Parameterising ecological validity and integrating individual differences within second-person neuroscience

This commentary situates the second person account within a broader framework of ecological validity for experimental paradigms in social cognitive neuroscience. It then considers how individual differences at psychological and genetic levels can be integrated within the proposed framework.

What the cognitive neurosciences mean to me

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary area of research that combines measurement of brain activity (mostly by means of neuroimaging) with a simultaneous performance of cognitive tasks by human subjects. These investigations have been successful in the task of connecting the sciences of the brain (Neurosciences) and the sciences of the mind (Cognitive Sciences). Advances on this kind of research provide a map of localization of cognitive functions in the human brain. Do these results help us to understand how mind relates to the brain? In my view, the results obtained by the Cognitive Neurosciences lead to new investigations in the domain of Molecular Neurobiology, aimed at discovering biophysical mechanisms that generate the activity measured by neuroimaging instruments. In this context, I argue that the understanding of how ionic/molecular processes support cognition and consciousness cannot be made by means of the standard reductionist explanations. Knowledge of ionic/molecular meclianisms can contribute to our understanding of the human mind as long as we assume an alternative form of explanation, based on psycho-physical similarities, together with an ontological view of mentality and spirituality as embedded in physical nature (and not outside nature, as frequently assumed in western culture).

Mathematical models of cognitive processes

The research activity carried out during the PhD course was focused on the development of mathematical models of some cognitive processes and their validation by means of data present in literature, with a double aim: i) to achieve a better interpretation and explanation of the great amount of data obtained on these processes from different methodologies (electrophysiological recordings on animals, neuropsychological, psychophysical and neuroimaging studies in humans), ii) to exploit model predictions and results to guide future research and experiments. In particular, the research activity has been focused on two different projects: 1) the first one concerns the development of neural oscillators networks, in order to investigate the mechanisms of synchronization of the neural oscillatory activity during cognitive processes, such as object recognition, memory, language, attention; 2) the second one concerns the mathematical modelling of multisensory integration processes (e.g. visual-acoustic), which occur in several cortical and subcortical regions (in particular in a subcortical structure named Superior Colliculus (SC)), and which are fundamental for orienting motor and attentive responses to external world stimuli. This activity has been realized in collaboration with the Center for Studies and Researches in Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of Bologna (in Cesena) and the Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy of the Wake Forest University School of Medicine (NC, USA). PART 1. Objects representation in a number of cognitive functions, like perception and recognition, foresees distribute processes in different cortical areas. One of the main neurophysiological question concerns how the correlation between these disparate areas is realized, in order to succeed in grouping together the characteristics of the same object (binding problem) and in maintaining segregated the properties belonging to different objects simultaneously present (segmentation problem). Different theories have been proposed to address these questions (Barlow, 1972). One of the most influential theory is the so called “assembly coding”, postulated by Singer (2003), according to which 1) an object is well described by a few fundamental properties, processing in different and distributed cortical areas; 2) the recognition of the object would be realized by means of the simultaneously activation of the cortical areas representing its different features; 3) groups of properties belonging to different objects would be kept separated in the time domain. In Chapter 1.1 and in Chapter 1.2 we present two neural network models for object recognition, based on the “assembly coding” hypothesis. These models are networks of Wilson-Cowan oscillators which exploit: i) two high-level “Gestalt Rules” (the similarity and previous knowledge rules), to realize the functional link between elements of different cortical areas representing properties of the same object (binding problem); 2) the synchronization of the neural oscillatory activity in the γ-band (30-100Hz), to segregate in time the representations of different objects simultaneously present (segmentation problem). These models are able to recognize and reconstruct multiple simultaneous external objects, even in difficult case (some wrong or lacking features, shared features, superimposed noise). In Chapter 1.3 the previous models are extended to realize a semantic memory, in which sensory-motor representations of objects are linked with words. To this aim, the network, previously developed, devoted to the representation of objects as a collection of sensory-motor features, is reciprocally linked with a second network devoted to the representation of words (lexical network) Synapses linking the two networks are trained