Creative Commons Australia and Organization for Transformative Works submission to the Australian Government’s online copyright infringement discussion paper

This submission focuses on the adverse effects that the Government’s proposals are likely to have on the legitimate use of copyright works. Copyright exists to support the production of new expression. Because new expression always builds on existing culture, any extension of copyright protection necessarily also increases the costs of creative expression. As a threshold matter, we do not believe that these further increases to the force of copyright law are justified. In recent years, the balance at the heart of copyright law has tipped too far in the direction of established producers and distributors, and now imposes unnecessary costs on ordinary creators. The available evidence does not support a further increase in the penalties and enforcement mechanisms available under copyright law.

How Modern Governments Made Prostitution a Social Problem: Creating a Responsible Prostitute Population

Table of Contents Acknowledgments Preface by Dr. Pat Carlen Introduction 1. Political Languages of Prostitution 2. Genealogical Analysis: Documenting The Disorder of Things 3. From Death Rituals to Health Practices 4. Policing Female Prostitutes 5. Private Remedies for Public Concerns 6. The Emergence of the Male Prostitute 7. From Procreation to Pleasure 8. HIV/AIDS and Prostitution Conclusion Bibliography Index

Coalition formation during technology adoption

The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is a prominent framework that addresses the challenge of organisations to understand and promote the factors that lead to acceptance of new technologies. Nevertheless, our understanding of one of the model's key variables – social influence – remains limited. Drawing upon earlier studies that address the role of referent individuals to technology acceptance, this paper introduces the notion of ‘coalition’ as a social group that can affect the opinion of other members within an organisation. Our empirical study centres on an organisation that has recently decided to introduce Big Data into its formal operations. Through a unique empirical approach that analyses sentiments expressed by individuals about this technology on the organisation's online forum, we demonstrate the emergence of a central referent, and in turn the dynamics of a coalition that builds around this referent as the attitudes of individuals converge upon the Big Data issue. Our paper contributes to existing TAM frameworks by elaborating the social influence variable and providing a dynamic lens to the technology acceptance process. We concurrently offer a methodological tool for organisations to understand social dynamics that form about a newly introduced technology and accelerate its acceptance by employees.

Obesity crisis must be owned not only by individuals but governments and industry

FOR the first time in Australia’s history, diet is the No.1 risk factor contributing to our burden of disease. That’s more than smoking, alcohol, injury or anything else. I’m sure some of you are thinking: “Life’s too short to worry about every mouthful you eat. This is such a First World problem.” But it’s not. Around the world, in countries rich and poor, more people die from preventable disease than any other kind, and what we eat is recognised as a major contributor...

Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Fossil fuels, the environment, and climate change

