The financial storms in Vietnam's transition economy: a reasoning on the 1991-2008 period

This study focuses on those substantial changes that characterize the shift of Vietnam’s macroeconomic structures and evolution of micro-structural interaction over an important period of 1991-2008. The results show that these events are completely distinct in terms of (i) Economic nature; (ii) Scale and depth of changes; (iii) Start and end results; and, (iv) Requirement for macroeconomic decisions. The study rejected a suspicion of similarity between the contagion of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and economic chaos in the first half of 2008 (starting from late 2007). The depth, economic settings of, and interconnection between macro choices and micro decisions have all grown up significantly, partly due to a much deeper level of integration of Vietnam into the world’s economy. On the one hand, this phenomenon gives rise to efficiency of macro level policies because the consideration of micro-structural factors within the framework has definitely become increasingly critical. On the other and, this is a unique opportunity for the macroeconomic mechanism of Vietnam to improve vastly, given the context in which the national economy entered an everchanging period under pressures of globalization and re-integration. The authors hope to also open up paths for further empirical verifications and to stress on the fact that macro policies will have, from now on, to be decided in line with changing micro-settings, which specify a market economy and decide the degree of success of any macroeconomic choices.

The Vietnam's Transition Economy and Its Fledgling Financial Markets: 1986-2003

In this paper, we analyze the context of Vietnam’s economic standings in the reform period. The first section embarks on most remarkable factors, which promote the development of financial markets are: (i) Doi Moi policies in 1986 unleash ‘productive powers’. Real GDP growth, and key economic indicators improve. The economy truly departs from the old-style command economy; (ii) FDI component is present in the economy as sine qua non; a crucial growth engine, forming part of the financial markets, planting the ‘seeds’ for its growth; and (iii) the private economy is both the result and cause of the reform. Its growth is steady. Today, it represents a powerhouse, and helps form part of the genuine financial economy. A few noteworthy points found in the next section are: (i) No evidence of financial markets existence was found before Doi Moi. The reform has generated a bulk of private-sector financial companies. New developments have roots in the 1992-amended constitution (x3.2); (ii) The need to reform the financial started with the domino collapse of credit cooperatives in early 1990s. More stress is caused by the ‘blow’ of banking deficiency in late 1990s; and (iii) Laws on SBV and credit institutions, and the launch of the stock market are bold steps. Besides, the Asian financial turmoil forces the economy to reaffirm its reform agenda. Our findings also indicate, through empirical evidences, that economic conditions have stabilized throughout the reform, thanks to the contributions of the FDI and private economic sector. Private investment flows continue to be an eminent factor that drives the economy growth.

Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: The Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, Müller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s

How can interlocking directorates cause financial instability for universal banks? A detailed history of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeninging in the 1920s answers this question in a case study. This large commercial bank adopted a new German-style universal banking business model from the early 1910s, sharing directors with the firms it financed as a means of controlling its interests. Then, in 1924, it required assistance from the Dutch state in order to survive a bank run brought on by public concerns over its close ties with Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate that suffered badly in the economic downturn of the early 1920s. Using a new narrative history combined with an interpretive model, this article shows how the interlocking directorates between the bank and this major client, and in particular the direction of influence of these interlocks, resulted in a conflict of interest that could not be easily overcome.

Crises financeiras e modelos de contágio

O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir os chamados modelos de “contágio mimético” como uma explicação das crises financeiras e mostrar que tais situações não nascem necessariamente de comportamentos irracionais dos agentes econômicos.

Crises financeira nos anos 1990 e poupança externa

Ao contrário do que afirma a análise econômica convencional, a causa das crises financeiras dos anos 1990 no México, Ásia, Brasil e Argentina não foi principalmente fiscal, mas sim a decisão dos governos de crescerem com poupança externa, isto é, com déficits em conta corrente. Essas foram crises de balanço de pagamento geradas pela sobreapreciação da moeda local e pelo alto nível de dívida externa e/ou rápido crescimento de déficit de conta corrente. Assim, repentinamente os credores externos se convenceram de que o país não enfrenta apenas um problema de liquidez, mas de solvência, e para de rolar a dívida. Um teste econométrico demonstra essas afirmações

Crises financeiras e modelos de contágio

O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir os chamados modelos de "contágio mimético" como uma explicação das crises financeiras e mostrar que tais situações não nascem necessariamente de comportamentos irracionais dos agentes econômicos.

Do capital controls boost resilence to crises?

Os controles de capitais estão novamente em voga em razão dos países emergentes reintroduzirem essas medidas nos últimos anos face a abundante entrada de capital internacional. As autoridades argumentam que tais medidas protegem as economias no caso de uma “parada abrupta” desses fluxos. Será demonstrado que os controles de capitais parecem fazer com que as economias emergentes (EMEs) fiquem mais resistentes diante de uma crise financeira (por exemplo, uma queda na atividade econômica seguida de uma crise é menor quando o controle é maior). No entanto, os controles de capitais parecem deixar as economias emergentes (EMEs) também mais propícias a uma crise. Deste modo, as autoridades devem ser cautelosas na avaliação quanto aos riscos e benefícios relativos a aplicação das medidas dos controles de capitais.

Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

O progama empregador de última instância: Sua relevância em tempos de crises financeiras e sua aplicabilidade ao Brasil.

This dissertation aims to continue the work developed previously concerning the properties of the employer of last resort program (ELR) that would be able to promote a complete elimination of the involuntary unemployment from the economy, so much of the unemployment generated by structural problems as for problems of the conjuncture, as the present world financial crisis. Besides, it intends to deepen the study concerning the applicability of that program to the Brazilian economy, estimating their potential target population in the country and the cost with the workers' remuneration. It was presented the ELR theoretical-conceptual structure and a debate concerning their economic viability; the program properties that turn it more efficient than the onetary and fiscal policies (PMFs) in the fight against involuntary unemployment in times of financial crises; a study on its applicability to the Brazilian socioeconomic specificities and an estimate of their potential target population and of the annual wage cost in the country, as a whole, and in the specific case of the Northeast region and of the state of Rio Grande do Norte.

The globalization of financial volatility: challenges for emerging economies

Includes bibliography

Korea and Taiwan in the financial crisis

Includes bibliography