via a time-dependent Hebbian rule, during a training period in which individual objects are presented together with the corresponding words. Simulation results demonstrate that, during the retrieval phase, the network can deal with the simultaneous presence of objects (from sensory-motor inputs) and words (from linguistic inputs), can correctly associate objects with words and segment objects even in the presence of incomplete information. Moreover, the network can realize some semantic links among words representing objects with some shared features. These results support the idea that semantic memory can be described as an integrated process, whose content is retrieved by the co-activation of different multimodal regions. In perspective, extended versions of this model may be used to test conceptual theories, and to provide a quantitative assessment of existing data (for instance concerning patients with neural deficits). PART 2. The ability of the brain to integrate information from different sensory channels is fundamental to perception of the external world (Stein et al, 1993). It is well documented that a number of extraprimary areas have neurons capable of such a task; one of the best known of these is the superior colliculus (SC). This midbrain structure receives auditory, visual and somatosensory inputs from different subcortical and cortical areas, and is involved in the control of orientation to external events (Wallace et al, 1993). SC neurons respond to each of these sensory inputs separately, but is also capable of integrating them (Stein et al, 1993) so that the response to the combined multisensory stimuli is greater than that to the individual component stimuli (enhancement). This enhancement is proportionately greater if the modality-specific paired stimuli are weaker (the principle of inverse effectiveness). Several studies have shown that the capability of SC neurons to engage in multisensory integration requires inputs from cortex; primarily the anterior ectosylvian sulcus (AES), but also the rostral lateral suprasylvian sulcus (rLS). If these cortical inputs are deactivated the response of SC neurons to cross-modal stimulation is no different from that evoked by the most effective of its individual component stimuli (Jiang et al 2001). This phenomenon can be better understood through mathematical models. The use of mathematical models and neural networks can place the mass of data that has been accumulated about this phenomenon and its underlying circuitry into a coherent theoretical structure. In Chapter 2.1 a simple neural network model of this structure is presented; this model is able to reproduce a large number of SC behaviours like multisensory enhancement, multisensory and unisensory depression, inverse effectiveness. In Chapter 2.2 this model was improved by incorporating more neurophysiological knowledge about the neural circuitry underlying SC multisensory integration, in order to suggest possible physiological mechanisms through which it is effected. This endeavour was realized in collaboration with Professor B.E. Stein and Doctor B. Rowland during the 6 months-period spent at the Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy of the Wake Forest University School of Medicine (NC, USA), within the Marco Polo Project. The model includes four distinct unisensory areas that are devoted to a topological representation of external stimuli. Two of them represent subregions of the AES (i.e., FAES, an auditory area, and AEV, a visual area) and send descending inputs to the ipsilateral SC; the other two represent subcortical areas (one auditory and one visual) projecting ascending inputs to the same SC. Different competitive mechanisms, realized by means of population of interneurons, are used in the model to reproduce the different behaviour of SC neurons in conditions of cortical activation and deactivation. The model, with a single set of parameters, is able to mimic the behaviour of SC multisensory neurons in response to very different stimulus conditions (multisensory enhancement, inverse effectiveness, within- and cross-modal suppression of spatially disparate stimuli), with cortex functional and cortex deactivated, and with a particular type of membrane receptors (NMDA receptors) active or inhibited. All these results agree with the data reported in Jiang et al. (2001) and in Binns and Salt (1996). The model suggests that non-linearities in neural responses and synaptic (excitatory and inhibitory) connections can explain the fundamental aspects of multisensory integration, and provides a biologically plausible hypothesis about the underlying circuitry.

Teaching Cognitive Modeling Using PDP++

PDP++ is a freely available, open source software package designed to support the development, simulation, and analysis of research-grade connectionist models of cognitive processes. It supports most popular parallel distributed processing paradigms and artificial neural network architectures, and it also provides an implementation of the LEABRA computational cognitive neuroscience framework. Models are typically constructed and examined using the PDP++ graphical user interface, but the system may also be extended through the incorporation of user-written C++ code. This article briefly reviews the features of PDP++, focusing on its utility for teaching cognitive modeling concepts and skills to university undergraduate and graduate students. An informal evaluation of the software as a pedagogical tool is provided, based on the author’s classroom experiences at three research universities and several conference-hosted tutorials.

