Real-Time Simulation of Real-Time Pricing Demand Response to Meet Wind Variations

Recent changes of paradigm in power systems opened the opportunity to the active participation of new players. The small and medium players gain new opportunities while participating in demand response programs. This paper explores the optimal resources scheduling in two distinct levels. First, the network operator facing large wind power variations makes use of real time pricing to induce consumers to meet wind power variations. Then, at the consumer level, each load is managed according to the consumer preferences. The two-level resources schedule has been implemented in a real-time simulation platform, which uses hardware for consumer’ loads control. The illustrative example includes a situation of large lack of wind power and focuses on a consumer with 18 loads.

An intertemporal pricing model for CO2 allowances: The impact of the clean development mechanism

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Pricing of exchange traded funds

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Pricing strategies of the supermarket sector

The food retail industry is a very competitive market. Supermarkets use a combination of price, quality of products and service to lure consumers and increase their profit. This work project draws upon both empirical and theoretical literatures to understand the different pricing strategies that the supermarket sector uses. Everyday Low Price, Promotional, Zone Pricing and Loyalty Programs are the most common pricing strategies in this industry. By using data from the Portuguese supermarket leader – Pingo Doce - , this work project conclude that Pingo Doce uses a combination of Loyalty Program and Promotion to attain the desired outcomes

On the pricing of bivariate options in the presence of a discrete dividend payment

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master's Double Degree in Finance from the NOVA School of Business and Economics / Masters Degree in Economics from Insper

The system of Transfer Pricing in a multinational

Transfer prices are used by the majority of firms worldwide when intermediate products or services are transferred within the same organization. These prices are reported as revenue for the selling entity (division, unit, department etc.) and as cost for the buying entity. Nevertheless, transfer prices lead to many disputes among managers in the same organization as transfer prices influence the performance of their entities. In cross-border transactions, transfer prices can be used by firms to reduce corporate taxes and thus, increase total firm profits. In order to fight against this firms’ practice, tax authorities require firms to establish a transfer pricing system in accordance with OECD1 Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

The Determinants of pricing in pharmaceuticals: are U.S. prices really higher than those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to purs

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

Multinational Firms’ Heterogeneity in Tax Responsiveness: the Role of Transfer Pricing

In this paper we show that the ability of multinational firms to manipulate transfer prices affects the tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI). We offer a model of international capital allocation where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to manipulate transfer prices. Perhaps paradoxically, we show that the ability to shift profits can make parent companies' investment more sensitive to host-country tax rates, as long as investors expect fisscal authorities to use price and profit detection methods. We then offer a comprehensive empirical study to test our predictions in the case of Japanese FDI. We exploit the finding that the unobservable ability to manipulate transfer prices is correlated with whole ownership of a±liates and R&D expenditure. Based on country, parent firm and sector characteristics, we estimate an investment equation on a sample of 3614 Japanese affiliates in 49 emerging countries. We obtain a greater semi-elasticity of investment to the statutory tax rate in a±liates that are wholly-owned and that have R&D intensive parents. We interpret these results as indirect evidence that abusive transfer pricing is one of the determinants of FDI activity.

Optimal Martingales and American Option Pricing

Pricing American options is an interesting research topic since there is no analytical solution to value these derivatives. Different numerical methods have been proposed in the literature with some, if not all, either limited to a specific payoff or not applicable to multidimensional cases. Applications of Monte Carlo methods to price American options is a relatively new area that started with Longstaff and Schwartz (2001). Since then, few variations of that methodology have been proposed. The general conclusion is that Monte Carlo estimators tend to underestimate the true option price. The present paper follows Glasserman and Yu (2004b) and proposes a novel Monte Carlo approach, based on designing "optimal martingales" to determine stopping times. We show that our martingale approach can also be used to compute the dual as described in Rogers (2002).