of the new Conservative Government in Australia to other trade deals – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

A Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth)

The film company, Roadshow, the pay television company Foxtel, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and News Limited — as well as copyright industries — have been clamouring for new copyright powers and remedies. In the summer break, the Coalition Government has responded to such entreaties from its industry supporters and donors, with a new package of copyright laws and policies. There has been significant debate over the proposals between the odd couple of Attorney-General George Brandis and the Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull. There has been deep, philosophical differences between the two Ministers over the copyright agenda. The Attorney-General George Brandis has supported a model of copyright maximalism, with strong rights and remedies for the copyright empires in film, television, and publishing. He has shown little empathy for the information technology companies of the digital economy. The Attorney-General has been impatient to press ahead with a copyright regime. The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has been somewhat more circumspect,recognising that there is a need to ensure that copyright laws do not adversely impact upon competition in the digital economy. The final proposal is a somewhat awkward compromise between the discipline-and-punish regime preferred by Brandis, and the responsive regulation model favoured by Turnbull. In his new book, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age, Cory Doctorow has some sage advice for copyright owners: Things that don’t make money: * Complaining about piracy. * Calling your customers thieves. * Treating your customers like thieves. In this context, the push by copyright owners and the Coalition Government to have a copyright crackdown may well be counter-productive to their interests. This submission considers a number of key elements of the Coalition Government’s Copyright Crackdown. Part 1 examines the proposals in respect of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth). Part 2 focuses upon the proposed Copyright Code. Part 3 considers the question of safe harbours for intermediaries. Part 4 examines the question of copyright exceptions – particularly looking at the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission for the introduction of a defence of fair use. Part 5 highlights the recommendations of the IT Pricing Inquiry and the Harper Competition Policy Review in respect of copyright law, consumer rights, and competition law.

Minutes of Committee on Accounts

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