Memorial of citizens of Chesterfield, Marlborough, and Darlington, assembled at Cheraw in South Carolina, against a further increase of duties on imported articles, February 4, 1828 : referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union

This document contains a memorial, which was written by the citizens of Chesterfield, Marlborough, and Darlington, assembled in the town of Cheraw, on July 25, the 25, 1827 in the state of South Carolina who were engaged in agriculture and commerce and presented it to oppose the tariff increase. It was presented to the Congress of the United States.

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.

The claim of Amasa Stetson, of Massachusetts, on the United States, for money advanced, in fulfilling the orders of the Government while discharging the duties of Commissary General of Purchases, in time of the late war with Great Britain ; and for services rendered. --

Claim relating to the War of 1812.

Village sermons on the chief articles of faith, &c., on the christian character, and on some of the relative duties...

UANL

NGO Duties in Relation to Human Rights. A Closer Look at One Proposal

This paper investigates the moral duties that human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and development NGOs, such as Oxfam, have in relation to human rights – especially in relation to the human right to a decent standard of living. The mentioned NGOs are powerful new agents on the global scene, and according to many they might be duty-bearers in relation to human rights. However, until now their moral duties have hardly been investigated. The present paper investigates NGO duties in relation to human rights by looking in particular to a moral theory recently proposed by Leif Wenar, a theory which has some similarities to utilitarianism. In applying this theory, a case for human-rights duties of NGOs is developed mainly by considering the indispensable role that civil society plays in protecting human rights. The paper concludes that, at least, NGOs bear duties with regard to human rights when, as in certain real-life cases, NGO involvement is the only way to achieve acceptable protection against standard threats to certain goods, such as a decent standard of living.

El estudio de los roles y funciones de los orientadores de secundaria utilizando la técnica de los grupos de discusión. 'The study of duties and roles of highschool counsellors by using the technique of focus groups'.

Resumen tomado de la publicación. Con el apoyo económico del departamento MIDE de la UNED

Eliminativism about derivative prima facie duties

Ross divides prima facie duties into derivative and foundational ones, but seems to understand the notion of a derivative prima facie duty in two very different ways. Sometimes he understands them in a non-eliminativist way. According to this understanding, basic prima facie duties ground distinct derivative ones. According to the eliminativist understanding, basic duties do not ground distinct derivative duties, but replace (eliminate) them. On the eliminativist view, discovering that a prima facie duty is derivative is discovering that it is not genuine. The genuine one is the basic one. I argue that Ross is best understood as an eliminativist.