Keep capital markets union simple. ECMI Commentary No. 38/July 2015

A few additional initiatives will need to be taken before a European capital markets union is able to unleash its full potential. The main problem is fragmentation, arising from the deep differences existing from one country to another in the structure of markets, user preferences and the availability of well organised, long-term saving schemes. Several attempts have been made to address these barriers, but with limited or uneven success so far

Light and shadows in Europe’s new Action Plan for Capital Markets Union. ECMI Commentary No. 40/5 October 2015

The European Commission’s Action Plan consists, in a nutshell, of a short list of technical proposals and a longer one of (rather general) potential actions. Overall, the plan indeed proposes to achieve some short-term objectives, such as a reduction of listing costs for SMEs, but it lacks long-term vision. The plan bundles actions under rather generic objectives of long-term finance or cross-border investing. Improving the informational infrastructure (e.g. accounting standards, company data) and cross-border enforcement of rules is left to vaguely defined future actions, but these constitute the core of the capital markets infrastructure. Without a well-defined set of measurable objectives, the whole plan may lose political momentum and become an opportunity for interested parties to cherry pick their pet provisions. Building a single market, i.e. removing cross-border obstacles to capital circulation, is too challenging a task to simply appear as one of many items on a long list of general objectives, which incidentally do not include institutional reform. The ultimate risk is that the Commission may just miss a unique opportunity to revamp and improve the financial integration process in Europe after almost a decade of harmful financial retrenchment.

Analysis of developments in EU capital flows in the global context. Bruegel Final study Bruegel N° 2015.2574, November 2015

Free movement of capital, which is one of the four fundamental economic freedoms of the European Union, can enhance welfare if it leads to better allocation of financial and productive resources. However, it can also be a source of vulnerability, with far-reaching spillovers. Monitoring and assessing capital flows is therefore crucial for policymakers, market participants and analysts.

Capital Markets Union: A Work in Progress: Quick and high impact measures for the Capital Markets Union. European Policy Brief No. 37, September 2015

Capital Markets Union has three objectives. The first objective is to improve access to finance for all businesses but especially SMEs; the second is to increase the share of capital markets in the funding mix of the real economy; and the third is to make capital markets more effective and integrate them more closely across borders. This paper examines the best impact measures for the Capital Markets Union to proceed successfully.

Brasil: dinámica de la industria de bienes de capital en el ciclo de expansivo 2003-2008 y tras la crisis mundial

La industria de bienes de capital es esencial para el desarrollo tecnológico y para garantizar un crecimiento económico a largo plazo sin restricciones externas. En el Brasil, después de un largo período de estancamiento, las inversiones volvieron a crecer a partir de 2003, dando nuevo impulso a la industria de bienes de capital. Sin embargo, se trata de una industria bastante heterogénea; mientras que en algunos sectores no se logró cubrir la expansión de la demanda, esto fue posible en otros que evidenciaron un elevado potencial tecnológico, como los proveedores de máquinas para las industrias del petróleo, la minería y la construcción, y los fabricantes de equipos de transporte y de generación y distribución de energía eléctrica. Esos sectores continuaron expandiéndose incluso en el período posterior a la crisis mundial de 2008 y casi no fueron afectados por la competencia internacional.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Relations entre le niveau de vie, la fécondité et les besoins non satisfaits en matière de planification familiale en Guinée

Tous mes travaux ont été réalisés à l'aide du logiciel stata 11.

