Purposeful program theory: Effective use of theories of change and logic models [Book Review]

The purpose of this book by two Australian authors is to: introduce the audience to the full complement of contextual elements found within program theory; offer practical suggestions to engage with theories of change, theories of action and logic models; and provide substantial evidence for this approach through scholarly literature, practice case studies together with the authors' combined experience of 60 years.

What Can A Service Logic Offer Marketing Theory

The goods-dominated marketing model has major shortcomings as a guiding marketing theory. Its marketing mix approach is mainly geared towards buying and does not include consumption as an integral part of marketing theory. Although it is during the process of consuming goods and services that value is generated for customers and the foundation for repeat purchasing and customer relationships are laid, this process is left outside the scope of marketing. The focus in service marketing is not on a product but on interactions in service encounters. Consumption has become an integral part of a holistic marketing model. Other than standardized goods-based value propositions can be better understood when taking a servicebased approach. It is concluded that marketing based on a goods logic is but a special case of marketing based on a service logic and applicable only in certain contexts with standardized products.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.

Mean Field Theory for Sigmoid Belief Networks

We develop a mean field theory for sigmoid belief networks based on ideas from statistical mechanics. Our mean field theory provides a tractable approximation to the true probability distribution in these networks; it also yields a lower bound on the likelihood of evidence. We demonstrate the utility of this framework on a benchmark problem in statistical pattern recognition -- the classification of handwritten digits.

Guest Editorial. Special Issue: Temporal logic in engineering

Logic-based models are thriving within artificial intelligence. A great number of new logics have been defined, and their theory investigated. Epistemic logics introduce modal operators for knowledge or belief; deontic logics are about norms, and introduce operators of deontic necessity and possibility (i.e., obligation or prohibition). And then we have a much investigated class—temporal logics—to whose application to engineering this special issue is devoted. This kind of formalism deserves increased widespread recognition and application in engineering, a domain where other kinds of temporal models (e.g., Petri nets) are by now a fairly standard part of the modelling toolbox.

Bridging Jeffrey's Rule, AGM Revision and Dempster Conditioning in the Theory of Evidence

Belief revision characterizes the process of revising an agent’s beliefs when receiving new evidence. In the field of artificial intelligence, revision strategies have been extensively studied in the context of logic-based formalisms and probability kinematics. However, so far there is not much literature on this topic in evidence theory. In contrast, combination rules proposed so far in the theory of evidence, especially Dempster rule, are symmetric. They rely on a basic assumption, that is, pieces of evidence being combined are considered to be on a par, i.e. play the same role. When one source of evidence is less reliable than another, it is possible to discount it and then a symmetric combination operation
is still used. In the case of revision, the idea is to let prior knowledge of an agent be altered by some input information. The change problem is thus intrinsically asymmetric. Assuming the input information is reliable, it should be retained whilst the prior information should be changed minimally to that effect. To deal with this issue, this paper defines the notion of revision for the theory of evidence in such a way as to bring together probabilistic and logical views. Several revision rules previously proposed are reviewed and we advocate one of them as better corresponding to the idea of revision. It is extended to cope with inconsistency between prior and input information. It reduces to Dempster
rule of combination, just like revision in the sense of Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson (AGM) reduces to expansion, when the input is strongly consistent with the prior belief function. Properties of this revision rule are also investigated and it is shown to generalize Jeffrey’s rule of updating, Dempster rule of conditioning and a form of AGM revision.

Farm forestry in Pakistan: an application of Theory of Planned Behaviour by probing into the measurement issues

A research has been conducted over methodological issues concerning the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) by determining an appropriate measurement (direct and indirect) of constructs and selection of a plausible scaling techniques (unipolar and bipolar) of constructs: attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control and intention that are important in explaining farm level tree planting in Pakistan. Unipolar scoring of beliefs showed higher correlation among the constructs of TPB than bipolar scaling technique. Both direct and indirect methods yielded significant results in explaining intention to perform farm forestry except the belief based measure of perceived behavioural control, which were analysed as statistically non-significant. A need to examine more carefully the scoring of perceived behavioural control (PBC) has been expressed