Eye Movement Measures of Cognitive Control in Children with Tourette Syndrome

Tourette Syndrome begins in childhood and is characterized by uncontrollable repetitive actions like neck craning or hopping and noises such as sniffing or chirping. Worst in early adolescence, these tics wax and wane in severity and occur in bouts unpredictably, often drawing unwanted attention from bystanders. Making matters worse, over half of children with Tourette Syndrome also suffer from comorbid, or concurrent, disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). These disorders introduce anxious thoughts, impulsivity, inattention, and mood variability that further disrupt children with Tourette Syndrome from focusing and performing well at school and home. Thus, deficits in the cognitive control functions of response inhibition, response generation, and working memory have long been ascribed to Tourette Syndrome. Yet, without considering the effect of medication, age, and comorbidity, this is a premature attribution. This study used an infrared eye tracking camera and various computer tasks requiring eye movement responses to evaluate response inhibition, response generation, and working memory in Tourette Syndrome. This study, the first to control for medication, age, and comorbidity, enrolled 39 unmedicated children with Tourette Syndrome and 29 typically developing peers aged 10-16 years who completed reflexive and voluntary eye movement tasks and diagnostic rating scales to assess symptom severities of Tourette Syndrome, ADHD, and OCD. Children with Tourette Syndrome and comorbid ADHD and/or OCD, but not children with Tourette Syndrome only, took longer to respond and made more errors and distracted eye movements compared to typically-developing children, displaying cognitive control deficits. However, increasing symptom severities of Tourette Syndrome, ADHD, and OCD correlated with one another. Thus, cognitive control deficits were not specific to Tourette Syndrome patients with comorbid conditions, but rather increase with increasing tic severity, suggesting that a majority of Tourette Syndrome patients, regardless of a clinical diagnosis of ADHD and/or OCD, have symptoms of cognitive control deficits at some level. Therefore, clinicians should evaluate and counsel all families of children with Tourette Syndrome, with or without currently diagnosed ADHD and/or OCD, about the functional ramifications of comorbid symptoms and that they may wax and wane with tic severity.

Turning univalent stimuli bivalent: Synesthesia can cause cognitive conflict in task switching

In this study we investigated whether synesthetic color experiences have similar effects as real colors in cognitive conflict adaptation. We tested 24 synesthetes and two yoke-matched control groups in a task-switching experiment that involved regular switches between three simple decision tasks (a color decision, a form decision, and a size decision). In most of the trials the stimuli were univalent, that is, specific for each task. However, occasionally, black graphemes were presented for the size decisions and we tested whether they would trigger synesthetic color experiences and thus, turn them into bivalent stimuli. The results confirmed this expectation. We were also interested in their effect for subsequent performance (i.e., the bivalency effect). The results showed that for synesthetic colors the bivalency effect was not as pronounced as for real colors. The latter result may be related to differences between synesthetes and controls in coping with color conflict.

What do brain network interactions tell about cognitive processes? How to seek causality?

Optimal adjustment of brain networks allows the biased processing of information in response to the demand of environments and is therefore prerequisite for adaptive behaviour. It is widely shown that a biased state of networks is associated with a particular cognitive process. However, those associations were identified by backward categorization of trials and cannot provide a causal association with cognitive processes. This problem still remains a big obstacle to advance the state of our field in particular human cognitive neuroscience. In my talk, I will present two approaches to address the causal relationships between brain network interactions and behaviour. Firstly, we combined connectivity analysis of fMRI data and a machine leaning method to predict inter-individual differences of behaviour and responsiveness to environmental demands. The connectivity-based classification approach outperforms local activation-based classification analysis, suggesting that interactions in brain networks carry information of instantaneous cognitive processes. Secondly, we have recently established a brand new method combining transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and EEG. We use the method to measure signal transmission between brain areas while introducing extrinsic oscillatory brain activity and to study causal association between oscillatory activity and behaviour. We show that phase-matched oscillatory activity creates the phase-dependent modulation of signal transmission between brain areas, while phase-shifted oscillatory activity blunts the phase-dependent modulation. The results suggest that phase coherence between brain areas plays a cardinal role in signal transmission in the brain networks. In sum, I argue that causal approaches will provide more concreate backbones to cognitive neuroscience.

Development of reasoning:Behavioral evidence to support reinforcement over cognitive control accounts

Speed's theory makes two predictions for the development of analogical reasoning. Firstly, young children should not be able to reason analogically due to an undeveloped PFC neural network. Secondly, category knowledge enables the reinforcement of structural features over surface features, and thus the development of sophisticated, analogical, reasoning. We outline existing studies that support these predictions and highlight some critical remaining issues. Specifically, we argue that the development of inhibition must be directly compared alongside the development of reasoning strategies in order to support Speed's account. © 2010 Psychology Press.