There has been much controversy over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a plurilateral trade agreement involving a dozen nations from throughout the Pacific Rim – and its impact upon the environment, biodiversity, and climate change. The secretive treaty negotiations involve Australia and New Zealand; countries from South East Asia such as Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan; the South American nations of Peru and Chile; and the members of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada, Mexico and the United States. There was an agreement reached between the parties in October 2015. The participants asserted: ‘We expect this historic agreement to promote economic growth, support higher-paying jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in our countries; and to promote transparency, good governance, and strong labor and environmental protections.’ The final texts of the agreement were published in November 2015. There has been discussion as to whether other countries – such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea – will join the deal. There has been much debate about the impact of this proposed treaty upon intellectual property, the environment, biodiversity and climate change. There have been similar concerns about the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a proposed trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. In 2011, the United States Trade Representative developed a Green Paper on trade, conservation, and the environment in the context of the TPP. In its rhetoric, the United States Trade Representative has maintained that it has been pushing for strong, enforceable environmental standards in the TPP. In a key statement in 2014, the United States Trade Representative Mike Froman insisted: ‘The United States’ position on the environment in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations is this: environmental stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP or we will not come to agreement.’ The United States Trade Representative maintained: ‘Our proposals in the TPP are centered around the enforcement of environmental laws, including those implementing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in TPP partner countries, and also around trailblazing, first-ever conservation proposals that will raise standards across the region’. Moreover, the United States Trade Representative asserted: ‘Furthermore, our proposals would enhance international cooperation and create new opportunities for public participation in environmental governance and enforcement.’ The United States Trade Representative has provided this public outline of the Environment Chapter of the TPP: A meaningful outcome on environment will ensure that the agreement appropriately addresses important trade and environment challenges and enhances the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment. The Trans-Pacific Partnership countries share the view that the environment text should include effective provisions on trade-related issues that would help to reinforce environmental protection and are discussing an effective institutional arrangement to oversee implementation and a specific cooperation framework for addressing capacity building needs. They also are discussing proposals on new issues, such as marine fisheries and other conservation issues, biodiversity, invasive alien species, climate change, and environmental goods and services. Mark Linscott, an assistant Trade Representative testified: ‘An environment chapter in the TPP should strengthen country commitments to enforce their environmental laws and regulations, including in areas related to ocean and fisheries governance, through the effective enforcement obligation subject to dispute settlement.’ Inside US Trade has commented: ‘While not initially expected to be among the most difficult areas, the environment chapter has emerged as a formidable challenge, partly due to disagreement over the United States proposal to make environmental obligations binding under the TPP dispute settlement mechanism’. Joshua Meltzer from the Brookings Institute contended that the trade agreement could be a boon for the protection of the environment in the Pacific Rim: Whether it is depleting fisheries, declining biodiversity or reduced space in the atmosphere for Greenhouse Gas emissions, the underlying issue is resource scarcity. And in a world where an additional 3 billion people are expected to enter the middle class over the next 15 years, countries need to find new and creative ways to cooperate in order to satisfy the legitimate needs of their population for growth and opportunity while using resources in a manner that is sustainable for current and future generations. The TPP parties already represent a diverse range of developed and developing countries. Should the TPP become a free trade agreement of the Asia-Pacific region, it will include the main developed and developing countries and will be a strong basis for building a global consensus on these trade and environmental issues. The TPP has been promoted by its proponents as a boon to the environment. The United States Trade Representative has maintained that the TPP will protect the environment: ‘The United States’ position on the environment in the TPP negotiations is this: environmental stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP or we will not come to agreement.’ The United States Trade Representative discussed ‘Trade for a Greener World’ on World Environment Day. Andrew Robb, at the time the Australian Trade and Investment Minister, vowed that the TPP will contain safeguards for the protection of the environment. In November 2015, after the release of the TPP text, Rohan Patel, the Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, sought to defend the environmental credentials of the TPP. He contended that the deal had been supported by the Nature Conservancy, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, the World Wildlife Fund, and World Animal Protection. The United States Congress, though, has been conflicted by the United States Trade Representative’s arguments about the TPP and the environment. In 2012, members of the United States Congress - including Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and John Kerry (D-MA) – wrote a letter, arguing that the trade agreement needs to provide strong protection for the environment: ‘We believe that a '21st century agreement' must have an environment chapter that guarantees ongoing sustainable trade and creates jobs, and this is what American businesses and consumers want and expect also.’ The group stressed that ‘A binding and enforceable TPP environment chapter that stands up for American interests is critical to our support of the TPP’. The Congressional leaders maintained: ‘We believe the 2007 bipartisan congressional consensus on environmental provisions included in recent trade agreements should serve as the framework for the environment chapter of the TPP.’ In 2013, senior members of the Democratic leadership expressed their opposition to granting President Barack Obama a fast-track authority in respect of the TPP House of Representatives Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi said: ‘No on fast-track – Camp-Baucus – out of the question.’ Senator Majority leader Harry Reid commented: ‘I’m against Fast-Track: Everyone would be well-advised to push this right now.’ Senator Elizabeth Warren has been particularly critical of the process and the substance of the negotiations in the TPP: From what I hear, Wall Street, pharmaceuticals, telecom, big polluters and outsourcers are all salivating at the chance to rig the deal in the upcoming trade talks. So the question is, Why are the trade talks secret? You’ll love this answer. Boy, the things you learn on Capitol Hill. I actually have had supporters of the deal say to me ‘They have to be secret, because if the American people knew what was actually in them, they would be opposed. Think about that. Real people, people whose jobs are at stake, small-business owners who don’t want to compete with overseas companies that dump their waste in rivers and hire workers for a dollar a day—those people, people without an army of lobbyists—they would be opposed. I believe if people across this country would be opposed to a particular trade agreement, then maybe that trade agreement should not happen. The Finance Committee in the United States Congress deliberated over the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in 2014. The new chair Ron Wyden has argued that there needs to be greater transparency in trade. Nonetheless, he has mooted the possibility of a ‘smart-track’ to reconcile the competing demands of the Obama Administration, and United States Congress. Wyden insisted: ‘The new breed of trade challenges spawned over the last generation must be addressed in imaginative new policies and locked into enforceable, ambitious, job-generating trade agreements.’ He emphasized that such agreements ‘must reflect the need for a free and open Internet, strong labor rights and environmental protections.’ Elder Democrat Sander Levin warned that the TPP failed to provide proper protection for the environment: The TPP parties are considering a different structure to protect the environment than the one adopted in the May 10 Agreement, which directly incorporated seven multilateral environmental agreements into the text of past trade agreements. While the form is less important than the substance, the TPP must provide an overall level of environmental protection that upholds and builds upon the May 10 standard, including fully enforceable obligations. But many of our trading partners are actively seeking to weaken the text to the point of falling short of that standard, including on key issues like conservation. Nonetheless, 2015, President Barack Obama was able to secure the overall support of the United States Congress for his ‘fast-track’ authority. This was made possible by the Republicans and dissident Democrats. Notably, Oregon Senator Ron Wyden switched sides, and was transformed from a critic of the TPP to an apologist for the TPP. For their part, green political parties and civil society organisations have been concerned about the secretive nature of the negotiations; and the substantive implications of the treaty for the environment. Environmental groups and climate advocates have been sceptical of the environmental claims made by the White House for the TPP. The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, the Australian Greens and the Green Party of Canada have released a joint declaration on the TPP observing: ‘More than just another trade agreement, the TPP provisions could hinder access to safe, affordable medicines, weaken local content rules for media, stifle high-tech innovation, and even restrict the ability of future governments to legislate for the good of public health and the environment’. In the United States, civil society groups such as the Sierra Club, Public Citizen, WWF, the Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network and 350.org have raised concerns about the TPP and the environment. Allison Chin, President of the Sierra Club, complained about the lack of transparency, due process, and public participation in the TPP talks: ‘This is a stealth affront to the principles of our democracy.’ Maude Barlow’s The Council of Canadians has also been concerned about the TPP and environmental justice. New Zealand Sustainability Council executive director Simon Terry said the agreement showed ‘minimal real gains for nature’. A number of organisations have joined a grand coalition of civil society organisations, which are opposed to the grant of a fast-track. On the 15th January 2013, WikiLeaks released the draft Environment Chapter of the TPP - along with a report by the Chairs of the Environmental Working Group. Julian Assange, WikiLeaks' publisher, stated: ‘Today's WikiLeaks release shows that the public sweetener in the TPP is just media sugar water.’ He observed: ‘The fabled TPP environmental chapter turns out to be a toothless public relations exercise with no enforcement mechanism.’ This article provides a critical examination of the draft Environment Chapter of the TPP. The overall argument of the article is that the Environment Chapter of the TPP is an exercise in greenwashing – it is a public relations exercise by the United States Trade Representative, rather than a substantive regime for the protection of the environment in the Pacific Rim. Greenwashing has long been a problem in commerce, in which companies making misleading and deceptive claims about the environment. In his 2012 book, Greenwash: Big Brands and Carbon Scams, Guy Pearse considers the rise of green marketing and greenwashing. Government greenwashing is also a significant issue. In his book Storms of My Grandchildren, the climate scientist James Hansen raises his concerns about government greenwashing. Such a problem is apparent with the TPP – in which there was a gap between the assertions of the United States Government, and the reality of the agreement. This article contends that the TPP fails to meet the expectations created by President Barack Obama, the White House, and the United States Trade Representative about the environmental value of the agreement. First, this piece considers the relationship of the TPP to multilateral environmental treaties. Second, it explores whether the provisions in respect of the environment are enforceable. Third, this article examines the treatment of trade and biodiversity in the TPP. Fourth, this study considers the question of marine capture fisheries. Fifth, there is an evaluation of the cursory text in the TPP on conservation. Sixth, the article considers trade in environmental services under the TPP. Seventh, this article highlights the tensions between the TPP and substantive international climate action. It is submitted that the TPP undermines effective and meaningful government action and regulation in respect of climate change. The conclusion also highlights that a number of other chapters of the TPP will impact upon the protection of the environment – including the Investment Chapter, the Intellectual Property Chapter, the Technical Barriers to Trade Chapter, and the text on public procurement.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