Universität und solidarische Ökonomie

RESUMO: A economia solidária é aqui apresentada como um movimento social emancipatório e como uma das formas de resistências das trabalhadoras e trabalhadores ao modelo de desenvolvimento capitalista. O movimento contemporâneo de economia solidária abrange o processo de produção, comercialização e finanças. A economia solidária é caracterizada pela posse coletiva dos meios de produção e pelo controle dos trabalhadores dos empreendimentos através de autogestão, cooperação e solidariedade. Os empreendimentos econômicos solidários se organizam sob a forma de cooperativas, associações e grupos informais. Um dos maiores desafios da economia solidária está no campo educativo, porque impõe a desconstrução dos princípios individualistas e privatistas preponderantes na maioria das relações econômicas, e exige a construção de outra cultura pautada na solidariedade. Nesse sentido, a pesquisa realizada, tem como objeto de estudo as metodologias de incubação fomentadas pelas universidades nas ações de economia solidária. Para isso, analisamos as experiências da Incubadora de Economia Solidária da Universidade Federal da Paraíba - Brasil e da Incubadora na Universidade de Kassel- Alemanha – Verein für Solidarische Ökonomie e.V. A pesquisa buscou conhecer e analisar as práticas de incubagem das universidades na economia solidária, como processos de mudança social. A coleta de informações foi realizada, tendo por base, uma revisão bibliográfica, relatórios das Incubadoras, registros fotográficos, observação participante e entrevistas semi-estruturadas. Os resultados da análise indicam que as metodologias de incubação na economia solidaria, por terem um caráter aberto e participativo, por considerarem os condicionamentos históricos e as diferentes culturas, fazem-nas portadoras de mudanças sociais. Esta metodologia pode ser utilizada por diferentes atores, em lugares e situações distintas. A pesquisa indica ainda, a centralidade da questão ecológica como elemento que poderá unificar o movimento internacional de economia solidária.

Tasa de depreciación endógena y crecimiento económico

En este trabajo se estudian las caracter´ısticas de los incentivos para invertir en bienes de capital con mayor durabilidad. Se considera el hecho de que las economías que invierten en bienes de capital menos duraderos pueden tener menor crecimiento econ´omico. Se elabora un modelo te´orico en el que la tasa de depreciaci´on es endógena y su reducci´on refleja innovaciones tecnológicas. Las tecnologías se diferencian por la tasa de depreciaci´on y aquellas que son más durables son m´as costosas. Esta estructura puede conducir a dos estados estacionarios debido a la complementariedad entre el capital y la tasa de depreciación. El principal resultado del documento es que se encuentran trampas de pobreza asociadas con altas tasas de depreciación.

Energy saving innovations, non-exhaustible sources of energy and long-run: what would happen if we run out of oil?

We formulate and solve a model of factor saving technological improvement considering three factors of production: labor, capital and energy. The productive activities have three main characteristics: first, in order to use capital goods firms need energy; second, there are two sources of energy: non-exhaustible and exhaustible; third, capital goods can be of different qualities and the quality of these goods can be changed along two dimensions -reducing the need of energy or changing the source of energy used in the production process. The economy goes through three stages of development after industrialization. In the first, firms make use of exhaustible energy and the e¢ ciency in the use of energy is constant. In the second stage, as the price of energy grows the e¢ ciency in its use is increased. In the third stage, the price of exhaustible sources is so high that firms have incentives to use non-exhaustible sources of energy. During this stage the price of energy is constant. In this set up, the end of the oil age has level effects on consumption and output but it does not cause the collapse of the economic system.

Tasa de depreciación endógena y crecimiento económico

En este trabajo se estudian las características de los incentivos para invertir en bienes de capital con mayor durabilidad. Se considera el hecho de que las economías que invierten en bienes de capital menos duraderos pueden tener menor crecimiento económico. Se elabora un modelo teórico en el que la tasa de depreciación es endógena y su reducción refleja innovaciones tecnológicas. Las tecnologías se diferencian por la tasa de depreciación y aquellas que son más durables son más costosas. Esta estructura puede conducir a dos estados estacionarios debido a la complementariedad entre el capital y la tasa de depreciación. El principal resultado del documento es que se encuentran trampas de pobreza asociadas con altas tasas de depreciación.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in the Eurozone and the European Union. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

Countercyclical regulation in Solvency II: merits and flaws. CEPS Commentary, 25 June 2012

October 2011 saw the latest draft of Solvency II, the European Union’s code for regulation of the insurance industry. This commentary, a collective effort by a group of academics specializing in financial, banking and insurance institutions, argues that the latest proposals need to be drafted again, urgently.