A study of ignorance: suffering and freedom in early Buddhist teachings and parallels in modern neuroscience

What might early Buddhist teachings offer neuroscience and how might neuroscience inform contemporary Buddhism? Both early Buddhist teachings and cognitive neuroscience suggest that the conditioning of our cognitive apparatus and brain plays a role in agency that may be either efficacious or non-efficacious. Both consider internal time to play a central role in the efficacy of agency. Buddhism offers an approach that promises to increase the efficacy of agency. This approach is found in five early Buddhist teachings that are re-interpreted here with a view to explaining how they might be understood as a dynamic basis for ‘participatory will’ in the context of existing free will debates and the neuroscientific work of Patrick Haggard (et al.). These perspectives offer Buddhism and neuroscience a basis for informing each other as the shared themes of: (1) cognition is dynamic and complex/aggregate based, (2) being dynamic, cognition lacks a fixed basis of efficacy, and (3) efficacy of cognition may be achieved by an understanding of the concept of dynamic: as harmony and efficiency and by means of Buddha-warranted processes that involve internal time.

The attentional demands of preferred and non-preferred gait patterns

The purpose of this study was to determine the attentional demands of natural and imposed gait, as well as the attentional costs of transitions between the walking and running co-ordination patterns. Seven healthy young men and four healthy young women undertook an auditory probe reaction time task concurrently with self-selected gait (Experiment 1) and imposed walking and running (Experiment 2) at different speeds on a motor-driven treadmill. In Experiment 1, where participants were free to choose their own movement pattern to match the speed of travel of the treadmill, normal gait control was shown to have a significant attentional cost, and hence not be automatic in the classical sense. However, this attentional cost did not differ between the two gait modes or at the transition point. In Experiment 2, where participants were required to maintain specific gait modes regardless of the treadmill speed, the maintenance of walking at speeds normally associated with running was found to have an attentional cost whereas this was not the case for running at normal walking speeds. Collectively the findings support a model of gait control in which the normal switching between gait modes is determined with minimal attention demand and in which it is possible to sustain non-preferred gait modes although, in the case of walking, only at a significant attentional/cognitive cost. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Bimanual aiming and overt attention: one law for two hands

Reaching to interact with an object requires a compromise between the speed of the limb movement and the required end-point accuracy. The time it takes one hand to move to a target in a simple aiming task can be predicted reliably from Fitts' law, which states that movement time is a function of a combined measure of amplitude and accuracy constraints (the index of difficulty, ID). It has been assumed previously that Fitts' law is violated in bimanual aiming movements to targets of unequal ID. We present data from two experiments to show that this assumption is incorrect: if the attention demands of a bimanual aiming task are constant then the movements are well described by a Fitts' law relationship. Movement time therefore depends not only on ID but on other task conditions, which is a basic feature of Fitts' law. In a third experiment we show that eye movements are an important determinant of the attention demands in a bimanual aiming task. The results from the third experiment extend the findings of the first two experiments and show that bimanual aiming often relies on the strategic co-ordination of separate actions into a seamless behaviour. A number of the task specific strategies employed by the adult human nervous system were elucidated in the third experiment. The general strategic pattern observed in the hand trajectories was reflected by the pattern of eye movements recorded during the experiment. The results from all three experiments demonstrate that eye movements must be considered as an important constraint in bimanual aiming tasks.

Constraints on the spatiotemporal accuracy of interceptive action: effects of target size on hitting a moving object

Results of two experiments are reported that examined how people respond to rectangular targets of different sizes in simple hitting tasks. If a target moves in a straight line and a person is constrained to move along a linear track oriented perpendicular to the targetrsquos motion, then the length of the target along its direction of motion constrains the temporal accuracy and precision required to make the interception. The dimensions of the target perpendicular to its direction of motion place no constraints on performance in such a task. In contrast, if the person is not constrained to move along a straight track, the targetrsquos dimensions may constrain the spatial as well as the temporal accuracy and precision. The experiments reported here examined how people responded to targets of different vertical extent (height): the task was to strike targets that moved along a straight, horizontal path. In experiment 1 participants were constrained to move along a horizontal linear track to strike targets and so target height did not constrain performance. Target height, length and speed were co-varied. Movement time (MT) was unaffected by target height but was systematically affected by length (briefer movements to smaller targets) and speed (briefer movements to faster targets). Peak movement speed (Vmax) was influenced by all three independent variables: participants struck shorter, narrower and faster targets harder. In experiment 2, participants were constrained to move in a vertical plane normal to the targetrsquos direction of motion. In this task target height constrains the spatial accuracy required to contact the target. Three groups of eight participants struck targets of different height but of constant length and speed, hence constant temporal accuracy demand (different for each group, one group struck stationary targets = no temporal accuracy demand). On average, participants showed little or no systematic response to changes in spatial accuracy demand on any dependent measure (MT, Vmax, spatial variable error). The results are interpreted in relation to previous results on movements aimed at stationary targets in the absence of visual feedback.

