The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Unification of multi-species vertebrate anatomy ontologies for comparative biology in Uberon.

BACKGROUND: Elucidating disease and developmental dysfunction requires understanding variation in phenotype. Single-species model organism anatomy ontologies (ssAOs) have been established to represent this variation. Multi-species anatomy ontologies (msAOs; vertebrate skeletal, vertebrate homologous, teleost, amphibian AOs) have been developed to represent 'natural' phenotypic variation across species. Our aim has been to integrate ssAOs and msAOs for various purposes, including establishing links between phenotypic variation and candidate genes. RESULTS: Previously, msAOs contained a mixture of unique and overlapping content. This hampered integration and coordination due to the need to maintain cross-references or inter-ontology equivalence axioms to the ssAOs, or to perform large-scale obsolescence and modular import. Here we present the unification of anatomy ontologies into Uberon, a single ontology resource that enables interoperability among disparate data and research groups. As a consequence, independent development of TAO, VSAO, AAO, and vHOG has been discontinued. CONCLUSIONS: The newly broadened Uberon ontology is a unified cross-taxon resource for metazoans (animals) that has been substantially expanded to include a broad diversity of vertebrate anatomical structures, permitting reasoning across anatomical variation in extinct and extant taxa. Uberon is a core resource that supports single- and cross-species queries for candidate genes using annotations for phenotypes from the systematics, biodiversity, medical, and model organism communities, while also providing entities for logical definitions in the Cell and Gene Ontologies. THE ONTOLOGY RELEASE FILES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ONTOLOGY MERGE DESCRIBED IN THIS MANUSCRIPT ARE AVAILABLE AT: http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/uberon/releases/2013-02-21/ CURRENT ONTOLOGY RELEASE FILES ARE AVAILABLE ALWAYS AVAILABLE AT: http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/uberon/releases/

A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources

In this paper we consider a sequential allocation problem with n individuals. The first individual can consume any amount of some endowment leaving the remaining for the second individual, and so on. Motivated by the limitations associated with the cooperative or non-cooperative solutions we propose a new approach. We establish some axioms that should be satisfied, representativeness, impartiality, etc. The result is a unique asymptotic allocation rule. It is shown for n = 2; 3; 4; and a claim is made for general n. We show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties. Key words: Sequential allocation rule, River sharing problem, Cooperative and non-cooperative games, Dictator and ultimatum games. JEL classification: C79, D63, D74.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

A Write-Based Solver for SAT Modulo the Theory of Arrays

The extensional theory of arrays is one of the most important ones for applications of SAT Modulo Theories (SMT) to hardware and software verification. Here we present a new T-solver for arrays in the context of the DPLL(T) approach to SMT. The main characteristics of our solver are: (i) no translation of writes into reads is needed, (ii) there is no axiom instantiation, and (iii) the T-solver interacts with the Boolean engine by asking to split on equality literals between indices. As far as we know, this is the first accurate description of an array solver integrated in a state-of-the-art SMT solver and, unlike most state-of-the-art solvers, it is not based on a lazy instantiation of the array axioms. Moreover, it is very competitive in practice, specially on problems that require heavy reasoning on array literals

HILBERT BETWEEN THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL SIDE OF MATHEMATICS

Abstract: In this article we analyze the key concept of Hilbert's axiomatic method, namely that of axiom. We will find two different concepts: the first one from the period of Hilbert's foundation of geometry and the second one at the time of the development of his proof theory. Both conceptions are linked to two different notions of intuition and show how Hilbert's ideas are far from a purely formalist conception of mathematics. The principal thesis of this article is that one of the main problems that Hilbert encountered in his foundational studies consisted in securing a link between formalization and intuition. We will also analyze a related problem, that we will call "Frege's Problem", form the time of the foundation of geometry and investigate the role of the Axiom of Completeness in its solution.

A volta de Ulisses: anotações sobre a lógica de planos e compromissos

This paper criticizes the conventional theory of choice for being grounded on a minimal set of rationality axioms. We claim that this theory does not take due account of the fact that agents are driven by motives other than the pursuit of material self-interest. Our departure point is logic of commitments and planned action, which helps us to identify some puzzles in the conventional theory of choice. As a way out, we discuss the Kantian perspective and the notions of metapreference and metaranking. We then build a model of choice which points to the possibility of a systematic treatment of higher order preferences and incommensurable objectives.

Can future systemic financial risks be quantified?: ergodic vs nonergodic stochastic processes

Different axioms underlie efficient market theory and Keynes's liquidity preference theory. Efficient market theory assumes the ergodic axiom. Consequently, today's decision makers can calculate with actuarial precision the future value of all possible outcomes resulting from today's decisions. Since in an efficient market world decision makers "know" their intertemporal budget constraints, decision makers never default on a loan, i.e., systemic defaults, insolvencies, and bankruptcies are impossible. Keynes liquidity preference theory rejects the ergodic axiom. The future is ontologically uncertain. Accordingly systemic defaults and insolvencies can occur but can never be predicted in advance.

Incerteza e não ergodicidade: crítica aos neoclássicos

The starting point of this essay is to show that, in our view, the problem of the traditional economics is not in the deductive method nor the mathematical methods used, but to attribute to economic agents "power" on the future and prescribe the existence of ergodic stochastic processes in their economic analyzes. Thus, building a theory on the ground whose bases are not able to sustain a proper understanding of the world, mainstream economics has difficulties in using the modeling for establishing deductions and conclusions that help understanding the system. Thus, the logical-mathematical rigor in economic models and deduction can be used with appropriate axioms, which is not the case of mainstream economics. Our hypothesis is that the inability of the mainstream in predicting economic crisis is due to the non-recognition of some principles that best describe the dynamics of financialized contemporary capitalism, as the principles of non-ergodicity and Keynesian uncertainty.

A System for Models of First Order Theories

If you want to know whether a property is true or not in a specific algebraic structure,you need to test that property on the given structure. This can be done by hand, which can be cumbersome and erroneous. In addition, the time consumed in testing depends on the size of the structure where the property is applied. We present an implementation of a system for finding counterexamples and testing properties of models of first-order theories. This system is supposed to provide a convenient and paperless environment for researchers and students investigating or studying such models and algebraic structures in particular. To implement a first-order theory in the system, a suitable first-order language.( and some axioms are required. The components of a language are given by a collection of variables, a set of predicate symbols, and a set of operation symbols. Variables and operation symbols are used to build terms. Terms, predicate symbols, and the usual logical connectives are used to build formulas. A first-order theory now consists of a language together with a set of closed formulas, i.e. formulas without free occurrences of variables. The set of formulas is also called the axioms of the theory. The system uses several different formats to allow the user to specify languages, to define axioms and theories and to create models. Besides the obvious operations and tests on these structures, we have introduced the notion of a functor between classes of models in order to generate more co~plex models from given ones automatically. As an example, we will use the system to create several lattices structures starting from a model of the theory of pre-orders.

The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics

This paper examines several families of population principles in the light of a set of axioms. In addition to the critical-level utilitarian, number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian and number-dampened families and their generalized counterparts, we consider the restricted number-dampened family (suggested by Hurka) and introduce two new families : the restricted critical-level and restricted number-dependent critical-level families. Subsets of the restricted families have nonnegative critical levels and avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions but fail to satisfy an important independence condition. We defend the critical-level principles with positive critical levels.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.