Brazil's derivatives markets: hedging, Central Bank intervention and regulation

Includes bibliography

The Central Bank and Chilean macroeconomic policy in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

Financial market reaction to central bank monetary policy communications under an inflation- targeting regime: the case of Brazil

Includes bibliography

Chile's macroeconomic policies in the 1990s as seen from the vantage point of the Central Bank

Includes bibliography

Central bank intervention and exchange rate behaviour : empirical evidence for India

This paper examines the causal relationship between central bank intervention and exchange returns in India. Using monthly data from December 1997 to December 2011, the empirical results derived from the CCF approach of Cheung and Ng (1996) suggest that there is causality-in-variance from exchange rate returns to central bank intervention, but not vice versa. These findings are robust in the sense that they hold in cases where the returns were measured from either the spot rate or the forward rate. Therefore, the results of this paper suggest that the Indian central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market to respond to exchange rate volatility, although the volatility has not been influenced by central bank intervention in the form of net purchases of foreign currency in the market.

The Central Bank and bank credits in the Philippines : a survey on effectiveness of monetary policy and its measures

In the post-Asian crisis period, bank loans to the manufacturing sector have shown a slow recovery in the affected countries, unexceptionally in the Philippines. This paper provides a literacy survey on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s monetary policy and the responsiveness of the financial market, and discusses on the future works necessary to better understand the monetary policy effectiveness in the Philippines. As the survey shows, most previous works focus on the correlation between the short-term policy rates and during the period of monetary tightening and relatively less interest in quantitative effectiveness. Future tasks would shed lights on (1) the asset side – other than loan outstanding – of banks to analyze their behavior/preference in structuring portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts during the monetary easing period.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.