Excitability changes in human forearm corticospinal projections and spinal reflex pathways during rhythmic voluntary movement of the opposite limb

Rhythmic movements brought about by the contraction of muscles on one side of the body give rise to phase-locked changes in the excitability of the homologous motor pathways of the opposite limb. Such crossed facilitation should favour patterns of bimanual coordination in which homologous muscles are engaged simultaneously, and disrupt those in which the muscles are activated in an alternating fashion. In order to examine these issues, we obtained responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to stimulation of the cervicomedullary junction (cervicomedullary-evoked potentials, CMEPs), to peripheral nerve stimulation (H-reflexes and f-waves), and elicited stretch reflexes in the relaxed right flexor carpi radialis (FCR) muscle during rhythmic (2 Hz) flexion and extension movements of the opposite (left) wrist. The potentials evoked by TMS in right FCR were potentiated during the phases of movement in which the left FCR was most strongly engaged. In contrast, CMEPs were unaffected by the movements of the opposite limb. These results suggest that there was systematic variation of the excitability of the motor cortex ipsilateral to the moving limb. H-reflexes and stretch reflexes recorded in right FCR were modulated in phase with the activation of left FCR. As the f-waves did not vary in corresponding fashion, it appears that the phasic modulation of the H-reflex was mediated by presynaptic inhibition of Ia afferents. The observation that both H-reflexes and f-waves were depressed markedly during movements of the opposite indicates that there may also have been postsynaptic inhibition or disfacilitation of the largest motor units. Our findings indicate that the patterned modulation of excitability in motor pathways that occurs during rhythmic movements of the opposite limb is mediated primarily by interhemispheric interactions between cortical motor areas.

Hitting a moving target: Perception and action in the timing of rapid interceptions

Different interceptive tasks and modes of interception (hitting or capturing) do not necessarily involve similar control processes. Control based on preprogramming of movement parameters is possible for actions with brief movement times but is now widely rejected; continuous perceptuomotor control models are preferred for all types of interception. The rejection of preprogrammed control and acceptance of continuous control is evaluated for the timing of rapidly executed, manual hitting actions. It is shown that a preprogrammed control model is capable of providing a convincing account of observed behavior patterns that avoids many of the arguments that have been raised against it. Prominent continuous perceptual control models are analyzed within a common framework and are shown to be interpretable as feedback control strategies. Although these models can explain observations of on-line adjustments to movement, they offer only post hoc explanations for observed behavior patterns in hitting tasks and are not directly supported by data. It is proposed that rapid manual hitting tasks make up a class of interceptions for which a preprogrammed strategy is adopted-a strategy that minimizes the role of visual feedback. Such a strategy is effective when the task demands a high degree of temporal accuracy.

Intercepting a moving target: effects of temporal precision constraints and movement amplitude

The effects of temporal precision constraints and movement amplitude on performance of an interceptive aiming task were examined. Participants were required to strike a moving target object with a 'bat' by moving the bat along a straight path (constrained by a linear slide) perpendicular to the path of the target. Temporal precision constraints were defined in terms of the time period (or window) within which contact with the target was possible. Three time windows were used (approx. 35, 50 and 65 ms) and these were achieved either by manipulating the size of the bat (experiment 1a), the size of the target (experiment 1b) or the speed of the target (experiment 2). In all experiments, movement time (MT) increased in proportion to movement amplitude but was only affected by differences in the temporal precision constraint if this was achieved by variation in the target's speed. In this case the MT was approximately inversely proportional to target speed. Peak movement speed was affected by temporal accuracy constraints in all three experiments: participants reached higher speeds when the temporal precision required was greater. These results are discussed with reference to the speed-accuracy trade-off observed for temporally constrained aiming movements. It is suggested that the MT and speed of interceptive aiming movements may be understood as responses to the spatiotemporal constraints of the task.