The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency

During the recent period of economic crisis, many countries have introduced scrappage schemes to boost the sale and production of vehicles, particularly of vehicles designed to pollute less. In this paper, we analyze the impact of a particular scheme in Spain (Plan2000E) on vehicle prices and sales figures as well as on the reduction of polluting emissions from vehicles on the road. We considered the introduction of this scheme an exogenous policy change and because we could distinguish a control group (non-subsidized vehicles) and a treatment group (subsidized vehicles), before and after the introduction of the Plan, we were able to carry out our analysis as a quasi-natural experiment. Our study reveals that manufacturers increased vehicle prices by the same amount they were granted through the Plan (1,000 €). In terms of sales, econometric estimations revealed an increase of almost 5% as a result of the implementation of the Plan. With regard to environmental efficiency, we compared the costs (inverted quantity of money) and the benefits of the program (reductions in polluting emissions and additional fiscal revenues) and found that the Plan would only be beneficial if it boosted demand by at least 30%.

Physicochemical aspects and efficiency of albuterol nebulization: comparison of three aerosol types in an in vitro pediatric model.

BACKGROUND: Advances in nebulizer design have produced both ultrasonic nebulizers and devices based on a vibrating mesh (vibrating mesh nebulizers), which are expected to enhance the efficiency of aerosol drug therapy. The aim of this study was to compare 4 different nebulizers, of 3 different types, in an in vitro model using albuterol delivery and physical characteristics as benchmarks. METHODS: The following nebulizers were tested: Sidestream Disposable jet nebulizer, Multisonic Infra Control ultrasonic nebulizer, and the Aerogen Pro and Aerogen Solo vibrating mesh nebulizers. Aerosol duration, temperature, and drug solution osmolality were measured during nebulization. Albuterol delivery was measured by a high-performance liquid chromatography system with fluorometric detection. The droplet size distribution was analyzed with a laser granulometer. RESULTS: The ultrasonic nebulizer was the fastest device based on the duration of nebulization; the jet nebulizer was the slowest. Solution temperature decreased during nebulization when the jet nebulizer and vibrating mesh nebulizers were used, but it increased with the ultrasonic nebulizer. Osmolality was stable during nebulization with the vibrating mesh nebulizers, but increased with the jet nebulizer and ultrasonic nebulizer, indicating solvent evaporation. Albuterol delivery was 1.6 and 2.3 times higher with the ultrasonic nebulizer and vibrating mesh nebulizers devices, respectively, than with the jet nebulizer. Particle size was significantly higher with the ultrasonic nebulizer. CONCLUSIONS: The in vitro model was effective for comparing nebulizer types, demonstrating important differences between nebulizer types. The new devices, both the ultrasonic nebulizers and vibrating mesh nebulizers, delivered more aerosolized drug than traditional jet nebulizers.

Ecological correlations between food availability and mortality: more than you can eat?

Introduction: There is little information regarding the impact of diet on disease incidence and mortality in Switzerland. Objectives: We aimed at assessing the associations between food availability and disease using ecological correlations. Methods: Time-trend ecologic study for period 1970 to 2009. Food availability was measured through the FAO food balance sheets. Standardized mortality rates (SMRs) were obtained from the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. Cancer incidence data was obtained from the WHO Health for all database and the Vaud cancer registry. Association between food availability and mortality/incidence was assessed at lags 0, 5, 10 and 15 years by Spearman correlation. Results: Alcoholic beverages and fruit availability were positively associated with SMRs from all types of cardiovascular disease, while fish availability was negatively associated. Animal products, meat and animal fats were positively associated with SMR from ischemic heart disease only. For cancers, opposite results were found whether the association used SMRs or incidence rates. For all cancers, alcoholic beverages and fruits were positively associated with SMRs but negatively associated with incidence rates. Similar findings were obtained for all other foods, with the exception of vegetables, which were weakly and negatively associated with SMRs and incidence rates. Finally, a 15 years lag time reversed the association for animal and vegetal products, weakened the association for alcohol and fruits and strengthened the association for fish. Conclusion: Ecologic associations between food availability and disease vary considerably whether mortality or incidence rates are used. Great care should be taken when interpreting the results.

Regional child care availability and fertility decisions in Spain

In this paper I explore two hypotheses: (1) Formal child care availability for children under three has a positive effect across contexts, according to the degree of adaptation of social institutions to changes in gender roles. Event history models with regional fixed effects are applied to data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-2001). The results show a significant and positive effect of regional day care availability on both, first and higher order births, while results are consistent with the second hypothesis only for second or higher order births.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Contagion and efficiency in gross and net interbank payment systems

The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.