Basic Income Grant in Namibia, a Viewpoint on the Proposal and on the Work of the BIG Coalition

This thesis studies the basic income grant proposal in Namibia. The proposal suggests a monthly grant of N$100 (approximately 10€) to all those Namibian citizens who do not receive the state pension. This thesis concentrates on the Basic Income Grant (BIG) Coalition and on its work. The formation and transformation of the coalition during the time period between 2003 and 2009 is analyzed with the help of data collected during two field work periods in 2008 and 2009. The data includes interviews, newspaper articles, observations and other background material. The analysis of this material is mainly conducted from organizational viewpoint. The final part of the thesis applies the results to the theory of Mosse, whose propositions about policy and practice will be discussed in relation to the basic income grant pilot project. The thesis argues that social legitimacy has been a vital resource for the work of the BIG Coalition and it has sought for it in various ways. The concept of social legitimacy originates from the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik, who propose that organizations are dependent on their environments, and on the resources provided by the surrounding environment. This thesis studies the concept of social legitimacy in the context of resource dependence theory. Social legitimacy is analyzed in the relations between the coalition and its environment, in the formation of the coalition, in the responses towards criticism, and finally in relation to the propositions concerning policy and practice. The work of the coalition in the pilot project will be analyzed through the propositions of Mosse concerning policy and practice. The results will describe and analyze key events in the formation of the BIG Coalition from the South African proposal until the end of the basic income pilot project. This BIG pilot project conducted in 2008-2009 is one of the most well-known activities of the coalition. The clashes between the coalition and its environment will be analyzed through four case studies. It will be shown that the project has been conducted in order to gain more legitimacy to the basic income grant proposal. The conclusion questions the legitimacy of the BIG Coalition as a research and development organization, and requests for more transparent research on the basic income proposal in Namibia.

Coalition Formation With Communication Ranges and Moving Targets

A team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication ranges and limited resources are deployed in a region to search and destroy stationary and moving targets. When a UAV detects a target, depending on the target resource requirement, it is tasked to form a coalition over the dynamic network formed by the UAVs. In this paper, we develop a mechanism to find potential coalition members over the network using principles from internet protocol and introduce an algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization to generate a coalition that destroys the target is minimum time. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out to study how coalition are formed and the effects of coalition process delays.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

How should governments support the emergence of new industries in leading economies?

Over the past 30 years, developed economies' approaches to supporting growth have focused on competitiveness, entrepreneurship and innovation to varying degrees. However, following the credit crisis and global recession in 2008 there has been demand for an updated narrative of growth based on the emergence of new industries. This paper provides a brief review of the available literature on how governments in leading economies can support new industries to emerge to the benefit of their national economy, discusses a number of issues for governments trying to support emerging industries, provides a framework of activities which governments considering this type of intervention should consider, and discusses the case of the regenerative medicine industry in the UK using the framework. Copyright © 2013 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

Coalition and distribution in fuzzy dynamic supply chain systems

In this paper, two models of coalition and income's distribution in FSCS (fuzzy supply chain systems) are proposed based on the fuzzy set theory and fuzzy cooperative game theory. The fuzzy dynamic coalition choice's recursive equations are constructed in terms of sup-t composition of fuzzy relations, where t is a triangular norm. The existence of the fuzzy relations in FSCS is also proved. On the other hand, the approaches to ascertain the fuzzy coalition through the choice's recursive equations and distribute the fuzzy income in FSCS by the fuzzy Shapley values are also given. These models are discussed in two parts: the fuzzy dynamic coalition choice of different units in FSCS; the fuzzy income's distribution model among different participators in the same coalition. Furthermore, numerical examples are given aiming at illustrating these models., and the results show that these models are feasible and validity in FSCS.

Should governments use a declining discount rate in project analysis?

At a workshop held at Resources for the Future in September 2011, twelve of the authors were asked by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide advice on the principles to be used in discounting the benefits and costs of projects that affect future generations. Maureen L. Cropper chaired the workshop. Much of the discussion in this article is based on the authors' recommendations and advice presented at the workshop. © The Author 2014.