Sino-African State Trading in Services: Added-Value through Angola-Model loaning, GATS commitments or FTAs?

Paper presented by Charlotte Sieber-Gasser at the 5th Annual TRAPCA Conference, Arusha (Tanzania), 25-26 November 2010. Despite the increasing volume of trade between China and African countries, not one single conventional free trade agreement (FTA) or economic partnership agreement (EPA) has yet been signed between an African country and China. Initially, Sino-African trade relations were to a very large extent centred on investments secured through bilateral investment agreements (BITs). The more recent Chinese investments on the African continent, however, are more informally based on FDI contracts with the state at the receiving end and a government-owned private company as the investor, or loosely attached to loans commonly known under term ‘the Angola-Model’. This rather unusual basis for economic integration and development assistance, outside the trodden path of free trade agreements and ODA, requires further analysis in order to understand how the current legal framework between China and the African continent impacts economic development and national sovereignty, and what kind of distributive consequences it may have.

Marginal Return of Infrastructure Investment on Bilateral Trade Performance

Investing in transport infrastructures such as roadways, airports and seaports has proven to improve a country's trade performance through reduction of transportation costs and providing access to production and market. This research investigates the diminishing return of infrastructure investment and also the rate of return of two types of infrastructure investment strategies on trade. An augmented gravity model is used with econometric analysis methods in this study. The results have shown that as roadway and airport densities increase, the marginal returns on trade decrease. Empirical evidence from the United States and China with all their trading partners from the past twenty years has also suggested existence of diminishing return of infrastructure investment on roadways and airports. Infrastructure investment strategy that focuses on increasing roadway and airport density experiences smaller diminishing return on trade. In contrast, seaport investment that focuses on port quality and efficiency generates higher return on trade. A trade benefiting infrastructure investment strategy that best utilizes financial resources must balance between quality and quantity based on a country's current level of infrastructure asset.

Evolución del derecho internacional de inversiones: hacia un régimen global estable (Tema Central)

En los últimos años, los flujos de inversión han crecido a nivel mundial y junto con estos se ha producido un desarrollo normativo que comprende la creación de más de 3.000 tratados bilaterales y regionales. Estos tratados comparten similares estándares sustantivos de trato, así como procedimientos similares de solución de controversias. Por esta razón, se ha conceptualizado a este conjunto de normas en el derecho internacional como un régimen emergente global de inversiones, el cual está generando constantes tensiones entre estados. La creación de este régimen emergente no es espontánea, ya que proviene de un complejo proceso de evolución que se desarrolla a través de la historia del derecho internacional. El presente trabajo analiza la historia y evolución del Derecho Internacional de Inversiones, e identifica los puntos clave que deben ser considerados en la construcción de una regulación integral de la inversión extranjera.

Are returns on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), FDI determinants?

Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) acquired an important role in the development process of the global economy. FDI inward stock was equivalent to an average of 32% of GDP for OECD countries in 2013. However, FDI affects a country’s Balance of Payments (BoP) in two ways: FDI flows are recorded in the BoP financial account while returns on FDI affect the BoP current account. Therefore, part of the positive contribution of inward FDI to a country on its financial account could be potentially offset by a negative contribution of FDI returns on the current account. The intent of this work is to complement the research on FDI determinants by introducing FDI returns as a variable in a gravity model where bilateral FDI outflows are the dependent variable. Moreover, using outward FDI flows as the dependent variable, the work allows looking at the behavior of Multinational Corporations (MNC) investing abroad. The results show that MNCs repatriate returns generating from the investments they make abroad. This is particularly true when high-income countries are involved: MNCs from high-income countries repatriate returns to their home countries from FDI made anywhere, while MNCs from middle-income countries repatriate returns from FDI in high-income countries. Repatriated returns are a relevant variable determining the value of FDI that a country makes in another country. The information on FDI returns is starting to become available to the public. This allows MNCs to sharpen their investment location decision models and national IPAs to better assess the two-fold BoP effects of promoting FDI.

