209 resultados para Altruism
Resumo:
This paper draws on James Ferguson’s concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of illusio to explore the nature of the international development cooperation programmes financed by the Czech government. It argues that its character as an ‘anti-politics machine’ turns development into a highly technical issue and dismisses essential political questions of global equity and policy coherence from the public debate. Moreover, the actors in the field of development cooperation are held in an illusio: they are required to appear as altruistic, which obscures their particular interests. This instrumentalization of development aid contributes to further isolation of the Czech development constituency and raises fundamental questions for the democratic legitimacy of development cooperation.
Resumo:
Altruism and selfishness are 30–50% heritable in man in both Western and non-Western populations. This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation. In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and satisfies the condition known as Hamilton's rule. This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the ratio of the benefit of receiving help to the cost of giving it exceeds a value that depends on the relatedness of the individuals involved. Standard analyses assume that the benefit provided by each individual is the same but it is plausible in some cases that as more individuals contribute, help is subject to diminishing returns. We analyse this situation using a single-locus two-allele model of selection in a diploid population with the altruistic allele dominant to the selfish allele. The analysis requires calculation of the relationship between the fitnesses of the genotypes and the frequencies of the genes. The fitnesses vary not only with the genotype of the individual but also with the distribution of phenotypes amongst the sibs of the individual and this depends on the genotypes of his parents. These calculations are not possible by direct fitness or ESS methods but are possible using population genetics. Our analysis shows that diminishing returns change the operation of natural selection and the outcome can now be a stable equilibrium between altruistic and selfish alleles rather than the elimination of one allele or the other. We thus provide a plausible genetic model of kin selection that leads to the stable coexistence in the same population of both altruistic and selfish individuals. This may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.
Resumo:
Where there is genetically based variation in selfishness and altruism, as in man, altruists with an innate ability to recognise and thereby only help their altruistic relatives may evolve. Here we use diploid population genetic models to chart the evolution of genetically-based discrimination in populations initially in stable equilibrium between altruism and selfishness. The initial stable equilibria occur because help is assumed subject to diminishing returns. Similar results were obtained whether we used a model with two independently inherited loci, one controlling altruism the other discrimination, or a one locus model with three alleles. The latter is the opposite extreme to the first model, and can be thought of as involving complete linkage between two loci on the same chromosome. The introduction of discrimination reduced the benefits obtained by selfish individuals, more so as the number of discriminators increased, and selfishness was eventually eliminated in some cases. In others selfishness persisted and the evolutionary outcome was a stable equilibrium involving selfish individuals and both discriminating and non-discriminating altruists. Heritable variation in selfishness, altruism and discrimination is predicted to be particularly evident among full sibs. The suggested coexistence of these three genetic dispositions could explain widespread interest within human social groups as to who will and who will not help others. These predictions merit experimental and observational investigation by primatologists, anthropologists and psychologists. Keywords: Population genetics, Diploid, Heritability, Prosocial, Behaviour genetics
Resumo:
The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.
Resumo:
Based on the self-licensing literature and goal theory, we expected and found that completed (im)moral actions lead to markedly different food choices (Studies 1 & 2) than intended (im)moral actions (Study 2). In Study 1, people more often chose healthy over unhealthy food options when they recalled a completed egoistic action than when they recalled a completed altruistic action. Study 2 confirmed this finding and furthermore showed that the self-licensing effect in food choices is moderated by the action stage (completed vs. intended) of the moral or immoral action. This article extends the existing self-licensing literature and opens up new perspectives for changing consumers’ food consumption behavior.
Resumo:
Parochial altruism - a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members and mistrust or hostility towards outgroup members--is a pervasive feature in human society and strongly shapes the enforcement of social norms. Since the uniqueness of human society critically depends on the enforcement of norms, the understanding of the neural circuitry of the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement is key, but unexplored. To fill this gap, we measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects had the opportunity to punish ingroup members and outgroup members for violating social norms. Findings revealed that subjects' strong punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in a functionally connected network involved in sanction-related decisions (right orbitofrontal gyrus, right lateral prefrontal cortex, right dorsal caudatus). Moreover, the stronger the connectivity in this network, the more outgroup members are punished. In contrast, the much weaker punishment of ingroup members who committed the very same norm violation is associated with increased activity and connectivity in the mentalizing-network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junction), as if subjects tried to understand or justify ingroup members' behavior. Finally, connectivity analyses between the two networks suggest that the mentalizing-network modulates punishment by affecting the activity in the right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, notably in the same areas showing enhanced activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting outgroup members.
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This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilibrium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead. When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy correspondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is single valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique, increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to the equilibrium.
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Is it possible to be altruistic in the face of altruism? With a naive definition of altruism, the answer is no. If an altruistic consumer is defined to be one whose preferences over allocations satisfy an appropriate interdependence condition, then the answer is yes. However, altruism in the face of malice is impossible. One of our findings is that if two consumers are mutually altruistic, exactly one of them should adopt selfish preferences over allocations.
Resumo:
For almost a century, events relating to the evolutionary origin of endosperm, a unique embryo-nourishing tissue that is essential to the reproductive process in flowering plants, have remained a mystery. Integration of recent advances in phylogenetic reconstruction, comparative reproductive biology, and genetic theory can be used to elucidate the evolutionary events and forces associated with the establishment of endosperm. Endosperm is shown to be derived from one of two embryos formed during a rudimentary process of "double fertilization" that evolved in the ancestors of angiosperms. Acquisition of embryo-nourishing behavior (with accompanying loss of individual fitness) by this supernumerary fertilization product was dependent upon compensatory gains in the inclusive fitness of related embryos. The result of the loss of individual fitness by one of the two original products of double fertilization was the establishment of endosperm, a highly modified embryo/organism that reproduces cryptically through behavior that enhances the fitness of its associated embryo within a seed. Finally, although triploid endosperm remains a synapomorphy of angiosperms, inclusive fitness analysis demonstrates that the embryo-nourishing properties of endosperm initially evolved in a diploid condition.
Resumo:
Deeply-embedded norms of liberalism and protectionism alongside EU policies focusing on promoting development and regional integration have shaped EU-Mercosur relations. These stand in stark contrast to the policies of the US, the historic hegemon in the region. This paper utilizes historical institutionalism to understand how the liberal tenets of EU competition policy and the protectionism of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have affected EU-Mercosur relations. Particular foci include Spain’s role in spearheading efforts to promote EU-Latin American relations and the way EU competition policies directed against monopolies in Europe spurred increased investment in Latin America, especially the Southern Cone. The latter prompted the EU to forge closer ties with Mercosur, encouraged cooperation and development programs and spurred regional integration and liberal trade regimes in Latin America.
Resumo:
Introduction.--Manners.--Gifts.--Defects of giving.--Mutuality.--Love.--Justice.--Conclusion.