964 resultados para COM finance
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The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the possibilities and challenges of Community Development Banks (CDBs) as an innovative method of socioeconomic management of microcredit for poor populations. To this end, we will discuss the case of Banco Palmas in Conjunto Palmeiras in the city of Fortaleza, in the northeastern state of Ceará, as an empirical case study. The analyses presented here are based on information obtained from Banco Palmas between late 2011 and early 2012. In addition, previous studies by other researchers on the bank and other studies on CDBs were important. The primary data collected at Banco Palmas came from documents made available by the bank, such as reports and mappings. The analyses describe some of the characteristics of the granting of microcredit and allow one to situate it in the universe of microfinance and solidarity finance. They also show the significant growth of local consumption, mostly through the use of the Palmas social currency. The Banco Palmas experience, aside from influencing national public policies of solidarity finance, initiated a CDBs network that encourages the replication of these experiences throughout the country.
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Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan
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Agency Performance Plan
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Railway finance report for the Iowa Department of Transportation.
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Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.
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State Agency Audit Report
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State Agency Audit Report State Revolving Fund - Clean Water & Drinking Programs
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Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.
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State Agency Audit Report
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State Agency Audit Report
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Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.
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State Agency Audit Report
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State Audit Reports