Opportunities for trade and investment between Latin America and Asia-Pacific: the link with APEC

Includes bibliography

Integración regional e integración con Estados Unidos. El rumbo de las exportaciones centroamericanas y de República Dominicana

Incluye Bibliografía

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

Bilateral treaty developments in Latin America, 1953-1955.

Continuation of Bilateral treaty developments in Latin America, 1938-1948, by the Division of Legal Affairs, and Bilateral treaty developments in Latin America, 1942-1952, by the Division of Law and Treaties.

Modelling foreign direct investment in China

This thesis consists of three empirical and one theoretical studies. While China has received an increasing amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) and become the second largest host country for FDI in recent years, the absence of comprehensive studies on FDI inflows into this country drives this research. In the first study, an econometric model is developed to analyse the economic, political, cultural and geographic determinants of both pledged and realised FDI in China. The results of this study suggest that China's relatively cheaper labour force, high degree of international integration with the outside world (represented by its exports and imports) and bilateral exchange rates are the important economic determinants of both pledged FDI and realised FDI in China. The second study analyses the regional distribution of both pledged and realised FDI within China. The econometric properties of the panel data set are examined using a standardised 't-bar' test. The empirical results indicate that provinces with higher level of international trade, lower wage rates, more R&D manpower, more preferential policies and closer ethnic links with overseas Chinese attract relatively more FDI. The third study constructs a dynamic equilibrium model to study the interactions among FDI, knowledge spillovers and long run economic growth in a developing country. The ideas of endogenous product cycles and trade-related international knowledge spillovers are modified and extended to FDI. The major conclusion is that, in the presence of FDI, economic growth is determined by the stock of human capital, the subjective discount rate and knowledge gap, while unskilled labour can not sustain growth. In the fourth study, the role of FDI in the growth process of the Chinese economy is investigated by using a panel of data for 27 provinces across China between 1986 and 1995. In addition to FDI, domestic R&D expenditure, international trade and human capital are added to the standard convergence regressions to control for different structural characteristics in each province. The empirical results support endogenous innovation growth theory in which regional per capita income can converge given technological diffusion, transfer and imitation.

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Foreign Direct Investment and Political Uncertainty

Recent developments in the general equilibrium theory of multinationals emphasize the importance of multilateral considerations. Yet, existing explanations and corresponding estimations of FDI patterns have largely limited political and institutional investment impediments to a bilateral framework. Through the application of spatial econometric techniques, I demonstrate that the presence of both domestic and regional political uncertainty generate real options effects that lead to the delay or redirection of foreign direct investment. The magnitude and direction of these effects is conditional upon the host country regime type and the predominant multinational integration strategies in the region. Comparing these results with FDI of U.S. origin, I find evidence for divergent investment behavior by U.S. multinationals during regime changes in partner countries. Additionally, I find no evidence that multinationals from developing countries are more likely to complete cross-border deals in environments characterized by greater political risk or political uncertainty.

Normative conflicts in international investment law: the case of environmental law

This dissertation investigates the relationship between investment and environmental obligations from the perspective of international investment law. In order to do so, the dissertation will consider how these obligations might enter into conflicts and what tools are available to investment tribunals to solve these normative conflicts. The dissertation analyses in order interpretative techniques, conflict resolution tools available in general international law, as expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and finally express clauses in international investment agreements. The dissertation includes the review of some relevant case law arising from investment agreements in investment treaty tribunals, to discover how in practice these conflict resolution tools are applied and to assess their effectiveness. This dissertation places itself squarely within the debate between the unity and the fragmentation of international law; therefore it tackles the issue of normative conflicts resolution in a dispute settlement environment with the view of gauging their value in maintaining the unity of international law and defuse the risk of fragmentation. The dissertation can only conclude that much work remains to be done, including by providing a more comprehensive taxonomy of possible interventions, both on the legal and political sphere.